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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC PROGRAMS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
Richard B. Stewart* and Cass R. Sunstein*
By what right may courts seek to remedy deficient administrative performance, and by what methods should they do so? This
question has been answered in fits and starts, in the context of
several existing remedies: rights to contest regulatory impositions,
hearing rights concerning government benefits, implied rights of
action, and most recently, rights to require an agency itself to take
enforcement action. Professors Stewart and Sunstein offer a theory
to explain both the conceptual similarities and the evolutionary
differences among these remedies. They show how the remedies are
linked with particularconceptions of the deepest purposes particular
statutes are meant to advance: security of entitlements, expansion
of production, and advancement of public values. These conceptions, they argue, justify judicial creation of such remedies in the
face of legislative silence. Ordinarily, courts create these remedies
as a matter offederal common law, subject to congressionalpreclusion; occasionally, however, the remedies are compelled by the
Constitution itself. By thoughtful use of their remedial powers,
courts can fill, in the regulatory era, the same role in protecting the
citizenry that they filled when the common law stood nearly alone.
I. INTRODUCTION

What

role should private initiatives play in enforcing reg-

latory programs? Consider this judicial quandary:
Congress has authorized a federal agency to control private
conduct in order to reduce pollution, eliminate sex discrimination, or prevent securities fraud. An individual or class,
claiming to be among the beneficiaries of the regulatory program, comes forward to assert that the agency' has failed to
enforce the applicable statute. To ensure obedience to regulatory norms, the beneficiary sues either the agency, to compel
enforcement, or a private party subject to those norms, to
compel compliance. The governing statute is silent on whether
a federal court may afford relief. How should the court respond to such claims, and what relief should it award?
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. Yale University, B.A., 1961; Oxford
University, M.A., 1963; Harvard University, L.L.B., 1966.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Harvard University, A.B.,
1975; J.D., 1978. The authors would like to thank David P. Currie, Frank H.
Easterbrook, Richard A. Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner, and Steven
Shavell for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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The debate over these questions has centered in recent
years on the creation by federal courts of private rights of
action-suits brought by private litigants against private persons allegedly acting in violation of a statute. At common law
such rights were generally recognized, even when the legislature had provided for enforcement by a public authority.'
This practice was followed by the federal courts in many
decisions. 2 After the Supreme Court enthusiastically endorsed
this form of federal common law in its 1964 decision in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak,3 lower federal courts recognized private
rights of action under regulatory statutes with increasing fre4
quency.
The past few years, however, have seen a sharp reversal.
The Supreme Court has all but repudiated Borak and has
created a strong presumption against judicial recognition of
private rights of action. 5 The Court's restrictive approach has
provoked sharp controversy. Some commentators argue that
it has deprived regulatory beneficiaries of an appropriate and
effective remedy for administrative failure. 6 Others maintain
that Congress alone should decide how regulatory statutes are
I See

infra pp. 1300-01.

See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,
162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from FederalRegulatory
Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).
2

3 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
4 See, e.g., Bratton v. Shiffrin, 635 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. i98o) (Federal Aviation

Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (198i); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579 (9 th Cir.
1978) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d
862 (2d Cir. 1977) (Investment Advisors Act), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973);
McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977) (Davis-Bacon Act),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978); Lodge I858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (National Aeronautics and Space Act).
5 See Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (i98I); Kissinger v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 148-50 (I98O); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (i979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 56o (i979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979). The question whether a statute creates a private right of action is now solely
"one of congressional intent, not . . . whether this Court thinks that it can improve
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross, 442 U.S.
at 578. Because Congress' failure to provide expressly for private remedies is taken
as an indication that those remedies were not intended, see TAMA, 444 U.S. at 19-24, it is plain that both the hospitable approach adopted in Borak and the more
cautious but still flexible approach espoused in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (i975), have
been substantially repudiated.
6 See, e.g., Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the
Federal Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L.
REv. 841 (1977) (arguing for explicit legislative creation of private rights of action in
order to remedy the situation); Pilla, Negative Implication: The Demise of Private
Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. T (1978) (same).
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to be enforced. 7 Meanwhile, some lower federal courts have
continued to create private remedies, although the controlling
standards are obscure and conflicts among courts are com8
mon.
During the past fifteen years, beneficiaries 9 of regulatory
programs have also sought to protect their interests in another
way - by suing the responsible agencies and challenging their
failure to take action. 10 We shall say that such suits assert a
private right of initiation. Under the traditional model of
administrative law, an agency's decision whether to initiate
proceedings against third parties was generally immune from
judicial review." Indeed, the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion is still taken to bar judicial supervision of many enforcement decisions. 12 In the past twenty years, however, federal
courts have frequently required agencies to implement and
enforce regulatory statutes, or at least to explain their failure
to do so.' 3
7 See, e.g., Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section ro(b) of the Securities Act
of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 8o (i98I).
8 Conflicts have appeared, for example, in the interpretation of the Commodities
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-19 (1976). Compare Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. i98o) (private right of action available under the Act), and Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. i98o) (plaintiffs not
required to exhaust administrative reparations procedures before bringing a private
action under the Act), with Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 198o)
(no implied right of action under the Act as revised in 1974). Conflicts have also
surfaced in the interpretation of § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 793 (1976). Compare California Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp.
125 (C.D. Cal. i98o) (finding a private right of action under § 503), and Clarke v.
FELEC Servs., 489 F. Supp. 165 (D. Alaska I98O) (same), with Davis v. United Air
Lines, 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 198i) (finding no private right of action under § 503),
and Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. i98o) (same).
9 The term "beneficiary" is used as shorthand for "purported beneficiary" throughout this Article.
10See infra pp. 1205-o6.
1 This result was alternately based on the notions that such decisions were not
"ripe" for review, offended no legally cognizable right on the part of a statutory
beneficiary, or represented an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See,
e.g., FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929) (no review of FTC decision not to issue
complaint); United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966)
(NLRB refusal to institute unfair labor practice complaint is a matter of unreviewable
discretion), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
12 See Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444 (1979) (no
right of initiation against ICC); Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 6o6 F.2d
1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dictum) (suggesting that decisions whether to enforce are
unreviewable if formal proceedings have not begun); Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1975) (NLRB decision not to issue unfair labor practice complaint); Pendleton
v. Trans Union Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (FTC decision to initiate
proceedings).
13E.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 56o (I975) (reviewing decision of Secretary
of Labor not to file suit to invalidate union election); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 1981-1982
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This Article is primarily concerned with determining
whether and in what circumstances the creation of private
rights of action and initiation is a legitimate form of judicial
lawmaking. We believe, however, that these two remedies
must be examined in relation to two other remedies for faulty
administrative performance. The first we call the "right of
defense" - the right of those regulated to obtain judicial
review of allegedly unauthorized government controls. The
second we call the "new-property hearing right" - the due
process right to an administrative hearing concerning an individual's claimed entitlement to assistance payments, job tenure, or other advantageous opportunities furnished by the government.
These four remedies have generally been considered by
courts and commentators to be independent, and Part II of
this Article summarizes their divergent development. But the
remedies have important similarities. Each is a judicially created corrective for defective administrative performance. And
in our system of separated powers, each raises the same basic
question of the ability and authority of courts to engraft private
correctives onto a statutory system of public administration.

807 (D.C. Cir. I98I) (reviewing FCC denial of petition to institute rulemaking pro-

ceedings); Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers, Local Union No. 419 v. Brown,
656 F.2d 564 (ioth Cir. ig8i) (holding that federal officials may be required to enforce
Davis-Bacon Act); Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 6o6 F.2d 1031 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (reviewing SEC refusal to promulgate rules requiring disclosure of environmental and employment policies); Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 52o F.2d ii (3d Cir. 1975) (ordering HUD to disseminate flood insurance information); REA Express, Inc. v. CAB, 507 F.2d 42 (2d Cir, 1974) (reviewing CAB
decision not to prohibit use of an allegedly confusing trade name); Davis v. Romney,
49o F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1974) (requiring FHA to make reasonable efforts to ascertain
whether homes with insured mortgages meet municipal housing code standards);
Adams v. Richardson, 48o F.2d iI59 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (requiring
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services)
to commence enforcement proceedings against certain segregated school districts);
Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9 th Cir. 1971) (requiring Secretary of the
Interior to adopt rules governing traders doing business on Indian reservations);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(requiring Secretary of Agriculture to commence proceedings to cancel registration of
DDT by issuing cancellation notices); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (requiring SEC to specify reasons for decision not to require
inclusion of shareholder proposals in management's proxy materials), vacated as moot,
404 U.S. 403 (1972); NAACP v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. iio9 (D.D.C. 1976) (reviewing
decision by Attorney General not to conduct extensive investigation of a crime);
Guerrero v. Garza, 418 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (holding that the Department
of Labor may be required to monitor activities of farm labor contractors employing
migrant workers); see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1752-56 (1975).
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1198 1981-1982

1982]

PRIVATE RIGHTS

1199

A. The Formalist Thesis and Its Flaws
The recognition by courts of private rights of action and
initiation has often been regarded as a form of federal common
law created pursuant to relevant federal statutes.14 As such,
this practice is subject to two related objections. First, decisions about the implementation of administrative programs
determine the effective content of those programs. By creating
new remedies and enlisting private enforcement initiatives,
courts usurp the power over regulatory policy that statutes
typically confer on agencies. Because agency choices about
enforcement are subject to legislative oversight, this usurpation
also diminishes political control over regulatory policy. Second, Congress often explicitly provides for one or more of the
four remedies. In the absence of constitutional compulsion,
courts invade the legislative domain by creating remedies that
Congress has not provided. 15 And no constitutional basis for
judicial creation of private rights of initiation or action appeared to exist before the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush C0.16

These objections to judicial creation of new remedies more fully elaborated in Part III - can be summarized in
what we call the formalist thesis: federal courts must have
some textual warrant, constitutional or statutory, for adding
new remedies to administrative systems. In this Article, we
seek to rebut the formalist thesis and to defend judicial authority to create remedies for defective administrative performances. Our argument is founded on three major points.
First, the courts' protection, through the common law, of
liberty and property has served an important separation-ofpowers function that is not automatically displaced by the
legislature's creation of administrative agencies. 17 In an administrative era, courts should generally assume, unless the
legislature provides otherwise, that they may continue to serve
14 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.

SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHS-

LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-800 (2d ed.

[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Friendly, In Praise of Erie -

1973)

And of the

New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).

Is Our equation of the four remedies and our ultimate conclusion are complicated
by the fact that regulatory benefits are predominantly collective in character. Judicial
intervention finds its strongest and most conventional justification when protection of
individual interests is required; collective benefits are arguably the appropriate province of the political branches. See infra pp. 1227-28.
16 50 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982). Of course, rights of defense and newproperty hearing rights have sometimes been held to be constitutionally compelled.
17 The federal courts historically served this function by enforcing law made by
both federal and state judges. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 14, at 694-702.
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1199 1981-1982
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that function by protecting private interests through the creation of remedies for deficient agency performance.
Second, the link between electoral representation and administrative decision is too weak to support the formalist thesis; the weakness of this link undermines the claim that judicial
creation of additional remedies would circumvent political controls on administration. Indeed, such remedies may help promote agency fidelity to statutory purposes.
Third, the inherent limitations of textual directives require
that the enterprise of government be based upon shared background understandings about the most general purposes of
government programs. These background understandings, we
maintain, consist of three different conceptions of institutional
purpose: entitlement, production, and public values. The
courts have drawn upon these conceptions in devising the four
remedies for defective agency performance; the conceptions
help determine whether a text that is silent on the availability
of private remedies should be construed to allow such remedies
or to forbid them.
Under the entitlement conception, the purpose both of the
common law and of administrative regimes is the protection
of basic personal rights.' 8 Administrative agencies are needed
to supplement or supplant common law arrangements that no
longer protect those rights adequately. If administrative regulation then fails to protect personal rights, courts may intervene anew to create appropriate remedies for rightholders.
The production conception views regulatory agencies as
instruments for maximizing the output of goods and services. 19
Under this view, administrative regulation may be necessary
to correct market failures that the private law system cannot
remedy. Regulatory agencies, however, are subject to various
forms of "government failure" that invite judicial correctives.
Under the public values conception, regulation is a process
20
for the collective determination of social and economic life.
Rules governing private activity both shape and express societal norms. The goal of the public values conception is to
ensure that choices among such norms are made through democratic processes, rather than through a private law system in
which important social decisions are made by judges and private rightholders. This goal, however, is frustrated by the
need for specialized agencies to implement administrative programs adopted by the legislature. The courts have responded
18 See infra pp. 1235-36.
19 See infra pp. 1236-38.
20 See infra pp. 1238-39.

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1200 1981-1982

1982]

PRIVATE RIGHTS

1201

by creating remedies designed to increase public participation
and influence in agency decisionmaking processes.
B. Toward a Theory of Remedies for Administrative
Beneficiaries
The differences in the evolution of the four remedies are
puzzling, because each remedy is a variation on a single theme
judicial relief for defective administrative performance.
Part III attempts to explain these differences through a "forms
of action" thesis. This thesis explains how each of the alternative conceptions of institutional purpose has become linked
with one of the different remedies. These links, which depend
on the identity of the litigants and the administrative function
in controversy, create four distinct remedial structures. In this
sense, each of the four remedies operates as a distinct administrative law "form of action."
Parts IV through VII examine each of the four remedies in
greater detail and seek to illustrate how particular remedies
converge with particular conceptions of institutional purpose.
In these Parts we also address the question of judicial authority
to create such remedies. We conclude that all of the remedies
have a similar two-part structure. In most instances, such
remedies represent a legitimate form of federal common law,
subject to legislative displacement. In a few instances, they
are required by the Constitution.
Although the focus of this Article is on judicial creation of
remedies for defective administrative performance, it also provides two reference points for a broader assessment of administrative conduct and remedial incentives. The first is the
question of the appropriate mix of public and private enforce21
ment - a matter about which no general theory now exists.
In many fields of social control, it is no longer feasible to rely
solely on private litigation to enforce regulatory standards and
deter violations. But experience has shown that there are also
21 For an early discussion, see Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IOWA L. REv. 485 (1940). For discussions with an economic perspective, see K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES (1976); Block,
Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 429
(i98i); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1975). For an early analysis of the problem of optimal sanctions, see Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For comparative works, see Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public

Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, in 2 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: PROMISING INSTITUTIONS 767 (M. Cappelletti & J. Weisner eds. I979); K6tz, Public Interest

Litigation: A Comparative Survey, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE
85 (M. Cappelletti ed. i98i).
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hazards in giving public authorities a monopoly on the enforcement process. 2 2 Although the theoretical literature has often
assumed that private and public enforcement are mutually
exclusive, 23 the best solution may be a mix of the two, along
with private review of public enforcement. Our analysis represents a preliminary effort to develop a general theory addressing these matters. We conclude provisionally that a substantial role for initiation rights and a more modest one for
rights of action are warranted.
The second reference point is the larger issue of incentives
and controls over administrative decisions that are disciplined
neither by the market nor by the electorate. Because their
institutional role lies between traditional private law and traditional public law, administrative agencies present an anomaly in our legal tradition. 24 Judicial creation of remedies for
defective agency performance can be understood as a response
to this anomaly. But the remedies developed by the courts are
surely not the only ones available, nor are they necessarily the
most appropriate.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REMEDIES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
BENEFICIARIES

A. The TraditionalModel of Administrative Law: Private
Rights of Defense
Under the traditional model of administrative law, courts
police the boundary between two realms. The first is the realm
of private law, in which citizens enjoy liberty and property
defined by common law entitlements, and contract with one
another within a juridically defined framework. The second
is the realm of government, in which elected representatives
and other government officials make decisions under procedures laid down by the Constitution and by statutes. 25 The

22 Judicial and legislative development of private enforcement rights is in substan-

tial part a response to this experience.

To take one example, the failure of the

Department of Health and Human Services (formerly HEW) to enforce title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has spawned considerable litigation. See, e.g., Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); see also infra note
71 (discussing Adams).
23 See sources cited supra note 21 (Prof. Jaffe's article is an exception).
24 Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393,
394 (1981).
2s See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1671-76.
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boundary between the two realms is crossed when government
decisions are implemented against private persons through the
coercive exercise of official power. An invasion of common
law rights is legitimate only if it has been authorized by the
elected legislature - the representative mechanism through
which members of society collectively consent to invasions of
that sort. A common law action by a citizen against an officer
becomes the occasion for a judicial determination whether the
legislature has authorized what would otherwise be a common
law wrong.
By creating private rights of defense, the traditional model
of administrative law curbs official bias or arbitrariness in the
enforcement process and thus promotes impartial treatment.
At the same time, the system limits the power of government,
maintains a well-ordered sphere of private liberty, and preserves the system of market exchange. These are the classic
26
functions of the rule of law.

B. Limitations of the TraditionalModel
The traditional model contains no ready basis on which
courts could entertain claims by the beneficiaries of a regulatory scheme that an agency had improperly failed to take
enforcement action against third parties. 27 If enforcement was
declined, the beneficiary was denied an advantageous opportunity to which he had no common law right.
An alternative basis for judicial review - the prerogative
writs, such as mandamus 28 - was deprived of its practical
utility by encrusted restrictions on its availability. 2 9 Tradi26 See F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS (,975); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy, Form and Substance];
Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (I973).
27 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1687.
28 See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 165-

93 (1965) (discussing availability of writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition).
29 See Byse & Fiocca, Section r36z of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory"Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV.
308 (1967). The Supreme Court early held that federal courts do not have general
authority to issue writs of mandamus. M'Intire v. Wood, I' U.S. (7 Cranch) 504
(x813). Moreover, mandamus would not issue to control the exercise of discretion.
Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 2,6-17 (1930); see also Jarrett v. Resor, 426
F.2d 213 (9 th Cir. 1970) (no federal mandamus jurisdiction when complaint does not

allege a failure to perform a "plainly ministerial duty"). In conjunction with the
development of the private right of initiation, some courts have become more receptive
to the mandamus remedy, see Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers, Local Union
No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (1oth Cir. x981); Note, Mandamus in Administrative
Actions: CurrentApproaches, 1973 DUKE L.J. 207, but only a few initiation suits are
brought as mandamus actions.
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tionally, courts also refused to endow many governmental benefits, such as employment, with the protections of due process. 30 Beneath the technical learning of these decisions lies
the conviction that private rights to regulatory protection or
to other benefits would be inconsistent with needed administrative flexibility, and the associated fear that recognition of
such rights would thrust judges into a supervisory role for
31
which they lack ability and authority.
C. The Modern Development of Beneficiary Remedies
During the past century, regulatory controls have proliferated; government has assumed a major role as insurer, redistributor, manager of the economy, and purchaser and provider of goods and services. Individual welfare is shaped less
and less by common law rules, more and more by legislative
and administrative action.
Contemporary government furnishes two types of advantageous opportunities that concern us here. The first consists
of regulatory benefits obtained through government control of
the conduct of regulated firms or persons. These benefits,
exemplified by the cleaner air resulting from pollution controls,
are typically collective in character, in that they cannot be
afforded to one person without simultaneously being provided
to many others. Courts have sought to protect collective interests in regulatory benefits through initiation rights. The
second type of advantageous opportunity consists of individual
benefits such as social assistance payments and individual
32
rights such as the right to be free from racial discrimination.
The private right of action and the new-property hearing right
have increasingly been limited to the protection of such individual benefits and rights.
30 See cases cited in S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 593-603 (1979).

31 See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); Kendall v. United States,
38 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Bailey v. Richardson, r82 F.zd 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); L. JAFFE, supra note 28, at
178-80.

32 Two caveats are in order. First, government also confers collective goods
through the spending power - for example, provision for the national defense,
prevention of recession through fiscal controls, and revenue sharing. The judicial
process has generally not been extended to control these functions. But see Adams
v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam). Second, the
common law and traditional administrative processes confer collective benefits because
enforcement actions against individual violators have a generalized deterrent effect
and bolster security of expectation. Traditional juristic thinking has, however, sharply
distinguished these benefits from the collective goods provided by the regulatory
welfare state.
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Statutes designed to protect reg-

ulatory beneficiaries would be undone if agency implementation and enforcement were inadequate or nonexistent. Responding to this possibility, courts have relaxed traditional
principles of standing, ripeness, and prosecutorial discretion in
order to permit review of agency inaction or of action that is
assertedly inadequate. 33 These developments amount
to the
34
judicial creation of a private right of initiation.
Occasionally, a court reads a statute to require an agency
to take enforcement action whenever a statutory violation is
shown. The duty to enforce is held to override agency claims
of inadequate resources, competing responsibilities, the need
for discretion, and the desirability of further study or negotiation. 35 Such decisions create a strongly responsive right of
initiation.36

More commonly, right of initiation decisions adopt a deferential standard of review. Courts require agencies to show
that they have considered the evidence and claims submitted
by beneficiaries and to explain allegedly unlawful inaction;
nevertheless, courts acknowledge the importance of discretion,
competing interests, and limited budgets. 3 7 Courts using this
approach will not compel enforcement simply because a violation has been shown; the claims of the agency or of third
parties must be demonstrably outweighed by the interests as33 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1723-56.

In some cases, courts have held that

statutory hearing requirements provide a right to formal agency proceedings for
beneficiaries who can make out a prima facie case. See Caswell v. Califano, 583
F.2d 9 (ist Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

In the absence of such requirements, courts have required

agencies to provide relevant data and an explanation for inaction, see Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 56o (975), or assertedly inadequate action, see Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and have also given statutory beneficiaries the

right to intervene in formal administrative proceedings initiated by others, see National
Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also cases cited

supra note 13 (review of agency inaction).
34 Congress has emulated these developments by including private rights of initiin many recent regulatory statutes. See infra note 9o.
Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, i6-i8 (st Cir. 1978); White v. Mathews, 559
852, 858-60 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
For the term "strongly responsive," we are indebted to Eisenberg, Participation,

ation
35
F.2d
36

Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essayfor Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 410 (1978).
37 See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1975); Wright v.
Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 353-56 (7th Cir. 1978). The court may remand for a more
adequate statement of the agency's position, but it rarely rejects a plausible explanation. See generally Note, Judicial Resolution of Systematic Delays in Social Se-

curity Hearings, 79 COLum. L. REv. 959, 961-65 (1979) (discussion of the level of
scrutiny in the social security context).
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serted by the beneficiary. 38 Such cases recognize a weakly
responsive right of initiation.
Whether strongly or weakly responsive, private initiation
rights may raise serious problems for regulatory administration. Successful suits could squander agency resources on isolated, minor controversies, thereby diverting energy from
larger patterns of misconduct.
2. Private Rights of Action. At common law, courts
created private rights of action either by relying upon statutes
to give specific content to the open-textured "reasonable man"
standard of negligence, or by creating an action in damages
for statutory wrongs. 3 9 In creating private rights of action,

federal courts have relied on the notion of federal common
law, bolstered at times by reference to legislative intent14° and
4
the need to effectuate the goals of regulatory statutes.
Before the twentieth century, private right of action cases
typically involved enforcement of criminal statutes. 42 The resulting system of private and public enforcement did not pose
a serious threat of divided administration. Whether enforcement was brought by a public prosecutor in a criminal proceeding or by a private plaintiff in a civil action, a court would
decide the ultimate reach of the statute.
Judicial creation of private rights of action raises greater
difficulties when the legislature has entrusted enforcement of
a statutory scheme to a specialized administrative agency that
38 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1979).

39 At times, the "statutory tort" action was said to be a common law remedy.
Lord Coke, for example, stated that at common law, "[ulpon every statute, made for
the remedy of any injury, mischief, or grievance, an action lies by the party grieved,
either by the express words of the statute, or by implication." T J. CoMYNs, A
DIGEST OF THE LAvs OF ENGLAND 434 (A. Hammond Sth ed. 1822) (ist ed. published
in installments, London 1762-1767) (citing E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55, 118 (London 1642)). Similarly, Chief

Justice Holt stated that "where-ever a statute enacts anything, or prohibits anything,
for the advantage of any person, that person shall have a remedy to recover the
advantage given him, or to have satisfaction for the injury done him contrary to law
by the same statute . . . ." 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (1703).

For a general discussion of the

wavering historical development of private rights of action, see Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968). At other times, however, "statutory tort" actions are
portrayed as the product of judicial recognition of remedies implicit in statutes. See,
e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
For discussion of the use of statutes to particularize common law standards, see
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).

40 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 717.
41 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1964).
42 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1071).
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is empowered to issue rules or to adjudicate controversies
under the statute. In this context, private rights of action may
usurp the agency's responsibility for regulatory implementation, decrease legislative control over the nature and amount
of enforcement activity, and force courts to determine in the

first instance the meaning of a regulatory statute.

43
3. New-Property Hearing Rights. - Goldberg v. Kelly
and later decisions 4 4 established that agencies may not withdraw or reduce certain individual statutory benefits, such as
welfare payments, without providing procedures ranging from
a statement of reasons to a trial-type hearing. A statute creates
a constitutionally protected "property" entitlement if it limits
the discretion of administrative officials so as to mandate the
45
provision of a benefit to those meeting specified terms.
Court-ordered procedural safeguards are designed to promote
accuracy in the agency's resolution of the entitlement claim;
the extent of protection required is determined by considering
the interest of the beneficiary, the probable value of additional
safeguards, and the burden on the government of providing
46
those safeguards.

43 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
44 See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (I977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (i975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974). Procedural safeguards must also be afforded in a limited class of cases in
which the government has denied a benefit on the basis of a constitutionally impermissible purpose, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597--98 (1972), or has
infringed one of a small category of interests that, solely by virtue of their importance,
amount to constitutionally recognized "liberty" rights. In several cases the Court has
indicated that, if an interest is of sufficient magnitude, it will be constitutionally
protected as a liberty, even if it does not have formal statutory protection. See Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (198o) (interest in not being transferred from prison
to mental hospital); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (interest in not
being subject to corporal punishment in public schools). But see Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (liberty interest not necessarily implicated by every "grievous
loss").
45 For example, a statute permitting discharge of a government employee only for
"cause" creates an entitlement requiring an administrative or judicial hearing in which
the existence of "cause" must be established. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 135, 167,
171 (I974) (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the result in part) (hearing is constitutionally required before final termination of
employment, but not before provisional removal); id. at 226-27 (Marshall, J., joined
by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (Constitution requires hearing before provisional removal). By contrast, a statute permitting discharge at will creates no
protected interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The breadth of
the class of entitlements depends on how generous the statutory criteria are. For
further discussion of the criteria of entitlement, see infra pp. 1256-57.
46 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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D. Remedies for Regulatory Beneficiaries: Four Systems
Assume that a regulatory program provides for public enforcement. Given the two private enforcement remedies rights of action and initiation - four different systems of
regulatory enforcement are possible. The following table il47
lustrates the possibilities:
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION

PRIVATE
RIHTE
OF
RIGHT OF
INITIATION

Available
_______

Not Available

Available

Exclusive
Public

Supplementary
Private

Enforcement

Enforcement

Judicial

Maximum

Supervision

Enforcement

Although courts have generally not framed their decisions as
choices among alternative enforcement systems, 48 analysis of
the alternatives clarifies the considerations at stake in judicial
decisions about private remedies.
i. Exclusive Public Enforcement: Neither Right of Initiation nor Right of Action. - The exclusive public enforcement
approach rejects any role for private enforcement in a system
of administrative regulation. Courts that follow this appioach
conclude that the enforcement of a statute cannot be divorced
49
from the agency's delegated task of giving life to that statute.
This approach emphasizes three defects in private enforcement remedies. First, courts lack the self-starting investigatory
and analytical capacities needed to deal with complex social
and economic problems.5 0 This point assumes particular force
47 Admittedly, this table is somewhat crude. It disregards important variations,
including whether the right of initiation is strongly or weakly responsive, and whether
damages or some other form of relief is being sought.
48 Indeed, it is only recently that courts have begun to recognize that rights of

action and initiation can be treated as alternatives, or even that initiation rights form
a distinct remedial category. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (i979)

(denying private right of action but reserving decision whether initiation right is
available); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 465 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring) (same); see also Morris v. Gressette,
432 U.S. 491 (1977) (denying private right of initiation, partially because of availability
of private right of action); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 64r (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same).
49 See infra note 58.
50 See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123-55 (1938); Bazelon, Coping
with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822-23 (1977);
Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1041, io56-6o (1975) (collecting authorities).
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when Congress, in writing vague or general laws, relies on
agency specialization to particularize and narrow statutory
norms.5 1 Second, courts are unable to ensure centralized and
coordinated enforcement.5 2 A passive and largely decentralized judiciary, dependent on the vicissitudes of private initiative, is likely to create ad hoc and inconsistent regulatory
policies. Finally, courts are largely isolated from the processes
of political oversight that serve to legitimate regulatory programs. Congress can control an agency's enforcement processes through appropriations and other forms of review; the
President can also assert a measure of supervision over agency
enforcement policies.5 3 Congress, the President, or agency officials may well conclude, on the basis of administrative experience or changing social norms, that full enforcement is not
warranted.
The premises of a public enforcement approach are well
illustrated by Judge Leventhal's opinion in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.5 4 In that case, the court of appeals refused to
create a private right of action under the Federal Trade Commission Act lest the "carefully erected legislative [enforcement]
scheme" be "skewed by the courts."' 55 It considered irrelevant
the plaintiffs' allegation that the Commission had failed to
respond effectively to consumer grievances, 56 and found that
coordinated enforcement might be disrupted by "piecemeal
51 For example, the "reasonableness" standard in the Federal Power Act, I6
U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1976) ("[Alny . . . rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is
hereby declared to be unlawful."), was meant to be given specific but continually
adjusted content by the Federal Power Commission. See Montana-Dakota Utils. Co.
v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (195).
52 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 462-65 (1974); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997-99
(D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board
and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 53, 58 ("An agency experienced in administering
the act is better able to make consistent and intelligent decisions involving interrelated
issues than a district court that may see only one labor case a year.").
53 A recent example is Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (98), which
requires executive agencies to conform to principles of cost-benefit analysis to the
extent permitted by law. See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of
Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 1267 (198i); see also Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (979) (courts should adopt flexible approach in evaluating role of President in agency supervision).
54 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Alleging that defendant's advertisements about
an analgesic compound were deceptive and misleading, plaintiffs sought to bring a
private action under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52(a)(i),
54(a) (1976 & Supp. HI 1979), which empowers the FTC to issue cease-and-desist
orders against unfair and deceptive practices. See 485 F.2d at 988.
55 485 F.2d at 989.
56 Id. at iooo-oi. The court also relied in part on the Commission's lack of power
to award monetary damages and suggested that an implied damage remedy would
violate an intended restriction on remedies. See id. at 999.
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lawsuits." 5 7 Further, the opinion noted that courts "lack the
expertise and knowledge of business5 8practices" needed to assume responsibility for enforcement.
Courts have refused to recognize private rights of initiation
for similar reasons. An agency's decision not to undertake a
regulatory initiative may be based not only on the legality of
private conduct, but also on a wide variety of other managerial, political, and substantive considerations. 5 9 Agencies are
thought specially competent and experienced at weighing such
considerations, 60 and the weighing process may be difficult to
recreate on judicial review. Furthermore, decisions not to act
are ordinarily made informally, without elaborate records. If
such decisions were subject to judicial review, some would
later have to be explained in detail; agencies might have to
use more formal procedures to make enforcement decisions;
and regulatory programs might be severely disrupted. Public
funds would also be expended in defending against initiation
requests; resources needed for the protection of other beneficiaries might be depleted. 6 1 And it would often be difficult for
courts either to judge the merits of agency allocations of en57
58

Id. at 997.
Id. at 998. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341

U.S. 246 (1951), also exemplifies these conclusions. The Court there held that the
reasonableness of rates must be decided through "the Commission's judgment, in
which there is some considerable element of discretion." Id. at 251. Asserting that
the "[pletitioner cannot separate what Congress has joined together," the Court concluded that reasonableness "is a standard fur the Commission to apply and, independently of Commission action, creates no right which courts may enforce." Id. This
rationale is frequently offered in support of decisions refusing to imply private rights
of action under regulatory programs. See, e.g., T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359
U.S. 464, 468-72 (1959); Acevedo v. Nassau County, 5oo Fd 1078, 1084 (2d Cir.
1974); Danna v. Air France, 334 F. Supp. 52, 59-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 463 F.2d
407 (2d Cir. 1972); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 684-87 (D.
Colo. 1969).

59 These factors include: (i) the conduct of regulated entities, (2) the costs of the
initiative, (3) the impact of proceedings on the agency's relations with the regulated
class and with other affected interests, (4) the availability of negotiated alternatives,
(5) the probability of success, (6) the importance of establishing a favorable precedent,
(7) the harm that would be caused by judicial reversal, (8) the social benefits and
costs of the activity that might be challenged, and (9) the importance of competing
demands on scarce agency resources.
60 Cf. Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1958) (it is no defense to an

enforcement action that agency is not proceeding against competitors who have engaged in similar conduct); Nader v Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.i8 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
("[T]he balancing of these permissible factors . . . is an executive, rather than a
judicial, function.
...).
61 The agency "alone is empowered to develop that enforcement policy best calculated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress and to allocate its available
funds and personnel in such a way as to execute its policy efficiently and economically." Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. at 413.
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forcement resources or to contribute to improved agency per62
formance.
2. Judicial Supervision: Private Right of Initiation, No
Private Right of Action. - The judicial supervision approach
is based on doubt that the political process can be trusted to
63
ensure proper performance of administrative responsibilities.
Courts that follow this approach acknowledge the value of an
agency's specialized experience, political accountability, and
capacity to plan for coordinated enforcement. For these reasons, they refuse to create private rights of action under statutes that provide for public enforcement. They believe, however, that initiation rights can improve agency performance
while avoiding many of the drawbacks of private rights of

action.
This belief is based on three grounds. First, the scope of
judicial review in initiation cases normally permits considerable deference to agency discretion. Only rarely will a relevant
statute unambiguously command enforcement in a particular
case; hence rights of initiation are generally weakly responsive.
By contrast, if a plaintiff has a private right of action, the
62 The court in Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Pa.
1977), adopted this reasoning and dismissed a suit brought to compel the FTC to

investigate the defendant for possible violations of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16ox-i693r, i8 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976 & Supp. IV i98o). The
court stated that "[iln our legal system, powers of enforcement are broadly discretionary." 43o F. Supp. at 97. For a discussion and criticism of the numeroug cases
holding, on similar grounds, that courts may not review a decision by the NLRB
not to issue a complaint, see Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel's
Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a Complaint under the NLRA, 86 YAE L.J.
1349 (1977). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. I7i, 181-83 (1967) (unreviewable
discretion not to issue a complaint means that NLRB should not have exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving "duty of fair representation").
Courts have frequently held, especially in the criminal area, that prosecutorial
inaction may not be scrutinized even if the governing statute is phrased in mandatory
terms. See, e.g., Howard v. Hodgson, 490 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (8th Cir. '974);
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-82 (2d Cir.
1973). Although such results have been severely criticized, see K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28.00-4 (1976), they are not necessarily unsound.
That Congress has used the word "shall" rather than "may" in describing an agency's
enforcement responsibility does not by itself subject inaction to judicial review, for
the use of mandatory language does not necessarily imply a judicially enforceable
duty. Given traditions of prosecutorial discretion, this conclusion is especially plausible in the area of criminal prosecutions.
On the other hand, some courts have held that agency inaction may be reviewed
even when the statutory language is permissive. See, e.g., Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), discussed at infra note
7X.
63 For an early analysis of the problem, see Jaffe, supra note 21. For an elegant
discussion of the value of judicial review, see L. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 320-27,
589-92.
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court must give de novo consideration to every asserted regulatory violation.
Second, recognition of a private right of action is much
more likely to undermine coordinated administration and orderly legal development than is recognition of a right of initiation. Dangers of ad hoc and inconsistent judgments are minimal under a weak right of initiation. 6 4 Even if a strong
initiation right is recognized, agencies can attempt to coordinate initiation orders with their overall enforcement schemes.
Third, initiation rights are less likely than rights of action
to subvert legislative oversight and fiscal control of the nature
and amount of enforcement. In initiation cases, courts will
ordinarily respect budget constraints aimed at limiting implementation and enforcement activity. 65 Rights of action, by
contrast, circumvent budgetary limits by enlisting private enforcement resources.
In Dunlop v. Bachowski, 6 6 the Supreme Court endorsed an
application of the judicial supervision approach. The plaintiff
sought to compel the Secretary of Labor to bring suit to set
aside a union election allegedly conducted in violation of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA). 6 7 Distinguishing cases holding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion unreviewable, the Third Circuit had noted
that the LMRDA "demonstrate[d] a deep concern with the
interest of individual union members," ' 68 and that judicial review was appropriate to ensure that the members were not
"left without a remedy."' 69 The court had also noted the absence of a private right of action. 70 The Supreme Court expressly endorsed the Third Circuit's ruling that enforcement
71
failure was judicially reviewable.
64 Private rights of action, by contrast, may be asserted even though an agency
might reasonably choose not to bring suit against activities that violate overinclusive
statutes.
65 Thus, if an agency can plausibly show that it has sought to use its limited
budget to bring proceedings against the worst offenders, a court should generally not
require enforcement in a particular case. This is hardly to say, however, that a
talismanic reference to "budget constraints" does or should shield an agency's inaction
from judicial scrutiny. See infra p. 1269.
66 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
67 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
68 Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 56o (1975).
69 Id. at 88.
70 Id. at 84.
71 Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 56o, 566-68 (1976). The Court accepted the
court of appeals' conclusion that prosecutorial discretion applies to statutes protecting
general social interests but not to those protecting individual rights. Id. at 567 n.7.
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3. Supplementary Private Enforcement: Private Right of
Action, No Private Right of Initiation.- The supplementary
private enforcement approach regards the creation of administrative agencies as a useful but by no means exclusive method

The Court left open the issue whether a court might, upon finding his explanation
for inaction insufficient, order the Secretary to bring suit under the Act. Id. at 575.
It has occasionally been suggested that such an order would raise serious constitutional
problems deriving from the separation of powers. See, e.g., Note, Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of JudicialReview under Title IV of the LMRDA: A Proposal
for Administrative Reform, 86 YALE L.J. 885, 901-02 & nn.61-62 (1977). The suggestion is probably misguided in light of the long history of judicial control of executive
action. "The Executive's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,' Art. I, § 3, applies to all laws . . . . It would seem to follow that the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, like the exercise of Executive discretion generally,
is subject to statutory and constitutional limits enforceable through judicial review."
Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.i9 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
For a discussion of Bachowski, see Note, supra, at 896-98. See also Bachowski
v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa.) (on remand, court found arbitrariness in
refusal to act), appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976).
In a case similar to Bachowski, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 97i), the court held EPA's failure to ban DDT reviewable
at the request of an environmental group. Finding that the group had made a prima
facie showing of undue hazard, the court required the EPA to explain why it did not
immediately suspend the registration of DDT. Id. at 596. The EPA was also required
to initiate formal proceedings to determine whether to cancel DDT's registration
permanently. Id. at 595.
The Ruckelshaus court held that a statute providing that an agency "may" institute
enforcement does not shield agency inaction from judicial review. Id. at 590 & n.9;
see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. i59, 165-66 (970) (permissive language in Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, § 4(3), i6 U.S.C. § 59od(3) (1976), does
not bar judicial review); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. i97I)
("A permissive statutory term . . . is not by itself to be read as a congressional
command precluding judicial review."); Guerrero v. Garza, 418 F. Supp. 182, i86
(W.D. Wis. 1976) (permissive terms of Farm Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2046 (1976), do not expressly prohibit judicial review). Such reasoning is generally
correct. That an agency is not required to redress all statutory violations does not
mean that decisions about which violations should be redressed are committed to
agency discretion. Similarly, a decision not to initiate proceedings may be based on
factors that Congress did not intend the agency to consider. In such cases, the fact
that the governing statute is phrased in permissive terms does not automatically
immunize agency inaction from judicial review. Cf. supra note 62 (that statute is
phrased in mandatory terms does not automatically subject agency inaction to judicial
review).
Judicial willingness to scrutinize an agency's enforcement policies is reflected in
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam). In
that case, plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) had not fulfilled its statutory duty to enforce title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2oood (1976), which required public educational institutions to
eliminate segregation before they could receive funds. The court read the statute to
require HEW to undertake enforcement action, and distinguished cases declining to
review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Other private right of initiation cases
are cited at supra note 13.
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for implementing statutory requirements. Public regulation
may be needed because of the inadequacies of the common
law system in coping with industrial conditions. 72 Public enforcement is, however, frequently inadequate because of
budget constraints; private actions can be a useful supplementary remedy by providing additional enforcement resources.73
75
74
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak reflects these considerations.
The Supreme Court created a private right of action under
section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193476 on
behalf of shareholders challenging management's proxy statements as deceptive, notwithstanding the power of the SEC to
bring suit and the failure of Congress explicitly to authorize
private enforcement. The Court emphasized the Act's "broad
remedial purposes" 77 as well as the apparent inability of the
SEC to effectuate those purposes adequately.78 The Court did
not discuss the possibility that private enforcement might subvert political control over enforcement. 79 Instead, the Court
72 The most important barriers to a common law solution are the difficulties posed
by collective goods. When the social benefits of eliminating an unlawful activity are
widely shared, the stake of any individual is often small and each individual can
enjoy a "free ride" on the enforcement efforts of others. As a result, no individual
may have sufficient incentive to bring suit. See R. STEWART & J. KRwER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 107-09 (1978). See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (discussing implications of the free-rider problem).

73 See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
74 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

75Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (i969), provides another illustration
of this approach. In that case, plaintiffs brought suit to enforce § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976), which prohibits racial discrimination
in voting. The Act provides for enforcement by the Attorney General. Concluding
that private suits would enhance the statutory scheme, the Court observed:
The Attorney General has a limited staff and often might be unable to
uncover quickly new regulations and enactments passed at the varying levels
of state government. It is consistent with the broad purpose of the Act to
allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his city or county government complies with the § 5 approval requirements.
393 U.S. at 556-57.
Creating a private right of action against conduct that the FTC had previously
found to violate § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, i5 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV
i98o), the court in Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D.
Ind. 1976), not only emphasized the inadequacy of agency enforcement efforts to
protect consumers against continuing violations, but also recognized the potential
advantages of a competing system of private enforcement with its own independent
assessment of enforcement benefits and costs. Id. at 588.
76 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
77 377 U.S. at 431.
78 Id. at 432. The Court noted that the SEC has limited resources available to

handle 2000 proxy statements annually, and that the courts' duty is "to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." Id. at 4323379The securities field is one in which there may be significant savings in a system
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asserted that the statutory goal of "'protection of investors'
.. . implies the availability
of judicial relief where necessary
80

to achieve that result.")

Private rights of action, unlike rights of initiation, do not

divert limited agency resources from other violations that may
be more important. 8 ' The supplementary private enforcement
approach rejects private rights of initiation, both because of
this problem of diversion of resources and because of the
2
drawbacks discussed earlier in this Section.8

This rejection of initiation rights is illustrated by Morris v.

Gressette.8 3 Plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Attorney
General's decision to approve a reapportionment plan submitted pursuant to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act.8 4 The
Court interpreted the statute to preclude such review, because
judicial scrutiny of the Attorney General's inaction would defeat Congress' "desire to provide a speedy alternative method
of compliance to covered States,",8 5 and because a private right
of decentralized, private enforcement. Affected individuals are likely to be knowledgeable and thus able to uncover statutory violations at lower costs than public
agencies. These perceptions probably account for the courts' traditional receptiveness
to private rights of action in the securities area. See infra pp. 1303-o5.
80 Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
81 Diversion of resources could displace political controls on the use of public
funds. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 23.1 (2d ed. 1977)
("[T]he structure of the administrative process is designed to increase political control
over the process of legal regulation .... ").
In addition, courts may have difficulty in assessing an agency's overall enforcement
program, particularly in light of the "polycentric" nature of decisions on the allocation
of limited enforcement resources. This fact has played some role in the cases by
justifying either a denial of review or a generally deferential standard of review. See
supra pp. 1209-10.

See supra pp. 1208-I1.
83 432 U.S. 491 (1977). In Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the
plaintiff sought to obtain review of informal advice given by the Commission staff to
a corporation. The staff had advised that it would not recommend SEC action to
challenge the exclusion of a stockholder proposal from management's proxy materials.
Holding the advice immune from judicial inspection, the court stated that "'the
agencies' internal management decisions and allocations of priorities are not a proper
subject of inquiry by the courts."' Id. at 645 (quoting Medical Comm. for Human
82

Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403

(1972)). The distinction between Kixmiller and Medical Comm. for Human Rights
v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), the
celebrated case in which the D.C. Circuit held that a no-action letter by the SEC was
subject to judicial review, is that, in Medical Committee, the Commission itself
reviewed the no-action recommendation. This distinction has been criticized, and
properly so: it ignores the functional identity of the claims in the two cases. See,
e.g., Vickery, JudicialReview of InformalAgency Action: A Case Study of Shareholder
Proposal No-Action Letters, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 307 (1976). The Kixmiller court
referred to the availability of a private right of action under the Act "with or without
prior administrative resort to the staff or the Commission." 492 F.2d at 645-46.
84 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
s5 432 U.S. at 503.
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of action was available under Allen v. State Board of Elec86

tions.

4. Maximum Enforcement: Both Right of Action and Right
of Initiation. - Under a maximum enforcement approach,
the values of political control, specialization, and centralization
are considered less important than maximizing private participation in the enforcement process. A powerful concern with
the possibility of agency abdication of regulatory responsibilities is characteristic of the maximum enforcement approach.
In Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC,8

7

the

District of Columbia Circuit followed this approach. The
court held reviewable a decision by the SEC not to initiate
proceedings against a corporation that had refused to include
a shareholder proposal in its proxy statement, even though the
shareholders had a private right of action against the corporation. The shareholders were permitted to forgo a private
suit and proceed against the SEC for two reasons - the
desirability of augmenting private enforcement with public
resources and experience, 8 8 and the "independent public interest in having the controversy decided" with agency participation. 89
E. The Evolution of Beneficiary Remedies 90
Forty years ago, the exclusive public enforcement approach
was dominant in the federal courts. 91 The supplementary pri86 Id. (citing Allen, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)); see supra note 75.
87 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).

Maine

v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. i (I98O), which expanded private rights of action under
§ 1983, also reflects a maximum enforcement approach. See Sunstein, Section 1983
and the PrivateEnforcement of FederalLaw, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. (1982) (forthcoming).
88 432 F.2d at 667, 674.
89 Id. at 672.
90 The evolution of new remedies has not been solely the work of the courts.

Congress has increasingly made explicit provisions for rights of initiation and rights
of action in numerous regulatory statutes. A maximum enforcement approach was
adopted in "citizen suit" provisions included in a number of environmental regulatory
statutes adopted in the 1970's. These provisions authorize private plaintiffs to institute
litigation against agencies for failure to perform duties mandated by the relevant
statute and also create private rights of action. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Supp. II 1978) (right of action and
right of initiation); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (Supp. III
1979) (right of action and right of initiation); Clean Air Act, id. § 7604 (right of action
and right of initiation).
In our view, these provisions are best understood as a codification and reformulation of the new remedies created by the courts. For discussion of the significance
of this development, see infra note 152.
91 For discussion of some of the earlier federal decisions, see Note, supra note 2.
Few initiation suits were sought or permitted before the 196o's. See generally S.
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vate enforcement approach prevailed during the past several
decades, 92 as courts reacted to perceived inadequacies in
agency enforcement efforts by creating private rights of action.

Today, judicial supervision appears to be the most widely
accepted approach. The Supreme Court's narrow construction
of the exception to reviewability for those decisions "committed
to agency discretion," ' 93 as well as the Court's willingness in
Bachowski to supervise enforcement discretion, 94 confirms the
tendency of lower courts to permit regulatory beneficiaries to
challenge agency failure to enforce regulatory programs adequately. It seems increasingly clear, however, that a deferential standard of judicial review will ordinarily be followed
in initiation cases. 95 At the same time, the Court's restrictive

approach to private rights of action 96 makes it far less likely
97
that such rights will be recognized.

This is not to say that the cases follow a consistent pattern,
for courts sometimes depart from the judicial supervision approach. When litigants seek to protect important personal
liberties, such as freedom from discrimination, courts often
create both initiation rights and rights of action. 98 By contrast,
BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 30, at 324-36, 921-35 (discussing growth of
initiation rights); infra note ioo; pp. 1267--69.
92 After Borak and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (I975),
the lower federal courts freely
created private causes of action. For a catalog of twenty such decisions in the twoyear period following Cort v. Ash, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 741-42 (I079) (Powell, J., dissenting).
93 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
94 Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566-68 (975); see also Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (i98o) (unanimous decision) (dictum) (reaffirming Bach-

owski).
95 See supra p. i2o5; infra pp. 1267, 1282-89.
96 See cases cited supra note 5; infra pp. 1302-07.
97Aside from occasional cases such as Medical Committee, a supplementary private
enforcement approach continues to be followed in the limited but important setting
of securities regulation. Private rights of action have become so well established under
a variety of securities provisions that it is unlikely that the Court will do away with
them. See infra pp. 1303-05; cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
692 n.13 (1979) (stating that the Court had acquiesced to history in accepting implied
rights of action under Rule rob-5); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (I97I) ("It is now established that a private right of action
is implied under § io(b)."); Hazen, Implied PrivateRemedies Under FederalStatutes:
Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium - Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and
Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1333 (198o) (implied-private-remedies approach retains
vitality at least in securities and civil rights areas).
99 Provisions of title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide an example. In
Cannon v. University of Chicago, for instance, the Supreme Court implied a private
right of action under 20 U.S.C. § 168i (1976), even though after Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d ir59 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam), it seemed plain that a private
right of initiation was available. The Court found that the initiation alternative was
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when an agency has been granted broad discretion in an area
such as regulation of rates and competitive practices, courts
are likely to deny both private remedies. 9 9
What explains this pattern of development? The analysis
in this Part suggests a balance of factors. Judges have been
influenced by institutional considerations: the limited analytic
and factfinding capacities of courts, the need for consistency
and coordination in enforcement, and the comparatively
greater political accountability of agencies. Courts have also
given varying weights to certain regulatory goals: effective
implementation of administrative programs, compensation of
those injured by statutory violations, and the need to adjust
regulatory objectives in light of implementation problems and
changing public attitudes.
The variations among judicial decisions during any given
period might be explained by variations in the particular regulatory programs involved and in the particular beneficiary
interests asserted. The differences in judicial approach over
time might be understood as a response to shifting judicial
perceptions of the weight to be accorded institutional considerations on the one hand and regulatory objectives on the
other. These shifting perceptions may in turn be attributable
to changes in the general climate of professional and public
opinion concerning agency "failure" and in the appropriate role
of the judiciary in responding to that failure. Other relevant
variables might include the successive "waves" of regulatory
statutes upon which private rights of action and initiation
could be based and the remedial incentives and funding
sources available to potential plaintiffs and their counsel.10 0
less desirable: it would disrupt agency resource management and might not furnish
an adequate remedy. 441 U.S. at 704-07 & n.41.
99 The Federal Trade Commission Act, i5 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. IV
ig8o), is an example. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (denying private right of action); see also Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys. Corp.,
43o F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (denying right of initiation under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, which is enforced by the FTC under i5 U.S.C. §§ 1607 &
x68is (1976 & Supp. IV i98o)).
100 Private rights of action tend to appear in the reports about a decade after the
enactment of the statutes on which they are based. Beginning in the late 1940's, a
new wave of private rights of action followed the enactment of the federal securities
laws. The most recent wave of private actions has been based on laws prohibiting
environmental pollution and discrimination and on other "social" legislation enacted
in the i96o's and 1970's.
The prospect of substantial recoveries stimulated the private bar to provide representation in private actions under the securities laws. Some forms of the new social
legislation, such as prohibitions of discrimination in employment, can lead to large
damage claims; other forms of social regulation, such as those banning generalized
environmental harms, generally do not. In a few instances, redress for injuries has
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1218 1981-1982

1982]

PRIVATE RIGHTS

1219

Any attempt to explain these judicial decisions by reference
to pragmatic factors of context and policy, however, is seribeen sought by determined individuals with a passionate commitment to vindicating
their own rights. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (I979). More
frequently, litigation has been initiated by a new breed of "public interest" lawyers.
Because substantial damages are infrequently awarded and because no mechanism
exists for identifying and taxing those who might benefit from litigation, these lawyers
depend on funding from foundations, mass-mail organizations, or (for Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) or Legal Services lawyers) the government. See Trubek
& Trubek, Civic Justice Through Civil Justice: A New Approach to Public Interest
Advocacy in the United States, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE,
supra note 2i, at II9, II9-44.
Private rights of initiation were first developed in the late i96o's. Based both on
the new "social" legislation and on older "economic" regulatory statutes, these actions
were also brought by the public interest lawyers and generally sought prospective,
collective relief and a redirection of agency priorities. See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"New property" hearing rights were also developed in the I96O's, primarily by a
subgroup of the public interest bar - "poverty lawyers" - which includes those
working for OEO and Legal Services as well as lawyers who represent prisoners.
These lawyers sought hearings in individual cases of deprivation, although the systematic failure to provide such hearing rights was the ultimate target. Even when
the ultimate object was the restoration of monetary benefits, the amounts involved
were generally too small to cover litigation costs; reliance on outside funding was
necessary. The decision to focus on hearing rights was apparently the product of
strategic decisions by a relatively few lawyers and an influential essay by Charles
Reich, which was devoted to the vindication of the value of individualism in the
modem state. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 741-74, 782-87
(1964). The focus on individual procedures has succeeded in particular cases. But
this strategy has often proved less successful in achieving the lawyers' political and
social goals.
Remedies for faulty agency performance are but one part of a larger system of
judicial controls on bureaucratic organizations of all kinds - not only agencies, but
also labor unions, corporations, universities, and similar entities. These "intermediate
organizations" are uneasily positioned between the realm of civil society (defined by
private law) and the realm of representative government (defined by public constitutional law). The judicial creation of remedies to control these organizations is one of
the great achievements of the law. One of the current authors (Prof. Stewart) is
developing a general account of judicial control of intermediate organizations, which
classifies the remedies created as "exit," "voice," "appeal," and "self-help." See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing exit and voice

remedies).
The latter three types of remedies are illustrated in this Article. In the case of the
private right of initiation, the mechanisms for registering dissatisfaction with agency
performance include both "voice" and "appeal." Beneficiaries are entitled to a formal
hearing process within the organization to register their views ("voice"). To the extent
that their voice goes unheard, they can seek to persuade a court to modify the agency's
allocation of regulatory resources in their favor ("appeal"). The new-property hearing
right relies principally on the mechanism of "voice." In contrast, the private right of
action provides dissatisfied beneficiaries a "self-help" mechanism; they abandon reliance upon the agency and seek a remedy directly from the courts in actions against
third parties. The significance of these differences is explored at supra pp. Mzo8-16.
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ously incomplete. Such an explanation fails to respond to the
most fundamental objections to judicial creation of private
enforcement rights - objections that derive their force from
the role of the federal judiciary in a scheme of separated
powers. These objections themselves operate as factors in
judicial decisions. This type of explanation also fails to address the more basic conceptions of judicial role and institutional purpose that, we believe, have played the central role
in the development of alternative systems of public and private
enforcement. These matters are addressed in Part III.

III.

THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Judicial creation of new remedies under federal regulatory
statutes mushroomed with remarkably little consideration of
the question of judicial authority. Leading cases, such as J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak,' 0 gave the question only cursory treatment. 10 2 But the problem is a serious one, for the jurisdiction
and remedial powers of the federal courts are limited to what
has been granted by the Constitution and Congress. The current attack on judicial creation of new remedies has centered
on private rights of action - ironically, Ione of the longest
established of these remedies. But the attack has more farreaching implications that endanger many accepted forms of
federal common law, including the other beneficiary remedies
and the right of defense.
A. JudicialAuthority and the Formalist Thesis
Among the possible sources of authority to create private
rights of action are the relevant substantive provisions of the
regulatory statute, the general grant of federal question jurisdiction, 10 3 and the principles of federal common law. Authority to create private rights of initiation may derive from these
three sources, as well as from the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). 10 4 Without more, however, such sources do not
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
See, e.g., id. at 433.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. ig8i).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-7o6 (1976 & Supp. II I979). In particular, § 706 authorizes
a reviewing court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed." Courts recognizing rights of initiation have relied on this provision. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Exchange Sec. Bank, 529 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1976); Nader
v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 2o6 (D.C. Cir. 1975). There is, however, little evidence that
the provision was intended to displace the ordinary discretion vested in the administrative prosecutor, and the APA bars review of action "committed to agency discretion
by law." 5 U.S.C. § 70i(a)(2). The question whether enforcement decisions are
101
102
103
104
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justify the enormous expansion of judicially created private
remedies that has occurred during the past two decades.
Two separation-of-powers considerations support this assertion. First, as both an analytical and a practical matter,
the procedures for implementing a regulatory program cannot
be separated from its substance. By enlisting new enforcement
resources, courts that create private remedies substantially affect the content of regulatory policy - a task properly reserved
for the political branches. Indeed, judicial creation of private
remedies may invite Congress to "shirk its constitutional obligation" by leaving controversial choices about implementation to the courts.10 5 Second, judicial creation of remedies
that Congress failed to provide is arguably a usurpation of
Congress' lawmaking authority. That Congress sometimes
10 6
provides explicitly for private rights of action and initiation
suggests that the absence of such provisions may not be inadvertent. 10 7 Judicial creation of such rights may thus hand
regulatory beneficiaries a victory that they failed to win in
Congress.
In light of these considerations, general jurisdictional statutes cannot plausibly be read to authorize judicial creation of
private rights of action. Moreover, in view of traditions of
prosecutorial discretion, it is doubtful that the APA's general
provisions for review warrant wholesale creation of rights of
initiation. 108
These objections to judicial creation of private remedies
can be summarized in what we term the formalist thesis. That
thesis holds that legal rights cannot be derived from conceptions of natural justice, background understandings, or theories of sound government. Unless the right to be vindicated
is granted by the Constitution or a statute, courts lack authority to recognize it; the only basis of legal rights is a textual
instrument drawn by a sovereign lawmaking authority. 109
The formalist thesis derives its vision of rights and judicial
authority from the conception of law as sovereign command.
"committed to agency discretion" cannot be resolved simply by reference to the text
of the APA.
105 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The "constitutional obligation" to which Justice Powell refers stems from
the doctrine that Congress may not delegate legislative powers.
o.
106 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 9
107 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. I (198).
10 See supra note 104.
109 See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. i, 11-18
(I98i); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. i34 (1974) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
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The supreme sovereign is the citizenry, and the Constitution
is the instrument by which the citizenry has created legal rights
and authorized the creation of courts to enforce them.11 0 Congress and the President possess derivative lawmaking powers;
statutes are the instrument by which they create rights and
confer judicial authority. Other sources of law - judicial
decisions and administrative rulings - depend on textual instruments for their authority. Basing judicial action on nontextual sources - such as the "spirit of the Constitution" or
"the underlying legislative purpose" - creates a grave risk of
usurpation of sovereign power. The written word of an authoritative text is thus the indispensable safeguard of legitimacy.
The formalist thesis bars private rights of action or initiation unless such rights are conferred by statute or required by
the Constitution. Because only recently and in unusual circumstances has the Constitution been thought to require such
remedies,"' the thesis generally denies judicial authority to
create them. The formalist thesis is also inconsistent with a
judicial presumption in favor of rights of defense:" 2 when no
substantive constitutional prohibition is violated" 3 and no statute explicitly calls for judicial review, the thesis dictates that
courts may not decide whether particular regulatory impositions either exceed statutory limits or represent an unreasonable exercise of discretion." 4 Finally, the formalist thesis is
110 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 70-76 (I961).
111 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982).
112 See S. BREYER & R. STEWVART, supra note 30, at 891-gig (presumption in
favor of judicial review). Although the formalist thesis has recently been used by the
Supreme Court to insulate private firms from private enforcement of regulatory controls, the thesis has also been embraced by liberals seeking to limit judicial development of rights of defense that favor regulated firms. See Wright, Judicial Review
and the Equal Protection Clause, i5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (Ig8o).
113 Basing review on substantive constitutional violations would justify creation of
a right of defense in only a small percentage of cases. A broader justification for
rights of action would be afforded if the due process clause were read to protect
"liberty" or "property" interests in addition to substantive constitutional entitlements.
But such a reading raises two questions. How are courts, consistent with the formalist
thesis, to identify such additional interests? And if such a category of protected
interests can support judicial creation of rights of defense, why does it not also support
creation of private rights of action and initiation?
The right of defense might be treated differently, because it can be argued that,
when government intrudes on a common law interest, it is invading a preexisting
liberty or property interest of a kind familiar to the framers and thus protected by the
due process clause. The pedigrees for rights of action and initiation, as well as that
for new-property hearing rights, are far less well established.
114 Despite this conclusion, the federal courts developed a strong presumption in
favor of review and have also created a "hard look" approach to review of discretion
in order to control regulatory impositions on industry. See infra pp. 1248-49.
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inconsistent as well with judicial creation of new-property
hearing rights. 115
The formalist thesis is reflected in recent Supreme Court
decisions denying private rights of action in a wide variety of
situations. 11 6 Other areas of federal common law have likewise been repudiated. The Court's refusal in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union"17 to create a right of contribution among joint violators of a federal statute, like its
readiness in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois118 to find statutory
displacement of the federal common law of interstate pollution,
exemplifies the thesis' requirement of a textual basis for the
"rights-making" process. The "mid-twentieth century type of
federal common law" celebrated by Judge Friendly" 9 seems
rapidly headed for oblivion.

B. The Inadequacy of TraditionalJustificationsfor Judicial
Creation of Beneficiary Remedies
There are a number of conventional responses to the formalist thesis; history provides the first. For centuries, English
judges created private rights of action to compensate plaintiffs
injured by conduct that violated statutes, 120 and both federal
and state judges in the United States have followed their
example. Traditionally, such decisions were founded on the
common law: the defendant was charged with negligence or
nuisance, and the statute was used to particularize the common

115 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-54 (i974) (plurality opinion).

116 See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (198i) (Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976)); Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. i (1981) (Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6ooo-6o8i (1976 & Supp. HI 1979)); Universities Research
Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (i98i) (Davis-Bacon Act, §§ i(a), 3, 40 U.S.C.
§§ 276a(a), 276a-2 (1976) (federal construction contracts)); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. Ii (979) (Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 8ob-i to -21 (1976 & Supp. m11979)).
117 451 U.S. 77 (198).
11S 45, U.S. 304 (1981).
119 Friendly, supra note 14, at 413.

120 There is evidence that, in connection with a growing acknowledgment of
Parliamentary supremacy, judicial creation of such remedies was curtailed during the
17th and i8th centuries. See Katz, supra note 39. Judicial creation of damage
remedies for statutory violations was not, however, extinguished. See, e.g., Couch
v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1854) (private right of action for violation of
statute requiring shipowners to keep medicine aboard vessel). For a discussion of
current English practice, see Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of
Tort, 23 MOD. L. REV. 233 (I96O).
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law standard of conduct.' 2 1 Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 122
however, federal courts have not enjoyed any general authority
to make common law. And the common law analogy is unavailing for the many cases, such as Borak, in which courts
create private remedies even though no common law wrong
could be charged.
Two decades ago, champions of the "new federal common
law," most notably Judge Friendly, sought to defend federal
judicial lawmaking against attacks based on Erie.123 The defense of decisions like Borak was straightforward: the new
remedies created by the federal courts were based on federal
statutes that invaded no constitutionally protected area of state
autonomy. Intent on meeting the Erie charge, Judge Friendly
did not adequately address the"equally serious intramural question 124 - the authority of federal courts in relation to that of
Congress.
The most well-recognized justifications for federal common
law are likewise inadequate bases for judicial creation of regulatory remedies. The creation of federal common law to
decide interstate disputes, 125 for example, is compelled by the
federal courts' jurisdiction and duty to decide such disputes,
the obvious unsuitability of state law, and the silence of Congress. Such compulsion is absent when Congress gives adjudicatory and rulemaking powers to an administrative agency

121 See Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 361 (r932); Thayer, supra note 39. Later, courts developed the notion of
"statutory tort" to create private rights of action. Rather than rely on a statute to
particularize common law standards of conduct, courts created a remedy upon a
violation of the statute itself. See sources cited supra notes 239 & 242. But the
"statutory tort" remedy is either an exercise of general common law powers, which
federal courts now lack, or it must be defended as "statutory interpretation," a
justification that is generally not persuasive in light of the separation-of-powers objections to judicial creation of new administrative remedies.
122 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
123 See Friendly, supra note 14.

124 The failure to address separation-of-powers issues was understandable in light
of the undifferentiated arguments calling for federal court deference to state law in
the name of Erie. A more discriminating analysis - like that subsequently offered
in Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974), distinguishing
the legal bearing of the Constitution, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976), the Rules Enabling Act, id. § 2072, and other federal statutes - would have
focused concern on the separation-of-powers issues.
125 See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (pollution of Lake
Michigan); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (diversion
of water from Lake Michigan).
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to implement a regulatory program. 126 Similarly, courts have
created federal common law under statutory provisions, such
as section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 127 that
give decisional jurisdiction to courts rather than agencies and
that provide no substantive standards for decision. Here
again, judicial creation of new law is motivated by much
stronger forces than exist in the case of an ordinary regulatory
statute. 128
Another justification for judicial creation of beneficiary
remedies derives from a conception of inherent judicial authority - authority enjoyed by article III courts as well as
common law judges. This conception was well expressed by
Justice Frankfurter:
Courts, unlike administrative agencies, are organs with
historic antecedents which bring with them well-defined powers. They do not require explicit statutory authorization for
familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations. A duty
declared by Congress does not evaporate for want of a for-

126 Compare Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (creating federal
common law of water pollution), with Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. i (i981) (comprehensiveness of congressional scheme
precludes private right of action), and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981) (same scheme preempts federal common law).
Judicial creation of federal common law has been defended on the ground that,
because of an overloaded agenda, Congress does not have the capacity to foresee or
enact subsequent amendments to deal with the myriad problems turned up by statutory implementation. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447, 465-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("futility of attempting allcomplete statutory codes"); Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, io5 U. PA.
L. REV. 797, 799-800 (957). With regulatory programs, however, Congress can
control implementation through means other than statutory amendment, such as
appropriations and oversight. See infra pp. i29o-9 i .
127 29 U.S.C. § i85 (1976); see, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (I957) (interpreting § 3O). Also distinguishable is the creation of remedies
under statutes that prohibit defined conduct without providing any remedy at all. See
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (r916) (Federal Safety Appliance Acts of
1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I5, 45, & 49
U.S.C.)). But even this practice is vulnerable to a formalist attack. First, the
argument for creation of a federal remedy in such a case is undermined by the
probability that an analogous remedy exists under state law. See Hill, Constitutional
Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. iio9 (1969); Note, supra note 2, at 292-94. Second,
Congress may occasionally intend to enact hortatory legislation.
128 Statutory interpretation blends imperceptibly into federal common law. If the
statutory language and history are silent on the point, however, the creation of private
remedies is vulnerable to the charge of pure judicial lawmaking, see Landis, Statutes
and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 219 (1934), at least in the
absence of shared understandings that permit courts to interpret statutory silence as
an invitation to exercise their own creativity.
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mulated sanction. When Congress has 'left the matter at large
for judicial determination,' our function is to decide what
remedies are appropriate in the light of the statutory language
and purpose and of the traditional modes by which courts
compel performance of legal obligations. If civil liability is
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are
not denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically
authorized. 129
Justice Frankfurter's argument, however, begs the key
question: has Congress in fact delegated to the federal courts
discretionary authority to create private rights of action? Perhaps Congress has legislated on the general assumption that
courts would and should decide whether private remedies are
desirable. But no such authority has been explicitly granted,
and there is scant evidence that Congress generally operates
on the basis of any such assumption. 130 In light of the separation-of-powers considerations identified previously, the "inherent powers" argument alone cannot justify the conclusion
that such a de facto delegation has been made or is unneces-

sary. 131
Judicial creation of beneficiary remedies has also been defended as a means of overcoming systemic obstacles to implementation of regulatory statutes. These obstacles are sometimes attributed to various forms of "capture."' 132 A more
subtle diagnosis attributes "implementation failure" to basic
features of the political and administrative system. 13 3 New
129 Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
261 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Board of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 3o8 U.S. 343, 351 (1939)). Note that the recognized
inherent authority of the federal courts to create new remedies for constitutional
violations, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (i8o); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (I971), cannot support similar authority with respect to obligations and programs
created by Congress and entrusted to administrative agencies.
130 In some instances, the legislative history of particular statutes contains evidence
that some congressmen assumed or hoped that courts would decide whether to create
private remedies. See infra note 405. But such isolated instances do not support,
and arguably negate, the existence of a general assumption of judicial power to create
private remedies.
131 That federal courts have historically c-eated private rights of action might lend
support to a claim that there has been an understanding on Congress' part that
creation of such remedies is within judicial authority. Cf. infra p. 1233 (judicial
creation of second-order remedies as response to growth of regulatory activity).
132 See sources cited in Stewart, supra note 13, at 1684-87.
133 See Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural
Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 248 (,978) ("gap between statutory promise and administrative reality" rooted in interest-group politics); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1684-87;
see also Weisbrod, Problems of Enhancing the Public Interest: Toward a Model of
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regulatory programs are characteristically launched with the
political support of the many diverse and often poorly organized persons who stand to benefit from the programs or who
believe them to be just. Implementation is then entrusted to
a bureaucratic agency. Here a pervasive imbalance in influence comes into play. The implementation process often turns
on issues that are technical, obscure, and unlikely to inspire
the individuals favoring regulatory initiatives to continue organized advocacy. The constituency that supported the original legislation dissipates, not because its stake has diminished,
but because transaction costs defeat efforts at continuous mobilization. Regulated firms and other organized interests opposed to full implementation do not face the same impediments. They are able to press their case relentlessly before the
legislature and the agency and thus to encourage the delay or
dilution of enforcement efforts. This systemic imbalance in
representation diminishes the reformist zeal of agency officials.
Moreover, because its resources are limited, the agency must
depend on the cooperation of the regulated parties. 134
Regulatory programs, according to this diagnosis, suffer
from a classic "collective good" failure. Effective implementation cannot be provided to one beneficiary without being
provided to all; because any individual beneficiary can take a
"free ride" on the efforts of others, no beneficiary is likely to
exert the influence required to ensure the level of enforcement
needed to realize the objectives of the original legislation.
Thus, the argument goes, courts should recognize private remedies to correct for these systemic obstacles and to ensure
properly balanced regulatory implementation. Private remedies afford personal, noncollective relief - and hence give
plaintiffs the incentive to press for full implementation. In
addition, the Archimedean force of individual court rulings
can help to compensate for the inevitably limited resources
available to "public interest" advocacy groups that seek to
vindicate collective interests. If the legislature believes that
the additional enforcement these remedies stimulate is unduly
disruptive, it can explicitly exclude such remedies.
But there are strong counterarguments. Electoral representation is the traditional mechanism for pooling collective interests. Since Congress has many tools for supervising the
Governmental Failure,in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 30-41 (1978) (discussion of "govern-

ment failure").
134 This process "filters" citizen demands and satisfies them with measures that

are largely symbolic. See Offe, PoliticalAuthority and Class Structures ysis of Late Capitalist Societies, 2 INT'L J. SOc. 73 (1972).
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regulatory process - budgets, oversight hearings, 135 and statutory authorization of private remedies - a failure fully to
implement a regulatory program may well reflect a considered
legislative judgment that further implementation would be undesirable. 136 Moreover, it seems bizarre to resolve the problem
of imbalance in influence by relying upon judges and selfappointed litigants, who are hardly subject to political review
and whose views may not be representative. 13 7 Judicially created enforcement rights may also do little to improve the
performance of administrative agencies and may even
worsen it. The studies of Donald Horowitz suggest that adversary litigation generates a distorted and narrow perspective
on implementation problems, and that courts are frequently
incapable of comprehending the full complexity of the

issues. 138
A final, more embracing justification for the creation of
private remedies is the argument that the courts' role is to
ensure completeness and consistency in the whole fabric of the
law, including those legal norms established through regulatory
schemes. 1 39 Consider, for example, a plaintiff harmed by a
defendant's tortlike violation of a regulatory prohibition intended to protect the plaintiff. Because the law generally
awards compensation in analogous contexts, a private right of
action in damages might be regarded as necessary in order to
achieve consistency and completeness in the legal system.
This justification, however, begs the question: is there a
need for a single juridical system for the reconciliation and
realization of legal norms? If regulatory administration is considered an independent system of normative ordering, the case

135The recent controversy in Congress concerning the Federal Trade Commission's

consumer protection initiatives is a notable example of such control. See FTC Funds
Bill With Legislative Veto Clears, 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 233, 233-36 (ig8o).
136 Some claim that legislatures may adopt measures that are purely symbolic:

[In the case of] social legislation that places the burden of progress on those
whom it regulates, a very low prospect of effectiveness may be the sine qua
non of winning enactment of the law at all.... Contrary to the instrumentalist
canon, the ineffectiveness of a law to achieve its goal may be itself a policy,
a policy shared by the act's opponents and some of its supporters, and may be
the price for permitting the law to reach enactment. . . . People have reasons
for wanting a law, and the lawmaker will see a value in meeting their wishes,
quite apart from any practical good it may do.
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 233 (1976).
137 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1713-15.
138 See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 255-98 (1977).
139 See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66
(1982); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-0 (1977); Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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for judicial creation of new regulatory remedies is considerably
weakened. Indeed, the situation may most closely resemble
that in the courts before the merger of law and equity. Criteria
must be developed to route business to one system or another;
conflicts of jurisdiction must be resolved; and the two systems
must be harmonized where they overlap. In administrative
regulation, these functions are performed by the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the rules that govern the scope of judicial
review, the principle that agencies must explain the exercise
of discretion, and so on. With the aid of these tools, the law
can be maintained as a system that is complete although diomnipotence in the courts
vided. A need for vesting remedial
40
has not yet been established.1
C. The Necessity of Background Understandings
The formalist thesis separates administrative law into two
domains - administrative discretion and private ordering. If
a statute confers authority but does not limit its exercise in
particular circumstances, the administrator has unreviewable
discretion; if authority is not conferred, or if its exercise is
limited, a realm of private ordering is preserved. The text
provides the dividing line.
The thesis, however, is both incomplete and inconsistent.
It is a commonplace that a lawmaker cannot anticipate all of
the situations to which a law may be applied; as a result, he
cannot specify in advance the legal consequences of all future
events. Moreover, statutory language cannot be intelligently
interpreted in isolation from the background understandings
from which it arises.141 The formalist thesis therefore leaves
significant gaps - cases that cannot be resolved by reference
to the statutory text alone. 142 Because the thesis is inescapably
agnostic with respect to the existence or possible content of a
text's underlying purposes, the gaps cannot be filled by reasoned elaboration of any such purposes.1 43 The text must be

140 Indeed, Congress has at its disposal more flexible tools for creating private

remedies.
141 Cf. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1958) (rules
generally cannot be understood in isolation from the "form of life" of which they are
a part).
142 Cf. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (198i) (discussing
gaps in Constitution). For discussion of the nature of gaps in another context, see C.
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 57-73 (1981).

143 For discussion of the relation between formalism and reasoned elaboration, see
Kennedy, Legal Formality, supra note 26, at 395-98. The Supreme Court's recent
tendency has been to resolve close issues of agency authority against the agency and
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taken to be an arbitrary expression of sovereign will.144 The
thesis is therefore fatally incomplete, for it cannot generate
5
solutions to unforeseen cases. 14
Suppose, for example, that a civil rights statute creates a
right to be free from certain forms of discrimination and provides for enforcement by a federal agency. Congressional silence on private rights of action may be a product of legislative
indifference, 14 6 willingness to delegate the matter to the courts,
failure to achieve a consensus on the matter, inability to foresee
that the issue would arise, or some combination of all of these.
How, then, shall such textual silence be understood? To authorize private rights of action? To preclude them? Or to
leave the matter to the judiciary? The text cannot resolve the
issue; it must be supplemented by understandings that give
content to legislative silence.
Courts must nonetheless decide cases. Even adherents to
the formalist thesis are driven to invoke a variety of "policy"
considerations in order to decide cases that fall into textual
gaps. But because of the normative agnosticism of the formalist approach, resolution of these policy issues becomes ad
47
hoc and arbitrary.1
In practice, moreover, the formalist thesis denies the respect for the sovereign lawgiver upon which it is supposedly
based and is thus internally inconsistent. If a judge insists
that the sovereign use a particular verbal formula to confer
authority, 148 he restricts the sovereign's lawmaking authority
by precluding other approaches, such as reliance on backto decide close issues of affirmative private relief against such relief. See Note, Intent,
Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 910-12 & n.I26 (1982). These choices, which tend to
enlarge business firms' freedom of action, can be justified only by appeal to considerations going beyond the formalist thesis.
144 See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 828
(1982).
145 Cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 12-14, ioi (1980) (offering similar
analysis in the context of constitutional "intent").
146 Judicial embrace of the formalist thesis may give legislatures some incentive to
strive for greater specificity in statutes, but the extent of the incentive is doubtful.
Cf. O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 231,
233 (1964) (discussing ambiguities of statutory interpretation when legislative history
neither mentions private remedies nor explains reasons for such omission).
147 See Williams, supra note 12o, at 244 ("This process of looking for what is not
there, unaided by any compelling presumptions, naturally leads to the most surprising
diversity of outcome."); see also Landis, supra note 128, at 233-34 (noting that statutes
are often cryptic about purposes and legislative motives).
148 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (if Congress wishes private rights of action to be available, it
should "specify as much").
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ground understandings. Touted as a safeguard against usurpation, the formalist thesis in this sense itself leads to usur49

pation. 1

When courts apply or interpret a statute, they must look
to general background understandings as a basis for identifying
the norms - sometimes hypostatized as "legislative intent"
- that underlie the statute. But the identification of such
background understandings is no simple task. The more general and powerful the background understanding, the less
likely it is to have been stated explicitly by the legislature,
150
even if the legislature in fact shares that understanding.
Moreover, because background understandings derive from an
evolving political and social context, they must also change
over time. Finally, because they provide the context that gives
meaning to a large variety of statutes, the understandings
among legislature, agency, and judge necessarily remain fluid.
The entitlement, production, and public values conceptions
represent general and powerful background understandings of
the basic functions of government. 15 1 In interpreting statutes
that are silent on the existence of private enforcement rights,
courts have derived guiding principles from these conceptions.
Because reliance on these background understandings is inevitable, such reliance should be viewed as an established and
legitimate device of lawmaking through statutory construction
rather than a controversial intrusion on legislative prerogatives.
To some extent most regulatory programs can be understood to serve each of these three functions. In practice, courts
in particular cases tend to follow a single conception, determined largely by the remedy sought and the administrative
function in question. For example, in creating private rights
of action under civil rights statutes, the courts have concluded
that the general purpose of the applicable regulatory system is
to vindicate individual entitlements and that private rights of
action are needed to effectuate that purpose. By contrast, in
declining to create beneficiary remedies under ratemaking statutes, the courts have suggested that the statutes are designed
149 Cf. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 515-x6 (1958) (unpublished manuscript on file at Harvard Law School Library) (discussing the "Paradox of Making
Law by Refusing to Make Law" and suggesting that every decision makes law and
that judges cannot make "no law" in deference to a lack of guidance from the
legislature).
150 Indeed, any effort to state a background understanding in fixed, authoritative
form would be self-defeating, because it would create the gaps and inconsistencies
already discussed in connection with the formalist thesis.
is1For an exposition of these three conceptions, see infra pp. 1232-39.
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to promote production and that private remedies would disrupt
the coordinated enforcement scheme necessary to achieve that
goal. As this example suggests, the background understandings embodied in the conceptions do not invariably argue in
favor of creation of private remedies. In its recent decisions
denying private rights of action, the Supreme Court has buttressed the formalist thesis with a public values conception
that calls on Congress to make all decisions about the availability of private remedies. This approach concludes that
judge-made remedies are inconsistent with the basic premise
of representative democracy. 152
Such a sweeping conclusion is inappropriate in light of our
government's structure and traditions. In our system of separated powers, courts have traditionally provided remedies to
vindicate individual entitlements, to encourage productive private ordering, and to limit the power of public agencies and
enhance their political accountability. 15 3 Given legislative silence and this accepted tradition, it is unclear why the courts
should refuse to create private remedies that would perform
these well-recognized functions.
D. Traditional Arrangements of Public and Private Law and
the Three Conceptions of Institutional Purpose
When the Republic was created, private law defined a
system of private economic ordering, regulated by the coujrts,
that was thought to be both distinct and insulated from the
54
public law system of electoral representation and legislation. 1
The reservation of a major share of economic life to a system
152 Frequently, after courts have created a private right of action or initiation
under a particular statute, Congress has amended the statute to provide specifically
for such a right, or for one closely analogous to that created by the court. This
"ratification," however, does not constitute legislative recognition of authority for
courts to create private enforcement rights whenever courts consider such action
appropriate. Congress may believe that courts do not have authority to create private
enforcement rights, but that a particular private enforcement right is desirable and
should be secure from shifts in judicial opinion. In fact, absent clear congressional
sentiment going beyond the specific right at issue, there is no basis for ascertaining
whether a broader principle of remedial creativity has been ratified. Accordingly, the
notion of "ratification" is no more helpful than the formalist thesis.
1S3 Justice Frankfurter may have been invoking this tradition when he championed
the inherent authority of courts to provide appropriate remedies. See supra pp.
1225-26.
154 See P. Du PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE

JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES at ix (Philadelphia 1824)
(noting reaction in America to English system "in which all the rights of the sovereign

as well as the privileges of the people are to be deduced from the common law" and
"[j]udges are a useful check against the encroachments of the monarch or his ministers"); G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 259305 (1969).
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structured through private litigation was a key element in the
separation-of-powers scheme. This structure was based upon
and supportive of the three conceptions of production, entitlement, and public values. But the creation of extensive regulatory and welfare programs disrupted this structure. The
grant of extensive lawmaking authority to administrative bodies
deprived the courts of much of their established dominion,
granted vast responsibilities to bureaucratic entities not anticipated in the Constitution, and undermined the separation of
55
powers. 1
This displacement created obvious risks to the integrity of
the system of rights and duties defined by the common law
and to the economic order built upon that system. Public law
threatened to swallow up private law. At the same time, the
expansion of executive authority threatened the established
framework of public law by combining traditionally separated
powers and weakening the checks imposed by electoral representation. The courts bowed to perceived historical and
political exigency and ultimately sustained, against direct constitutional assault, this displacement of power.156 But they
also created a system of second-order remedies to control the
power thus transferred - remedies designed to further, under
new conditions, the same three conceptions upon which arrangements of private and public law had been traditionally
based. Through creation of new remedies, courts have continued to exercise their historic responsibilities in the era of administrative agencies.
z. The Common Law. - Each of the three conceptions
generates a different account of the common law. The entitlement view of the common law (which is currently enjoying
a rebirth i5 7 in reaction to accounts of rights derived solely
from economic or utilitarian principles) is premised on an enduring commitment to the legal protection of certain zones of
individual action and choice - for example, bodily integrity,
private property, and voluntary agreement with others. These
zones, the contours of which are subject to judicial adjustment
in the light of changing circumstances, are described and protected by common law rules of entitlement.
Under the production conception, common law rules (and
the individual rights based upon them) are designed to increase
155 See M.

VILE,

CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 287

(967).
156 See S. BREYER & R. STEVART, supra note 30, ch. 2.
157 See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 100 (1978); Epstein, A Theory of

Strict Liability, 2 J.

LEGAL STUD. 151, 198-201 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 166 (974);
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
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economic output by reducing or compensating for transaction
5 8
costs that inhibit private bargaining and create externalities. 1
The goal of legal rules and remedies is to maximize aggregate

wealth. 159
The public values account portrays the common law as a
system that covertly channels economic and political power to
a dominant class of private rightholders. 160 Structured by
litigants and judges, the common law is seen to be antithetical
to a conception of public values in which distributional decisions and other basic social choices are made through an open
and democratic political process.
Although the public values conception generally aims at
supplanting the common law system, the production and entitlement conceptions can be viewed as complementary accounts that mutually sustain that system. Because the last two
approaches favor decentralization, it is plausible to suppose
that common law rules that protect entitlements may also
158 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 81, chs. 8, 20.
159 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:

One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. IO89, 1093-98 (1972). In order to
determine whether a given legal rule is more efficient than another, some background
set of entitlements must be specified to determine the value (based on willingness of
affected individuals to pay or demand compensation) of the alternative resource
allocations associated with the two rules. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 388-89 (I98i). In the
context that we examine, it is most plausible to equate that set of entitlements with
existing law, on the assumption that the latter will be fully enforced. Under this
approach, the economic value of a new rule or of a change in any given rule would
be determined by the willingness to pay of those who would benefit by the implementation of the rule. Costs would be determined by the compensation demanded by
those injured. Since the common law does not take account of moral externalities
(such as the distress of third parties over enforcement of a slavery contract), they
should be excluded from the calculus. Cf. id. at 410-19 (effects on third parties of
entitlement-setting decisions, such as adjudication of enslavement contracts); Stewart,
Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1571-72 (1972) (collective interests, such as those
in environmental quality, are implicated in bilateral rights); Sunstein, supra note 53,
at 1276-77 (discussing factors to be considered in economic cost-benefit analysis).
We believe that this approach, which assesses the efficiency of successive particular
changes in law rather than that of the legal system as a whole, is a coherent and
appropriate basis for analyzing the economics of judge-made law. But we do not
claim that courts have necessarily internalized this conception of efficiency or that
judge-made law is always efficient. The production conception, as it is understood
by the courts, is both looser and more limited than this technical approach. As
applied by the courts, the production conception tends to equate efficiency with
competitive markets and industrial output, and ignores many potential sources of
market failure. It also emphasizes the importance of incentives for capital investment.
Judicial decisions explicitly addressing resource allocation often appear to reflect concern with both static efficiency and dynamic incentives for investment and growth.
See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 5oi F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Spur Indus. v. Del
E. Webb Dev. Co., io8 Ariz. 178, 494 P.zd 700 (1972) (en banc).
160 See M. HoRwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
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foster production, and vice versa. A system of market
ordering, in which private property and contract are secured
by common law rules, has historically been considered economically productive. 16 1 But those rules can also be understood as minimal conditions of individual liberty and
respect.162 In an idealized Hayekian system of law, all legal
rules that vindicate entitlements to individual liberty and security would simultaneously promote productivity by encouraging investment and mutually advantageous cooperation.163
2. The Rise of Administrative Regulation. (a) Entitlement Account: More Effective Protection. - Under the entitlement view, the common law is a system of individual rights
that empower their bearers to make contracts and prohibit or
redress specified conduct by others. But the rise of an urban
industrial economy has, for several reasons, undermined the
capacity of the common law system to vindicate such rights.
First, common law rules of exchange, designed for face-toface transactions, are increasingly inadequate when applied to
mass markets dominated by large firms. Such markets may
create acute disparities in information and bargaining power.
Second, modern industrial society taxes the common law's
ability to define private entitlements. Direct transgressions
proscribed by the common law of trespass give way to complex
and collective harms, such as pollution. The content of common law entitlements must be redefined, but the task of redefinition is often beyond the capacity of judges involved in
64
case-by-case decisionmaking. 1
161 See, e.g., J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956). But see Kennedy & Michelman, Are
Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (I98O) (challenging view
that common law rules are necessarily efficient).
162 See C. FRIED, supra note 157, at 114-16, 123-24, 132-39.
163 To ,the extent that legal rules are regarded as cultural or social institutions that
are not fabricated by individual calculations but that develop through an evolutionary
process, explanations that link the two accounts even more closely are possible. See
F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 35-54 (I973).
Even if a total reconciliation cannot be effected, there are elements of a working
compromise. All rules and entitlements cannot be derived from an unadorned principle of economic efficiency. See Kennedy, supra note 159; Kennedy & Michelman,
supra note 161. There must be some logically prior core of entitlements that defines
the basic features of the environment in which individuals strive for gain. See C.
FRIED, supra note 157, at 91-105. On the other hand, few if any contemporary
advocates of the entitlement approach would argue that all common law rules can be
derived from basic moral conditions of individual liberty and reciprocity. For example, Professor Epstein has sketched out a considerable role for collective "utilitarian
considerations" in defining the remedial attributes of legal rules and institutions.
Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and Its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 49, 77-98 (1979).
164 See

J.

DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw
6

supra note 5o, at -15, 31-35, 96.
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Third, new types of harms typically affect large numbers
of individuals simultaneously; the impact is large in the aggregate but small for any individual. Because the costs of litigation are likely to exceed any individual's expected recovery,
private damage actions no longer deter socially undesirable
actions or provide compensation for violations of entitlements. 165 The alternative - the prophylactic deployment of
injunctive relief - presents courts with discouraging managerial complexities.
Fourth, it is difficult to ensure uniform treatment of similarly situated individuals through decentralized private litigation. Such uniformity became important in the late nineteenth
century, when monopolies such as railroads discriminated
among consumers, 166 and is important today because of heightened concern with race and sex discrimination.
The failure of the common law effectively to protect entitlements created a morally based, politically effective demand
for the creation of regulatory agencies to safeguard personal
security and dignity under industrial conditions. The performance of an administrative agency is thus to be judged by
how well it protects rights to clean air, nondiscrimination, safe
products, and so on. During the past fifteen years, it has been
widely believed that agencies have substantially failed in this

task. 167
(b) Production Account: Market Failure. - The production conception justifies administrative regulation as a response
to the failure of the market, as structured by the common law,
to deal with the dramatic increase in spillovers, information
costs, and other transaction costs in industrial society. 168 In
this view, the regulatory agency is designed to correct market
failures by altering the behavior of regulated actors in order,
for example, to reduce pollution. Because such benefits are
collective goods, "free rider" effects prevent the market and

165 See J. LANDIS, supra note 5o, at 36-38; Epstein, supra note 163, at 98-102.
166 See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 (1907).
167 Some critics have argued that the entire enterprise is flawed, because the
attempt to protect individuals through administrative intervention inevitably involves
destruction of liberty. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1g6o). A
less radical critique holds that the flaw lies in the pervasive failure of administrators
to adopt and enforce regulatory measures with a vigor sufficient to protect individual
rights. This failure may be attributed to the corruption of the political process, the
dominance in that process of regulated firms and other "special interests," or bureaucratic inertia and lack of accountability. See sources discussed in Stewart, supra note
13, at 1684-88.
168 See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 72, at 155-324 (failure of private

litigation to deal with pollution).
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common law litigation from producing them. Public enforcement, financed by tax revenues, overcomes the free rider problem and secures allocative efficiency. 16 9 The success of the
effort can be measured by standard economic criteria - the
value of the good, as measured by the willingness of beneficiaries to pay, 170 and the costs of producing the good, as
measured by the forgone benefits of other possible uses of the
relevant resources.
Under an optimistic view, those whose economic welfare
is reduced by pollution or false advertising will demand and
obtain regulatory programs that correct the failures of the
market and the common law and thus advance aggregate economic welfare. But many contemporary critics, invoking a
variety of reasons, argue that regulation often reduces economic welfare. 17 1 This failure is sometimes blamed on the
inability or disinclination of mission-oriented bureaucrats to
account for all aspects of benefit and cost when formulating
regulatory policy. Others maintain that regulation is sought
and manipulated by well-organized groups in order to restrict
competition, to redistribute income, and to ward off more
intrusive forms of government control. 172 A third theory views
the regulatory system as one primarily serving the interests of
73
a "new class" of advocates, bureaucrats, and professionals. 1
And a final theory of "government failure" emphasizes that
169 See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, SupTa note 72, at 107-10.

170 The "willingness to pay" criterion assumes that beneficiaries are not entitled to
prevent the harm in question and must pay to avoid it. Alternatively, the value of
regulatory protection might be measured by the price beneficiaries could demand for
agreeing to endure the harm in question; such a measure assumes an entitlement in
beneficiaries to prevent the harm. See Kennedy, supra note i59.
171 See generally Weisbrod, supra note 133, at 30-31 (collecting suggestions of
political scientists for dealing with "governmental failures").
172See Stigler, The theory of economic regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971); see also G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, at 3-6,
231-39 (1965) (discussing Progressive era). Firms are better organized and therefore
politically more effective than the unorganized class of consumers or other "smallstake" individuals who are the scheme's intended beneficiaries. See G. STIGLER, THE
CITIZEN AND THE STATE ch. 1 (1975).

Efficient regulation is itself a collective good

that the political market fails to produce because of free-rider effects. See supra
note 72.
173 See I. KRISTOL, Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM 25-31 (1978).

Under this

theory, advocates of regulation use single issue politics and media publicity to secure
legislation for widespread regulatory intervention. At the same time, bureaucrats seek
to expand their budget, personnel, and authority, and may be able to disregard or
deemphasize many of the external costs of their initiatives. It is extremely difficult
for legislators to determine whether such expanded initiatives are warranted. See W.
NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (971).
The overall
tendency is to create swollen bureaucracies administering unnecessarily elaborate regulatory controls that produce few if any net benefits.
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regulation retards efficient market adaptation to new condi74
tions. 1
(c) Public Values Account: The Progressive Critique of the
Common Law. - The third account of regulation posits the
5
existence of shared but evolving public values. 17
In this view,
the purpose of administrative agencies is to help to define and
realize social and economic norms in industrialized society.
The regulation of nuclear power, consumer fraud, or occupational health is seen to be not a matter of counting economic
costs and benefits, or of defending private entitlements, but
part of a continuing process of deciding what sort of a society
we shall be - how risk averse, how hospitable to entrepreneurial change, how solicitous of the vulnerable, and how
willing to allocate resources through markets or public control.
The public values conception criticizes the common law
system for delegating the determination of economic life to
private rightholders, to judges who are not adequately accountable, and to a litigation process that invites domination
by "repeat players."' 17 6 The Progressives' solution was the
regulatory administrative agency, 177 whose specialized nonpartisan structure and self-starting capabilities would ensure the
178
steady implementation of public values.
In recent years, this solution has been widely regarded as
self-defeating. Bureaucracies have been seen as overly influenced by parochial interests and incentives and to be shrouded
from public accountability by the proliferation of regulatory
activities and by the remote and seemingly technical character
174 See B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME (I978). Regulation
can have such an impact in a number of ways. Because regulatory action is often
required for the entrance of a new firm or the introduction of new technology, existing
firms use the administrative process to limit competition. Environmental or other
advocacy groups opposed to new plants or products can delay or block their approval.
A market system, in contrast, promotes efficient adaptation to new circumstances
precisely because those injured economically by change generally have no legal right
to prevent it.
175 See J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 28-29, 35-36, 47, 52 (1978); Michelman,

PoliticalMarkets and Community Self-Determination: Competing JudicialModels of
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. i45 (1977-1978) (contrasting the publicvalue model with the market-failure model in the context of land-use regulation).
176 This process assertedly generates distributional outcomes that reinforce the
dominance of private rightholders. See M. HORWITZ, supra note i6o.
177 The initial program of the reformers who shared this critique of the common
law system was legislative regulation through detailed statutory prescription. This
response, however, proved to be infeasible because of the demands on scarce legislative
resources and the need for specialized and adaptive implementation mechanisms. See,
e.g., State ex rel. R.R. Warehouse Comm'n v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 38 Minn.
281, 300-02, 37 N.W. 782, 788 (1888), rev'd, 134 U.S. 418 (189o).
178 See J. LANDIS, supra note 5o, at 28-42.
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of regulatory issues. We have become disabused of faith in
the efficacy of distinctively administrative methods for identifying public values, or in the existence of an invisible but
inevitable rapport between the administrators and the citizenry
at large. 179
E. Remedies for Faulty Administration and Conceptions of
Institutional Purpose
In this Section, we first examine the general relation between remedies and conceptions of institutional purpose and
then show how each of the remedies for faulty administration - the rights of defense, action, and initiation, and the
new-property hearing right - has become associated with,
and seeks to advance, one of the three conceptions of institutional purpose. We next analyze the conflicts among the conceptions themselves. Finally, we discuss the difficulties courts
face in protecting entitlements in the modern regulatory context.
i. Paradigm Remedies as Forms of Action. - Paradigms
are, in Thomas Kuhn's words, "the concrete puzzle-solutions
which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit
rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of
normal science."' 180 In administrative law, a paradigm is an
exemplary case in which a particular remedy advances a particular conception of institutional purpose.
Under the traditional model of administrative law, the paradigm right of defense prohibited, at the instance of regulated
entities, coercive administrative acts that exceeded an agency's
statutory authority. As we later show,is1 this remedy was
179 The Senate recently expressed its dissatisfaction with the performance of regulatory agencies in a 94-o vote to amend the APA so as to empower both houses of
Congress to veto an agency regulation by majority vote. The action reportedly
responded to an "outcry against . . . regulatory excesses." N.Y. Times, Mar. 25,

1982, at I, col. 2.
Such legislative oversight, however, is often episodic and is frequently the province
of a committee or subcommittee that may not be representative of Congress as a

whole and that is subject to imperfect electoral accountability. This perception may
inform recent holdings that "one house" legislative vetoes are unconstitutional. See
Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, Nos. 80-2184, -2312 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1982);

Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 198o), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981); infra note 254.
180 T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 175 (2d ed. 1970).

Kuhn acknowledges that the first edition of his book had created misunderstanding
by using the term "paradigm" also in the broader sense of "the entire constellation of
beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community."
Id.
181 See infra pp. 1246-47.
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originally associated with an entitlement conception based on
traditional distinctions between private and public law. The
contemporary pervasiveness of regulatory discretion, however,
has undermined the foundations of the entitlement conception;
the right of defense now rests upon a production conception.
The private right of initiation, which aims to reallocate administrative resources among competing regulatory objectives,
is associated with a public values conception.1 8 2 Finally, the
private right of action and the new-property hearing right are
both linked with the entitlement conception 183
Each of these remedies originates in a particular combination of litigants and a particular administrative function,
and each is primarily linked to a single conception. 184 For
example, new-property hearing rights are recognized when individuals seek private benefits directly from agencies; this
structure invites an entitlement conception of agency functions.
An entitlement conception, however, would be unworkable in
connection with an initiation right, through which beneficiaries
seek to obtain collective benefits by influencing the exercise of
agency discretion in enforcing regulatory controls against third
parties. This situation invites a public values conception. In
later parts of this Article, we discuss these matters in detail
and show how each remedy is founded on a distinctive tripartite structure of litigants, institutional function, and conception. Like the forms of action at common law, each remedy
protects a narrow spectrum of social concerns through a distinctive system of substantive and adjective law.
The three conceptions we have identified are not the only
means of defining and evaluating the performance of administrative agencies. 185 But courts have' an institutional tunnel
vision that restricts them to only a few of the possible conceptions. This tunnel vision is attributable to the nature of fo-

182 See infra pp. 1278-84.
183 See infra pp. 1263-67, 1307-16.

184 Although a particular remedy is primarily associated with a particular conception, it may sometimes be associated with a different conception. For example, rights
of defense, usually linked with the production conception, are sometimes used to
secure entitlements, such as those guaranteed by the first amendment. See, e.g.,
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
185 For example, the performance of administrative regimes could be measured in

terms of the degree to which the regimes successfully restructure the pattern of political
and economic power resulting from a system of private ordering. See L. JAFFE, supra

note 28, at 3-27. Another conception could invoke the Weberian theory of bureaucratic rationality to account for the rise of administratve regimes and to assess their
performance. See J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Administrative Law from an
Internal Perspective (forthcoming). But a system of judicial remedies is functionally
ill suited to advance these conceptions.
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rensic decisionmaking and to the grounding of American courts
in traditional conceptions of private and public law.
2. Relations Among Competing Paradigms. In many
studies employing the notion of paradigms, a single paradigm
is seen to dominate an entire discipline for a lengthy period,
only to be succeeded by another dominant paradigm following
a revolutionary struggle. 186 But the pattern that emerges from
our study is quite different: a number of conflicting remedial
paradigms coexist over a considerable period of time, 18 7 even
within the confines of a single administrative program.
The perseverance within administrative law of divergent
conceptions of institutional purpose has received little attention. This neglect, we believe, has occurred because the remedies to which conceptions are linked are each invoked by a
particular class of litigants in a particular context, and because
each remedy has a particular doctrinal origin. The remedial
forms of action thus disguise the conflicts among the different
underlying conceptions.
Could one emulate, in the administrative law context, the
nineteenth century reformers who sought to abolish the common law forms of action and create a unitary civil action?
Imagine a new federal statute that provides: "Private rights of
action, private rights of initiation, rights of defense, and newproperty hearing rights are hereby abolished. There will
henceforth be one form of action for review of unlawful administrative performance, to be denominated an action for
administrative relief." Could a single remedy be developed
that would integrate the entitlement, production, and public
values conceptions? The remainder of this Section attempts to
explain how conflicts among the three conceptions would make
186 T. KUHN, supra note I8o, portrays paradigms of scientific thought as succeeding one another over time. A given paradigm is accepted by a scientific community
until it generates anomalies that cannot be solved. The end of the reign of one
paradigm and the accession of its replacement occur in a revolution that takes place
when the anomalies stimulate the creation of a new paradigm that resolves the
anomalies.
Applications of Kuhn's approach to law and other disciplines have employed or
discovered similar patterns of a linear succession of single paradigms, punctuated by
revolutionary periods. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, supra note x6o; Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982). But see E. KITZINGER,
BYZANTINE ART IN THE MAKING (1977) (dialectical interplay between competing

paradigm styles extending over centuries); Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism:
Reflections on Investment Management Treatises (Book Review), 94 HARV. L. REv.
56i (i98i) (earlier paradigms persist but are subsumed by later ones).
187 Cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 26 (judicial insistence on rules
derived from individualist conception of social life coexists with use of equitable
standards to further altruistic conception). Indeed, Kuhn supposed that the persistence
of inconsistent rival paradigms for considerable periods would typify law and other
disciplines. See T. KUHN, supra note I8o, at 160-73.
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such an integration impossible, and how courts have dealt
with conflicts among the different conceptions and their associated remedies.
The incompatibility of the production conception and the
entitlement conception is evident. For example, the production conception requires that regulatory policies be adjusted to
rapidly changing economic and social conditions.' 8 8 This need
for flexibility, however, is inconsistent with a system of entitlements to regulatory protection: an entitlement to the advantages conferred by particular regulations would thwart needed
changes in regulatory policy. 18 9 Conversely, if production is
the overriding goal of regulation, the individual is no longer
secure against fraud, discrimination, or serious injury to
health. His entitlements may, in principle, be sacrificed whenever the economic calculus so requires.1 90
It would be fortunate if this clash could somehow be resolved under the public values conception, but no such happy
ending is likely. The premises of the production conception
and those of the public values conception are incompatible.
Under the production conception, regulatory policies are determined by the willingness of individuals to pay for regulatory
benefits. 19 1 Under a regime of public values, by contrast,
decisions are made not on the basis of dollars, but instead on
that of voices and votes; regulation is thought to succeed when
188 See J. LANDIS, supra note 5o, at 1o-12.
159 By contrast, the conceptions of production and entitlement do not conflict in
a common law system of market exchange, because that system relies upon a decentralized mechanism for allocating resources. Entitlements do not determine outcomes;
they simply provide the starting points and framework for individual choices and
agreements. Because such choices and agreements respond to changes in opportunities, the common law system of entitlements permits adaptation to changing conditions.
190 To the extent that risks are widely distributed, the application of an economic
calculus may result in roughly equivalent risk exposure for each individual. See C.
FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 183-206 (1970) (risk pool concept); Easterbrook,
Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331 (i98o). But disparities in individual conditions and
susceptibilities, geographic variations, and limitations on mobility may result in nonuniform risk distribution. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (local risks associated with nuclear generating facility).
191 The production approach enshrines either the existing distribution of income
and set of preferences, or a system of investment in future economic growth, and
must give dominant weight to maximization of wealth. A public values approach, by
contrast, must deliberately cultivate and weigh divergent conceptions of value. It
aspires to the moral development of citizens and communities that reflectively and
deliberately choose their own ends. Preferences are not an exogenous "given"; their
selection is the very object of the enterprise. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971). Citizens are regarded as bearers of alternative social values, not as purchasers
or investors. They may, but need not, choose production as a dominant public value.
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1242 1981-1982

1982]

1243

PRIVATE RIGHTS

it advances goals that the community has endorsed though
collective political processes. 192
The public values conception of administrative regulation
is also incompatible with the entitlement-based approach. Under the entitlement conception, an aggrieved entitlementholder can "trump" (by resort to litigation) the outcome of a
community process for making -

and changing -

regulatory

policy. In this respect, the static and individual character of
judicially protected entitlements is at odds with the community
93
dynamics of public values.1
These conflicts have sometimes surfaced when different
litigants in a single case espouse different conceptions of institutional purpose. The recent Supreme Court decisions involv194
ing federal regulation of occupational exposure to benzene
95
and cotton dust' provide examples. The principal issue was
whether the Secretary of Labor was required to prove, first,
that Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
standards were necessary to eliminate a "significant risk" to
employee health, and second, that the costs of compliance
were reasonably related to the benefits. The regulated industries invoked a production approach to argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively. Regulatory beneficiaries and the Secretary urged a negative answer to each
question by asserting the protection of health as an overriding
public value chartered by statute. 196 The cases involved the
functional equivalent of an initiation right by the beneficiaries
and a right of defense by the regulated firms.197
192 See Baker, StartingPoints in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv.
939, 971 (i98o); cf. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.

191 (1980)

(denying that wealth maximation can be considered a normative good); Sager, Pareto
Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (198o) (arguing that a
pareto-optimal state is not necessarily just). But see Posner, The Ethical and Political
Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487
(i98o) (defending wealth maximization as a legitimate ethical norm).
193 Although it is theoretically possible that an institution charged with selecting
and implementing public values might choose to safeguard entitlements, that choice
is hardly inevitable.
194 Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448
U.S. 607 (1980).

195 American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
196 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
197 Tripartite litigation involving a regulatory agency, regulated firms, and regulatory beneficiaries is common. In some cases, such as Benzene and Cotton Dust, the
industry asserts a right of defense while beneficiaries support the agency. In other
cases, the beneficiary asserts an initiation right and the regulated firm defends the
agency. In still other cases, the beneficiary challenges an agency's action as inadequate, and the industry claims that the agency has gone too far. Each of these
tripartite cases represents a functional combination of defense and initiation rights.
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The Court resolved the conflict by mediating between the
conflicting remedial paradigms, rather than by subordinating
one to the other. In Benzene, it forbade OSHA from imposing
regulatory controls unless the exposure presented a "significant" risk of harm. In doing so, the plurality pointed out the
threat to production posed by regulatory intervention on the
basis of agency speculation.198 But in Cotton Dust, a significant health risk was shown and the Court insisted that the
public health norm be wholeheartedly vindicated without regard to costs and benefits.1 99 The mediating technique that
emerges from the two decisions is the delineation of independent spheres of application, within each of which a single
conception could hold total sway. The Court has taken a
rather different mediating approach in other instances of conflict among paradigms. For example, in the context of newproperty hearing rights, the threshold qualification for protection is solely a function of entitlement, but considerations
of
200
production help to determine the process that is due.
Benzene and Cotton Dust also provide a lesson about the
relative status of the three conceptions. When the relevant
public values are ascertainable and definite, they must be
respected even in the face of a conflicting claim of production.
Arguments based on production do not have the constitutional
authority that is necessary to override a legislative consensus
favoring a different value. Principles of entitlement, by con-

195 448 U.S. at 639-45 (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist found the statutory
provision for setting standards to be so vague that it amounted to an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. Id. at 687-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment). He thus would have given to Congress the choice among the competing
conceptions, in accordance with the formalist thesis.
199 ioi S. Ct. at 2491-92; see Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150-5

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (r98o). Firms must generally reduce significant risks as long as it is economically and technologically feasible to do so; but
courts use the right of defense to ensure that regulatory requirements are feasible and
will not cause widespread plant shutdowns and unemployment. See, e.g., American
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), Io S. Ct. 2478 (I98i); National Lime
Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. I98O). Because avoidance of shutdowns is a
crude proxy for production, this result represents a further form of mediation between
competing conceptions. A similar approach is followed in decisions in which an
injunction against an industrial facility is sought on grounds of nuisance. See Reserve
Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Reynolds Metals Co. v.
Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (r958).
When this mediating technique is inapplicable, the basic responsibility for balancing production concerns and regulatory norms is left to the agency, subject to a "hard
look" standard of review. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (coal-fired power plants).
200 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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trast, may prevail over general public purposes, as in cases
involving the first amendment or constitutional "takings."
3. The Formal-FunctionalDilemma. - In attempting to
remedy deficient agency performance, courts frequently encounter a persistent dilemma. Private entitlements to regulatory protection or other government benefits are of two types,
formal and functional. Formal entitlements are established by
common law or statute; they define a relation between rightholders and duty-bearers that empowers a rightholder to prohibit or command specific conduct by a duty-bearer. Such
entitlements, although enforceable as rights with definite content, do not necessarily protect particularly important interests
of the rightholder. The right to redress insignificant invasions
of the exclusive possession of land illustrates this point. Another example is the requirement in the Veterans' Act that
veterans' benefits checks must be mailed in envelopes bearing
the notice "POSTMASTER: PLEASE FORWARD if addressee
20 1
has moved and filed a regular change-of-address notice."
A functional entitlement, by contrast, is a morally
grounded claim to protection of interests or expectations that
are central to private security and liberty of action. Although
a functional entitlement need not be embodied in any existing
common law rule or statutory text, many common law rules
protecting privacy, reputation, and liberty of the person are
functional as well as formal.
For reasons cataloged above, the common law system
proved ill equipped to adapt to industrial conditions. Although
the common law still protected formal entitlements, in many
cases those entitlements either could no longer be effectively
enforced or had lost their functional significance. Administrative agencies were created in part to correct these shortcomings
and to define and secure new and important liberties, such as
freedom from discrimination.
When asked to create remedies to correct inadequate administrative protection of entitlements, courts face serious
problems. Courts might attempt to identify those private interests that are functionally important and to protect them by
creating formal entitlements to regulatory protection, newproperty benefits, or freedom from regulatory impositions.
Whether based on constitutional principles or federal common
law, however, this approach would require courts to select
certain private economic and social interests as "basic" or
"fundamental" - a hazardous enterprise that might appear
subjective and arbitrary. By creating entitlements to particu201

38 U.S.C. § 302o(a) (1976).
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lar forms of regulatory protection, government assistance, or immunity from regulatory control, this approach would also impair needed administrative or legislative flexibility.
Rather than create formal entitlements to protect interests
they deem basic, courts might instead attempt to supervise
regulatory programs to ensure that the functional entitlements
recognized by the legislature in creating a program are in fact
secured. But courts are ill suited to perform this managerial
task.
Finally, courts might adopt a purely formal approach and
provide remedies to protect whatever entitlements the legislature or agencies have cast in formal terms. Since by hypothesis
a political branch has concluded that it is desirable to define
the relevant interests in formal terms, protecting those interests
through private remedies cannot as readily be attacked as
subjective or arbitrary, and will probably disrupt administration less than a system in which courts define formal entitlements on their own. But the formal entitlements created by
a legislature or agency will not necessarily be functionally
important, and it is unclear why courts should create remedies
to protect unimportant interests. Moreover, many functional
entitlements may not be recognized at all under positive law.
This, then, is the formal-functional dilemma. Courts are
ill equipped to identify functional entitlements or to give them
enforceable content. But if courts protect only formal entitlements created by positive law, they may fail to carry forward
their historic function of securing important private liberties
and expectations.

IV. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF DEFENSE
Between 1885 and 1940, the federal courts created rights
of defense to enable individuals and regulated firms to prevent
20 2
agencies from imposing controls not authorized by statute.
Courts repeatedly held that due process requires a hearing and
judicial review when administrators impose taxes or assessments, 20 3 fix prices, 20 4 or regulate business activity in other
ways. 20 5 The right of defense was originally founded on a
202 See L. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 339-43. See generally Stewart, supra note 13,
at 1671-76, 1723-25 (traditional model required regulation to conform to specific
legislative standards, and granted standing to challenge any regulation to plaintiffs
whose "legal right" under common law was infringed).
203 See, e.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (19o8).
204 See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300-05
(i937); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (189o).
205 See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 198-99 (i933).
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stable system of common law liberty and property rights. In
the original conception of the Republic, the independent judiciary was to protect these rights against political factions
bent on the exploitation of government power for parochial
ends. 20 6 Administrative intrusions on common law rights were
regarded as presumptively illegitimate and required explicit
20 7
legislative authorization.
This traditional, pre-New Deal model of administrative
law integrated the conceptions of entitlement, production, and
public values. Property rights were protected by hearings and
judicial review. 20 Production was likewise served by limiting
regulatory intrusion on private investment decisions. And the
requirement of clearly stated legislative authorization for regulatory intervention 20 9 furthered public values by placing policy decisions in the hands of elected representatives rather than
2 10
those of administrative officials.
In championing the creation of rights of defense, early
students of administrative law viewed agency discretion with
great suspicion. Ernst Freund and John Dickinson, for example, believed that such discretion was a temporary expedient that would disappear once the legislature and reviewing
courts had accumulated sufficient experience to fix clear and
21
consistent regulatory principles. '
These attitudes were challenged during the New Deal, as
the number of federal regulatory agencies - and their powers
- were expanded significantly -in response to the breakdown
of the private economy. This breakdown inspired the defenders of the new agencies to create a novel administrative jurisprudence, based on the notion that full employment and
productivity could be achieved only by replacing decentralized
private ordering of economic life with centralized public man206 See sources cited supra note 154; infra note 357.
207 See" Stewart, supra note 13, at 1673-76.
20 See, e.g., ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91-94 (1913); see also
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108-10 (1902)
(right of review).
209 See, e.g., ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1897); ICC v.
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 505 (1897).
210 Repeated judicial invocation of clear-statement principles could actually subvert
public values by restricting regulation designed to increase public supervision or
control of economic and social life. See cases cited supra note 209. Congress has
sometimes responded to such rulings by explicitly expanding an agency's statutory
authority. See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 32 (1962);
I I. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 22-35 (1931).
211 See E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 97-

103, 580-83 (1928); see also J. DICKINSON, supra note 164, at 203-35 (noting, however,
that there will be some areas in which the courts and legislature will not be able to
accumulate experience because the fact situations that arise will be unique).
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agement. From this perspective, administrative discretion represented not a necessary evil, but an opening for desirable
managerial initiatives in the service of production. 2 12 Technocratic premises were invoked to reconcile broad agency discretion with the conception of public values. There was a
public consensus that it was necessary to expand production;
agency professionals who were "bred to the facts,"' 2 13 it was
believed, could diagnose the malaise of the old economic order
and administer the necessary restorative tonic. It was on this
premise that James Landis could assert that agencies were a
mechanism by which "our democratic institutions" could ensure "the economic integrity of industries and their normal
2 14
development."
This view was utterly inconsistent with a conception of
economic ordering based on a stable set of private entitlements.
Many members of the bar seized upon this inconsistency to
decry the New Deal goal of regulatory management as a flimsy
pretext for administrative absolutism. 2 15 The defenders and
critics of the New Deal eventually achieved a working compromise, in which broad delegations of discretion were tolerated as long as they were checked by extensive procedural
216
safeguards.
These procedural safeguards have been extended in the
past twenty years, as courts have created a strong presumption
in favor of rights of defense even when the relevant organic
statute does not authorize them. 2 17 Defense rights have also
218
been strengthened by the development of "hard look" review
and by the use of clear-statement principles to restrict agency
219
power.
The kernel of "hard look" review is the requirement that
agencies explain and justify their exercise of discretion on the
basis of a detailed record containing data and analysis both
for and against the agency's position. Such review seeks to
212 See J. LANDIS, supra note 5o, at 14-16. Dean Landis argued that government

regulation, as a form of public business enterprise, is no more amenable to a system

of trial-type hearings and judicial review than is private business. See id. at io-I2.
213 Id. at I55.
214Id.at i6.
215 See sources cited in K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.7, at 24

(2d ed. 1978).
216 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-7o6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
217 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-43 (1967).
218 See cases cited in S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 30, at 291-309;
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509 (i974).

219 See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 63-52 (i98o) (plurality opinion); Note, supra note 143, at 899-907.
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discipline agency discretion through scrutiny of the economic
costs and technological feasibility of compliance with regulations and of the benefits that compliance will assertedly
produce.
"Hard look" review has been supplemented by judicial
principles of clear statement that limit an agency's discretion
to impose burdensome regulations, even when the agency has
seemingly been delegated broad powers by Congress. The
plurality opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute (Benzene)220 illustrates this
use of clear-statement principles. 22 1 The plurality held that
OSHA had authority to regulate only "significant risks" of
occupational disease. In reaching this result, the plurality concluded that "[i]n the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it
is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give
[OSHA] the unprecedented power over American industry that
would result from the Government's view" 2 22 that "significant"
risks need not be established before imposing controls costing
223
hundreds of millions of dollars.
220 448 U.S. 607, 6iz (i98o).
221 Id. at 639-52.
222 Id. at 645. This position, which commanded only a plurality of four, is
consonant with the hostility to regulatory burdens evident in an increasing number of
lower court decisions. See, e.g., Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978); American Meat Inst. v. USDA, 496 F. Supp.
64 (E.D. Va. 198o), vacated and remanded, 646 F.2d 125 (4 th Cir. 1981). It is also
consistent with other Supreme Court decisions that have protected private investment
and business activity from administrative control on quite different rationales, including first amendment protection of commercial advertising, see, e.g., Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566-71 (i98o); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-70 (1976), and a modest revival of the contracts clause, see Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
223 448 U.S. at 641 & n.46. The plurality's concern for production was underscored
in the concurrences. See, e.g., id. at 664 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[Riesponsible
administration calls for avoidance of extravagant, comprehensive regulation. Perfect
safety is a chimera; regulation must not strangle human activity in the search for the
impossible."); id. at 669 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (expressing concern over "the ability of American industries to compete effectively with foreign
businesses and to provide employment for American workers").
The plurality also indicated that OSHA's suggested construction of the statute
might represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 448 U.S. at 646.
To the extent that the nondelegation doctrine simply prohibits Congress from delegating fundamental policy choices, that suggestion was misguided. As Justice Marshall
pointed out in dissent, there would be no delegation problem if Congress explicitly
authorized OSHA to require the elimination of all carcinogens to the extent technologically and economically feasible. See id. at 717-18 n.3o (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Although he accepted Justice Marshall's point, Justice Rehnquist found the relevant
provision of the OSHA statute so ambiguous that he would have invalidated it as an
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What is the source of the federal courts' authority to create
this modern system of defense rights? To answer this question,
we look to the three conceptions of institutional purpose; we
also discuss whether defense rights are constitutional or nonconstitutional in status. We begin by examining these rights
in relation to the entitlement conception.
A system of defense rights aimed at protecting entitlements
would need to derive those entitlements from one of three
sources of substantive law - the Constitution, common law,
or statutes. 2 24 First, when administrative controls transgress
a substantive constitutional limit on government, 225 such as
the first amendment, judicial review is probably required by
the due process clause. 226 Only a few rights of defense, however, could be accounted for in this way. Most regulation falls
2 7
well short, for example, of a "taking" of property2
If common law entitlements were "liberty" or "property"
subject to the procedural protections of the due process clause,
unconstitutional delegation. See id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
224 The general jurisdictional statutes cannot fairly be read to grant federal courts
general power to create such remedies. See supra pp. 1220-21. Nor can the current
system of rights of defense be explained solely by reference to the Administrative
Procedure Act. First, the APA cannot plausibly be read to create a "hard look"
doctrine. Second, the current system creates a presumption in favor of rights of
defense even when the APA is inapplicable. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974). Third, the APA provisions for review were originally designed to codify
existing judge-made law by allowing rights of defense not whenever there was "injury
in fact," but only at the behest of (i) those suffering an injury to common law
interests, and (2) those adversely affected or aggrieved under the relevant organic
statute. See Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 41; Stewart,
supra note 13, at 1723-30. If, however, the APA can be read to create a general rule
of reviewability in the context of rights of defense, it should also be so read in the
context of rights of initiation.
225 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (first amendment); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota,
134 U.S. 4r8, 458 (289o) (reasonableness of railroad rate "is eminently a question for
judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination").
226 Professor Hart suggests that due process requires judicial review when the
government acts coercively against an individual. Hart, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv.
1362, 1386-1401 (1953), reprinted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 14, at 330. The
Court has endorsed this argument in situations in which the government curtails an
individual's physical liberty. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (iq8o), discussed at
infra note 232.
227 Any regulation of property use, including most regulation of business, presents
a potential "taking" claim that could serve as a basis for judicial review. But the
extent to which government can regulate property use without committing a compensable taking is so vast, see, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978), that this remedy would be of little practical importance. Certainly it cannot account for the "hard look" right of defense afforded by contemporary
courts.
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the common law might provide a foundation for defense rights.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright 228 unambiguously holds that procedural due process protects at least
some categories of common law entitlements against invasion
by a government official. 229 Ingraham involved the allegedly
unjustified corporal punishment of a public school student.
The Court found no substantive constitutional violation, 230 but
nonetheless concluded that the student's interest in personal
security - a core common law right - was entitled to due
process protection. 23 1 Similar reasoning was employed in Vitek
232
v. Jones.
The due process protection found in Ingraham does not,
however, extend to all common law rights. For example, in
numerous cases - including Paul v. Davis23 3 and Barr v.
Matteo234 - the courts have denied any relief under federal
law to citizens defamed by government officials. 235 Many interests protected at common law are less weighty than the
reputation interests at stake in Paul v. Davis and Barr and
would not be regarded today as sufficiently important to merit
due process protection.236 Conversely, courts have often
228 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
229 Id. at 673-74; cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94

(ig8o) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing whether common law rights are protected
under due process clause).
230 430 U.S. at 671.

231 Id. at 672-74 & n.4I. The Court observed that the liberty protected by the
fifth amendment "included the right 'generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' Id. at
673 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).

The Court also found,

however, that the state law remedy furnished all the-process that was due. 430 U.S.
at 676-8o; see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (i98I) (same).
232 445 U.S. 480, 488-94 (1980). In Vitek, the Court held that a state prisoner
who had been duly convicted of a felony had a liberty interest in avoiding involuntary
transfer to a state mental institution for the duration of his sentence. His conviction
did not extinguish his interest in avoiding the additional personal constraints accompanying such commitment; due process still required an administrative hearing on his
mental condition. Id. at 491-96.
233 424 U.S. 693, 699-7o,

710-12 (1976).

234 36o U.S. 564 (1959) (denying damage remedy for libel against official on ground
that statement was privileged); see also Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters. v.
Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (governmental official held
to have absolute immunity from liability for defamation), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978).

235 Although Barrwas not explicitly decided on constitutional grounds - it treated
defamation as a common law rather than a constitutional injury - its preclusion of
a damage remedy against the responsible official, when coupled with Paul v. Davis'
denial of an administrative hearing, forecloses federal relief for defamation by federal
officials. Barr is explained in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 487-95 (1978).
236 Consider, for example, a government official's trespass that causes no physical
or economic injury.
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created rights of defense even when no common law right was
at stake. 23 7 Accordingly, the current system of defense rights
cannot be justified by common law entitlements. And in light
of the formal-functional dilemma, an equation of defense rights
and common law entitlements would be undesirable.
A third potential source of judicial authority to create rights
of defense might be statutory limits on agency power. The
Constitution does not require a right of defense whenever a
statutory violation is alleged, but some statutory limits arguably create corresponding formal entitlements for persons or
entities subject to regulation. 238 As we develop later in the
context of new-property hearing rights and private rights of
action, due process may demand procedural protection for such
formal entitlements. 239 Because of the breadth of statutory
delegations of lawmaking power to administrative agencies,
however, such entitlements are irrelevant to most regulatory
controversies. 240 Certainly, "hard look" review of agency discretion cannot be justified by such statutorily derived entitlements.
Thus, the entitlement conception that once provided the
foundation for defense rights can no longer serve as their
principal justification. Numerous factors combine to make
futile any effort to identify fixed, judicially enforceable limits
on agency authority. The factors include the pervasiveness of
regulation, the inevitable discretion enjoyed by agencies in
resolving difficult technical issues, 24 1 the need to adjust regulations in light of changing circumstances, and the fact that
regulation affects the economic welfare of firms in many different, often unexpected ways. 2 4 2 A useful illustration is the
Benzene case itself, in which the petroleum industry protested
237 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (i67) (promulgation of

labeling regulations).
238 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 1718. For discussion of the absence of constitutional grounding for the view that a remedy must be available for every statutory
wrong, see generally infra pp. 1255-67.
239See infra pp. 1262, 1266, 1307-16.

240 Courts have taken a "hard look" when the relevant organic statute does not
provide for judicial review at all, see, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (i97i) (Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 138, 23 U.S.C.
§ 138 (1976); Department of Transportation Act of 1966, § 4 (f), 49 U.S.C. § 138
(1976)), as well as when the statute provides for review in general terms, see, e.g.,
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 927 (1974); cases cited infra note 246.
241 See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1145-47 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. r042 (ig8o).
242 See Koch & Leone, The Clean Water Act: Unexpected Impacts on Industry, 3
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 84 (i979).
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OSHA's lowering of the standard for occupational exposure to
benzene from ten parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. The
epidemiological data on the relevant health risks were inconclusive. 243 The extra costs of complying with the stricter standard were high, but would not force industry shutdowns.
How can constitutional entitlements, common law rules of
property or tort, or opaque statutory language 244 explain the
"hard look" approach that eight Justices took to review of the
245
technical issues involved?
A public values conception is also inadequate to explain
judicial creation of "hard look" review in defense cases. For
the most part, the aim is neither to vindicate regulatory norms
nor to establish a community forum for dialogue; 24 6 it is instead to protect private investment and management from
governmental intrusions. Hearing rights and judicial review
are enlisted, through a case-by-case process of federal commonlaw-making, to limit and justify the economic burden of particular regulatory initiatives. Both the plurality opinion in
Benzene 247 and numerous lower court decisions probing the
technological and economic explication of regulatory
controls 248 make it plain that the modern24 defense
right rests
9
principally upon a production conception.
243 448 U.S. at 634-35.
244 The statute at issue in Benzene states that the agency is to take action "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places
of employment," 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976); standards should be designed to assure,
"to the extent feasible,... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health
or functional capacity." Id. § 655(b)(5).
245 The plurality's effort to develop a "significant risk" test could be seen as an
effort to develop a substitute for common law rules; but the test is inherently subjective, and its outcome is inevitably determined by an ad hoc balancing of the putative
justification of a particular regulation against the burdens that regulation imposes on
private production. For further discussion of Benzene, see supra pp. 1243-44.
246 Occasionally, however, "hard look" review is justified as a means of assuring
that an agency's decisions are responsive to the various norms reflected in the governing statute, even though such norms may be so general or vague that they do not
fix precise limits on the agency's authority. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 3536 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); id. at 652 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in
result); Leventhal, supra note 218, at 51I.
247 See supra p. 1249.

248 E.g., McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 65c F.2d
1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981); Central Power & Light Co. v. United States, 634
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 198o); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.
I980); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 662-67 (ist Cir. 1974).
249 If an agency regulation is simultaneously attacked by a beneficiary claiming it
to be inadequate and by industry claiming it to be excessive, both a public values
and a production conception may come into play. See supra note 197.
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It is no accident that the rise of "hard look" review coincided with the implementation of a new generation of costly
and intrusive "social" regulations, 250 a sharp deterioration in
the performance of the American economy, 25 1 and mounting

distrust of bureaucratic institutions disciplined neither by the
market nor by demonstrable political accountability. 25 2 For a
variety of institutional reasons, 253 Congress has been unable
to provide an appropriate corrective, either by rewriting organic statutes or through case-by-case review of particular
initiatives. 25 4 Drawing on the production conception as a
background understanding, courts have sought to fill the gap
in order to prevent unwarranted regulatory impositions on the
national economy. New Deal administrative jurisprudence,
which counseled deference to the expertise of regulators as the
surest path to a productive economy, has thus been stood on
its head.
But the courts' development of "hard look" defense rights
rests on more than a naked concern with economic productivity. In creating rights of defense in the face of statutory si250 Broader notions of productivity, including the value of renewable resources

and human capital, often offer a more powerful justification for health, safety, and
environmental regulation than do conventional measures of economic output. See A.
FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT (1979). But popular

and judicial perceptions of the benefits of such regulation are framed primarily in
moral rather than economic terms, in part because of the difficulties in measuring
these broader values. See infra pp. 1296-97 & note 418.
251 See generally G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981) (analyzing reasons for
deterioration in the American economy's performance).
252 See generally J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY (1978) (examining "crisis"
in the administrative process, its sources, and the legitimacy of administrative agencies); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1711-6o (chronicling expansion of the traditional
model of administrative law to allow fuller representation of interests affected by
agency action).
253 The legitimacy that Congress might lend to agency actions through close
legislative attention has not been forthcoming; the nature of bureaucracies, Congress'
own crowded agenda, and severe information limitations have precluded serious
supervision. See e.g., W. NISKANEN, supra note 173 (discussing information difficulties faced by Congress in evaluating administrative performance).
254 The legislative veto is intended to provide such congressional review, but both
its practical effectiveness, see Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1409-12,
1414-17 (1977) (wide range of effectiveness in negotiations between Congress and
agencies; time burdens inhibit effective review in Congress), and its constitutionality,
see Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, Nos. 80-2184, -2312 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29,
1982); Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 4o8, 429-36 ( 9 th Cir.
I98O), cert. granted, io2 S. Ct. 87 (i98I), are subject to serious question.
The Bumpers Amendment, which would strengthen judicial review of agency
action, see 125 CONG. REC. S12,I 4 5 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979), would essentially
delegate policymaking responsibility to the courts and endorse the development of
"hard look" review.

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1254 1981-1982

1982]

1255

PRIVATE RIGHTS

lence, courts have continued to perform their historic role of
limiting governmental intrusions upon private ordering. This
practice belies the formalist thesis and the claim that judicial
creation of remedies violates principles of separation of powers.
Rights of defense secure production only very imperfectly,
however; courts are institutionally ill equipped to assess the
technical and managerial questions presented by regulatory
controversies. Moreover, as charged in the Benzene dissent,
clear-statement limits on agency discretion can become a device for judicial usurpation of legislative authority to define
2 55
public norms.
These drawbacks support the conclusion that rights of defense, particularly those of the "hard look" variety, are usually
not constitutionally mandated, but are instead a form of federal common law. Concededly, rights of defense are constitutionally required in some circumstances: when a prohibited
"taking" is involved or some other constitutional provision has
been violated; when there has been an infringement of a common law interest, such as personal security, that is part of the
"liberty" protected by the due process clause; or when formal
statutory limits on regulatory power create entitlements that
are also protected by the due process clause as "liberty" or
"property." 256 In such cases, rights of defense must be made
available against state as well as federal regulators. But there
is a far broader category of cases, including "hard look" cases,
in which judicial creation of rights of defense represents no
more than federal common law; in such cases, rights of defense
apply only to federal measures and are subject to preclusion
by Congress.
V.

NEW-PROPERTY HEARING RIGHTS

257

During the past fifteen years, federal courts have held that
due process requires procedural safeguards for many statutory
benefits, even though an individual's interest in these benefits
is not protected by the common law or by any substantive
provision of the Constitution. The basic purpose of these
safeguards is to ensure that benefits are in fact provided to
those entitled to them under the applicable statute. 258 The
255 In this respect, Justice Marshall's reference to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (19o5), was apt. See 448 U.S. at 723-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
256 See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (i9o8); infra pp. 1256-57, 1266.
257 The term "new property" is taken, of course, from Reich, supra note xoo.
258 The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the purpose of procedural

protection is to ensure accurate application of the relevant statute. See, e.g., Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-62 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1255 1981-1982

1256

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1193

leading cases - involving government employment, the administration of public education, and the provision of assistance and disability payments - typically concern benefits
that are private rather than collective, in that they can be
conferred on one individual without being conferred on oth25 9
ers.
The Supreme Court has held that due process protection
is limited to "liberty" rights safeguarded by the Constitution
and "property" rights derived from federal or state statutes
and regulations or from state common law. Such "property"
entitlements are created by provisions that limit an administrator's choice rather than grant him broad discretion. For
example, a statute providing that an employee may be fired
only for cause creates a "property" right; statutory authority
to discharge at will defeats any such claim of right. 260 More
specifically, the following criteria have been used in determining whether a "property" interest has been created:
(i) Class of entitlement-holders. Does the relevant statute
26 1
explicitly define the class holding such entitlements?
(2) Incisiveness. Does the statute furnish criteria that enable a court readily to determine, without extrapolating from
general statutory purposes, whether the decisionmaker has vi262
olated a statutory duty in any given case?
(3) Responsiveness. To what extent does the statute require
a strongly responsive administrative decision, in which the
(1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972). The process required normally
consists of an administrative proceeding in which the individual claiming an entitlement may participate. The proceeding need not always precede the deprivation. See
Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. I, I9 (1978); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-43 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, I56-58
(1974) (plurality opinion). Judicial review of the merits is ordinarily available, al-

though it has not been determined whether such review is required by due process.
In some cases, the alternative of a damage remedy against responsible officials may
satisfy due process. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 65I, 678 (1977).
259 In this respect, new-property hearing rights resemble common law remedies
and rights of defense, which also protect benefits that are primarily private.
260 In some cases, however, due process may require administrators to adopt
ascertainable standards of decision. See Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398
F.2d 262, 264-65 (2d Cir. x968); Ressler v. Landrieu, 502 F. Supp. 324 (D. Alaska
i98o); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 4o6 F. Supp. 1134, 1139-40 (D.N.H. 1976). Such
standards may in turn create entitlements that trigger procedural safeguards.
261 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 4o8 U.S. 564 (1972); see also Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 5o U.S.L.W. 4247, 4250 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (under the
relevant statute, "claimant has more than an abstract desire or interest in redressing
his grievance: his right to redress is guaranteed by the State").

262 See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565

(r975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Aero Schirch v. Thomas, 486 F.2d
69I (7th Cir. 1973).
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result depends on information put forward by the individual
claimant rather than on information
submitted by others or on
26 3
general considerations of policy?

(4) Polarity. Does the statute establish rights and obligations solely between the claimant and government officials, 2or
64
must the rights of third parties also be taken into account?
(5)Individuation. Is the benefit personal in character, like
265
a welfare check, or collective, like clean air?

The Court has thus defined new-property hearing rights
formally rather than functionally. It has declined to extend
due process safeguards to discretionary exercises of official
power that affect important personal interests, 266 even though
general statutory purposes or social policies might be elabo2 67
rated to limit the exercise of that discretion.
A formal definition of entitlements was not inevitable. The
Court might have sought to identify those interests that are as
central to individual well-being in contemporary society as
were the interests protected at common law in a different era.
The judicial discretion inherent in any such task has been a
major factor in the Court's refusal to follow a functional approach. 268 Moreover, if courts were to select certain "impor263 See Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (ist Cir. 197o); Eisenberg, supra note 36.

264 Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due process protection for
social security benefits), with O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S.
773, 788 (198o) (no due process protection in context of transfer from a particular
nursing home when governmental action is "directed against a third party and affects
the citizen only indirectly or incidentally"), and Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (Ist
Cir. 1970) (no due process protection in context of rent increase in federally subsidized
housing when increase would affect many persons).
265 Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (976) (due process protection for
social security benefits), with O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S.
773, 799-8OI (i98o) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (where alleged deprivation of property affects i8o patients, it is impracticable to give each a hearing),
and Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (no substantive
constitutional right to clean air).
266 See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1 (1979) (parole); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (976) (prison transfer);
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (defamation).
267 See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
265 For criticism of the Court's formal approach, see K. DAvIs, supra note 215,
§§ 11:13, :14;L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ io-II, -12 (1978);
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977); Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977). Professor Van Alstyne suggests that
the formal new-property approach be rejected in favor of a standard that recognizes
an independent liberty interest in "freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures."
Id. at 487.
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tant" interests as those deserving due process protection, they
might be driven to give those interests substantive as well as
procedural protection; procedural rights alone might be of little
value if administrators were free to decide cases as they pleased
as long as procedural formalities were observed. 269 A functional approach could thus invite courts to rule the welfare
state through a new form of substantive due process.
A. Sources of Authority for Judicial Imposition of Procedural
Requirements
Even a formal approach to defining entitlements must address the question of judicial authority to create procedural
remedies beyond those provided by the legislature. If the
legislature is free to grant or withhold statutory benefits, why
should it not be equally free to select the remedies through
which the statutory plan is vindicated? 270 There are several
possible answers.
i. Legislative Candor. - The legislature may be evading
accountability for its actions when it purports to grant statutory entitlements but simultaneously specifies enforcement procedures that substantially but surreptitiously diminish the protection afforded. Democratic processes could arguably be
strengthened if courts were to insist on procedures that forced
27 1
Congress to deliver on its substantive promises.

269 A court could conceivably require procedural formalities, such as a hearing,
whenever it found a functional entitlement, but leave administrators free to exercise
statutorily conferred discretion on the merits. Such procedural protection of entitlements would not be absurd; an administrator exercising otherwise unreviewable discretion might, because of a hearing, become sympathetic to an individual's claim. See
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in NoMos:
DUE PROCESS 126 (3. Pennock and J. Chapman eds. 1977). Nevertheless, it would
be much more logical for courts to protect functional entitlements through substantive
as well as procedural review; without substantive limitations, procedural checks could
have little consequence.
270See Easterbrook, Due Process and Parole Decisionmaking, in PAROLE IN THE
8o's, at 77 (B. Borsage ed. 1981); cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974)

(plurality opinion) (employee challenging limited procedural safeguards in statute that
requires "cause" for discharge "must take the bitter with the sweet").
271 The argument is similar to the "structural due process" approach. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 268, §§ 17-1 to -3; Tribe, Structural Due Process, io HARV. C.R.-

C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (I98o)
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (Congress must demonstrate reasons for its action); Linde,
supra note 136 (role of due process clause is to provide procedural protection in
lawmaking, not to restrict the legislature's use of constitutional ends or means);
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162 (I977) (courts
should overturn only legislation that Congress does not appear to have considered
fully).
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This argument, however, ignores the political necessity and
virtue of compromise. Limited procedural protections may
have been necessary to obtain sufficient legislative support for
the substantive entitlement in the first place. More fundamentally, the most basic separation-of-powers considerations prohibit courts from seizing on the due process clause as a basis
for imposing their own notions of political responsibility on
the process by which elected officials make laws. 272 If Congress wishes to enact legislation that is to some degree hortatory, it is unclear from what source the courts obtain authority
273
to provide otherwise.
2. Honoring Expectations. A variant of the "candor"
argument emphasizes that procedural qualifications of substantive entitlements disappoint reasonable expectations derived
from the public's understanding of legislation. 2 74 Under this
theory, citizens are aware of substantive statutory entitlements,
but are ignorant of the procedural riders that compromise
those entitlements. In its traditional role as guardian of reasonable expectations, the judiciary may demand procedures
that will enable citizens to plan their activities with an en2 75
hanced sense of security.
This argument too rests on shaky ground. Do citizens
really know that statutes contain formal entitlements, and is
it likely that those who do know are ignorant of the effect of
procedural riders? Even if statutory procedures might result
in surprise or disappointed expectations, what is the constitutional basis for striking such procedures down if the legislature
believes that they serve important policies, such as reduction
of cost and delay? 2 76 Moreover, arguments based on disappointed expectations must take account of the legislature's rec272 For an argument that such a judicial role may sometimes be appropriate, see
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (ig8o) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Note that
there are more specific constitutional provisions designed to promote political accountability, but it may be that no citizen has standing to enforce them. See Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. I66 (1974).
273 See passage quoted supra note 136.
274 Cf. cases cited infra note 276 (applying principles of estoppel).
275 F. HAYEK, supra note 67, at 205-09.

276 Disappointed expectations have been a factor in judicial application of estoppel
principles against administrators. See, e.g., United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481
F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 ( 9th Cir.
1970); Roberts v. United States, 357 F.2d 938 (Ct. Cl. i966). But estoppel is by no
means automatic, see, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 38o (1947)

(Frankfurter, J.); Montilla v. United States, 457 F.2d 978 (Ct. Cl. 1972), and it has
never been suggested that estoppel of administrators - much less of federal and state
legislators - is constitutionally required.
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ognized power to disappoint expectations through amendment
2 77
or repeal of statutes that confer new-property entitlements.
3. The Ontological Argument. - Professor Michelman has
suggested that, in a system based on legal rights, it may be
unnecessary to find a "functional" explanation for due process
protection of entitlements. 278 In the separation-of-powers
scheme, the essential duty of the judiciary is to enforce and
defend legal rights. 2 79 The legislature has broad discretion in
creating such rights, but once they are created the judiciary
2 80
has the power to enforce them.
Unquestionably, this way of thinking exercises a powerful
hold on the legal mind. But is it so fixed in the Constitution
as to disable Congress from providing for delivery of welfare
benefits through systems that do not involve the courts? The
administrative necessities of an industrial age caution against
reading the due process clause to forbid departures from traditional methods of vindicating legal rights.
4. Nondelegation Considerations. - Under the nondelegation doctrine, the legislature is required to confine the authority of administrative officials through relatively precise
standards or directives. 28 1 This requirement serves three principal purposes. First, it promotes political accountability by
ensuring that policies are made by elected representatives
rather than administrators. 282 Second, it promotes predicta277 See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. i66 (ig8o); Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (ig6o).
The expectations argument for due process protection might be based instead on
a system of functional entitlements designed to foster certain types of expectations
deemed intrinsically worthwhile. See C. FRIED, supra note 142. But for reasons
already discussed, the Court has rejected this approach, on the apparent premise that
judicial reason is inadequate to the task. See supra pp. 1257-58. Still another
approach would provide procedural protection to those expectations that are "objectively reasonable" because they are rooted in community practice and custom. See
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); F. HAYEK, supra
note 167, at 94-io9. But the identification of such expectations and customs is a task
that may be beyond judicial competence in a pluralistic, dynamic society.
278 Michelman, supra note 269.

279 The third-party beneficiary doctrine in contract law is a familiar example. See
Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Serv., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1877, 392 N.E.2d 1045.
280 This argument resembles that made by Justice Frankfurter. See, e.g., supra
pp. 1225-26.

281 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F, Supp. 732 (D.D.C. 197);
Stewart, supra note 13, at 1693-97. The requirement has been used almost exclusively
to confine discretion in the context of rights of defense; it has never been applied to
require Congress to limit the discretion of government officials in the dispensation of
new-property benefits. But see Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. r968) (due process requires administrators to draft ascertainable standards
to select residents for public housing).
282 See J. ELY, supra note 145, at 131-34, 177.
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bility for individuals benefited or burdened by regulatory programs. Third, it protects against arbitrary or discriminatory
action by minimizing the discretion of administrators. By serving the latter two functions, the nondelegation doctrine simul-

283
taneously promotes due process and equal protection goals.

Despite the threat to the constitutional structure posed by
broad delegation to agencies, federal courts have generally
failed to enforce the nondelegation doctrine. This failure can
be explained partly by the difficulty of prescribing how much
delegation is permissible, and partly by the spectre of wholesale invalidation of established administrative programs. 28 4 A
formal approach to due process protection of statutory benefits
operates as a substitute for the nondelegation doctrine that
avoids the crippling defects of that doctrine.
The formal approach is, to be sure, only a "second best"
substitute, for it does not require the legislature to make "hard
political choices" by enacting precise statutes. 28 5 But it does
serve the latter two purposes of the nondelegation doctrine.
If Congress has chosen to mandate statutory benefits in specific
terms, new-property hearing rights help to ensure predictability and to combat arbitrariness in the distribution of those
benefits, without endangering entire statutory programs or requiring judicial review of the legislature's decision to delegate
discretion. 28 6 Moreover, to some degree procedural safeguards
283 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 5o U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982)

(equal protection), discussed at infra note 395; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972) (due process; void-for-vagueness doctrine promotes predictability
and limits discretion); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
io9 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (i96o) (due process).
284 See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980); id. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (indicating that
toxic substance provisions of OSHA should be invalidated); supra note 245.
285 Indeed, it is quite possible that procedural requirements may discourage Congress from enacting specific provisions, because specificity would cause courts to
demand procedural safeguards that would not be required if a statute simply left
decisions to an administrator's discretion. There is, however, little evidence of any
such effect.
286 There are substantial dangers of discrimination when no standards constrain
the exercise of official discretion. The dangers may be equally severe when standards
have been promulgated without a mechanism for ensuring that they are respected by
the relevant officials. Political and operational considerations make courts reluctant
to invalidate broad delegations on equal protection grounds. But cf. Holmes v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (absence of "ascertainable
standards" in allocation of subsidized housing creates "an intolerable invitation to
abuse" that violates due process). But when the legislature is able to agree upon
substantive provisions limiting administrative discretion, courts are competent to impose procedural safeguards that will ensure adherence to the provisions and decrease
the risk of arbitrariness and discriminatory treatment.
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may promote political accountability by ensuring bureaucratic
conformity to legislative limitations.
In short, although courts may lack the authority and competence to require that Congress legislate with specificity, when
Congress does so of its own volition courts may impose procedural safeguards to ensure that Congress' specific standards
are carried out evenhandedly. 28 7 In this respect, considerations of equal protection and due process also argue in favor
of judicial creation of procedural safeguards for statutory entitlements when the formal criteria are met, at least when the
28 8
legislature has not clearly ruled out such procedures.
Admittedly, new-property hearing rights serve these purposes quite imperfectly. Because such rights attach only when
the political branches cast a benefit in entitlement form, 28 9 a
287 See infra pp. 1295, 1315-16.
288 One may well ask, however, why the notion of entitlement is necessary to
achieve the objectives described. Why not let any citizen bring suit to require that
officials employ accurate procedures to implement legislation that contains specific
directives? Why have courts insisted upon a class of beneficiaries holding individual
entitlements, and why are members of that class the only persons qualified to invoke
those procedural requirements? The answers most probably lie in the entitlement
conception and in associated notions of "private rights" that undergird our conception
of administrative law and the role of the judiciary. See J. VINING, supra note 175.
To the extent that the argument in text rests on the due process clause, it might
be objected that our conclusion cannot be squared with the language of that clause.
The due process clause creates a right to procedural safeguards not when any benefit
is denied, but only when there has been a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property."
For reasons already given, the formal-functional dilemma generally prohibits courts
from selecting particular statutory benefits for treatment as "liberty" or "property."
Nonetheless, when the formal criteria are met, it is proper for the courts to treat
freedom from arbitrary deprivation or other imposition of harm as an aspect of the
liberty and property protected by the due process clause.
289 The various arguments offered in support of judicial authority to create procedural safeguards when the legislature has chosen to impose formal limits on agency
discretion would also seem to support a requirement that specific directives (legislative
or administrative) govern all official action. But courts do not have the competence
to determine the extent to which formal standards are workable or appropriate for
particular benefit programs. A fortiori, the courts are not competent to require the
legislature to confer such benefits where the legislature has not done so in any manner.
Cf. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 39 (1969) (equal protection
may require "remedies which cannot be directly embodied in judicial decrees").
These competing considerations are resolved by imposing on government, as a
matter of due process, the quite modest burden of furnishing some rational justification
for not providing standards for the distribution of statutory benefits. The withholding
of a benefit to which an individual has a plausible claim is a harm, and it is a general
requirement that government justify the infliction of harm.
This compromise is reflected in the cases. In the contexts of parole and employment, in which determinations are necessarily highly subjective and dependent upon
ad hoc evaluations of a broad range of personal factors, courts do not require standards. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
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number of important interests - such as the interest in continued employment - may enjoy no procedural protection
from unwise or arbitrary exercises of discretion. When protection is afforded, moreover, the use of adversary procedures
may prove ineffective or may impede efficient administration
or compromise important program objectives. 290 Accommodating these problems by adjusting the extent of procedural
formalities through "what-process-is-due" balancing is a difficult and often clumsy task. 2 9 1 Nevertheless, the current system of new-property hearing rights does preserve the traditional role of courts in promoting individual security and in
limiting official power, 292 while accommodating the need for
legislative and administrative flexibility under contemporary
conditions.
B. New-Property Hearing Rights and the Three Conceptions
The entitlement conception, not the production or public
values conceptions, explains the new-property hearing right
cases. In these cases, the threshold question - whether an

1 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Welfare and housing benefits,
however, are quite different. At least under current assistance programs, eligibility
involves determinations for which standards are appropriate and often required. See
White v. Roughton, 53o F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Holmes v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F.
Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 50 U.S.L.W.
4247, 4251 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (suggesting that the state had little or no interest in
not affording procedural protection for regulatory benefits in context of civil rights/
employment discrimination). For discussion of Logan, see infra notes 395-96.
Such a compromise approach may be criticized on the ground that it invites openended legislative grants of discretion that create too great a danger to personal security.
But the danger is less serious than that suggested by the possibility that legislatures
might redraft statutes to eliminate language granting formal entitlements. In a juridical society with responsive legislatures, many, perhaps most statutorily protected
interests central to individual liberty and well-being will be defined and protected
through formal directives.
290 See, e.g.,

D.

BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE

JUSTICE 35-69 (974);

P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (969); Frug, Does the
ConstitutionPrevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REv.
942, 101I (1976) (civil service law has sought for ioo years to avoid evidentiary trials
as precondition to removal); Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 200, 223 (972) (noting
that necessity of preserving staff morale diminishes value of prisoners' procedural
rights).
291 See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 775-76 (I974); J.
Mashaw, supra note i85.
292 See supra pp. 1232-35.
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interest constitutes "liberty" or "property" - turns on whether
the criteria of formality are met by positive law. Requiring
hearings when this formal test is satisfied seems entirely unrelated to maximizing production. 293 In the context of government employment, for example, hearing requirements impede
the discharge of incompetent personnel. 2 94 In addition, newproperty hearing rights have not been and cannot be justified
as a means either of bringing the full range of public values
to the government's attention or of recognizing the intrinsic
value of participation in decisionmaking processes. 295 Hearing
rights are designed to secure individual rights to statutory
benefits when claimants meet the relevant formal criteria.
As the degree of formality in statutory benefits declines,
however, the entitlement becomes "thinner"; 29 6 as it becomes
progressively thinner, it no longer "trumps" all other interests.
Agencies are nonetheless charged by statute and by the principle of reasoned discretion with taking these thinner interests
into account and balancing them against competing interests.
To monitor this process, courts have developed techniques to
ensure "interest representation" in administration and "adequate consideration" of all the interests at issue.297
Because no formal or functional individual entitlement is
at stake, these techniques are not constitutionally compelled;

293 See infra note 463.
294 See Frug, supra note 29o, at 99o-96. But see Merrill, Proceduresfor Adverse
Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REv. 196, 272 (I973) (removal procedures "frequently ignore or undervalue the interests of employees"). Similarly, deciding unemployment compensation issues through case-by-case judicial hearings may
impede the larger effort to maintain a healthy work force. See P. NONET, supra note
290.

295 First, the formal criteria used by the Court in rationing due process protection
imply that the purpose of such protection is not to promote participation and dialogue
or otherwise to encourage examination of competing public values. Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (due process protections limited to "legitimate claim[s]
of entitlement" to benefits); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 43o F.2d 1243 (ist Cir. 1970) (no
hearing on tenants' protest of housing project rent increase). Second, the stated aim
of procedural requirements is simply to ensure accuracy in the allocation of entitlements, and may therefore include procedures other than oral hearings. See Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (social security disability benefits may be terminated
on the basis of written submissions by doctors). Third, due process may be satisfied
by damage awards after the deprivation has occurred; this remedy cuts off any
opportunity for those affected to provide input before a decision is made. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
296 For example, a statute might provide that highways may not be built through
parklands if there is a feasible and prudent alternative. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (i97i).

297 Stewart, supra note 23, at 276o-9o. This "interest representation" approach
parallels the weak right of initiation in the regulatory context. See infra pp. 1278-84.
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they are a form of federal common law. Under current due
process doctrine, the existence of constitutional protection thus
depends on the thinness of the relevant entitlement. 298 But
the distinction between this federal common law and the procedures imposed on agencies as a matter of due process is not
always crisp or certain; it is largely one of degree rather than
of kind. Even when the relevant statute does not explicitly
create formal entitlements to benefits, courts have used clearstatement principles to narrow agency authority to withdraw
those benefits without notice and the opportunity for a relatively formal hearing. 29 9 This form of federal common law
parallels the contemporary creation of clear-statement techniques and "hard look" standards in judicial review of federal
regulatory impositions, 30 0 but is based on principles of entitlement rather than of production.
At the same time, when the legislature does define statutory
benefits in formal terms, due process does not always require
a court to insist upon its version of appropriate procedural
safeguards. The justifications we have offered for granting
protection to formally defined statutory benefits do not have
irresistible force. In most cases, they are sufficient to require
a substantial showing by government that procedural safeguards are incompatible with the effective operation of an
administrative program; but once such a showing is made,
they are too diffuse to override it. Ordinarily, courts find that
the legislature has deemed a procedure incompatible only if
the statute explicitly excludes it. But when the statute is so
explicit, courts should in most cases accept the statutory pro30 1
cedures as controlling.
298 See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 795-97 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (Ist Cir. I970).
299 See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979) (using clear-statement
principles to require hearing on decision whether to waive recoupment of social
security overpayments; court "assume[s] congressional solicitude for fair procedure,
absent explicit statutory language to the contrary"); Thompson v. Washington, 497
F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Jamroz v. Blum, 509 F. Supp. 953 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). The
federal courts have also developed other nonconstitutional remedies to protect beneficiaries. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (permitting intervention in administrative proceedings in which termination of
federal welfare grants to states was being considered). In the absence of a clear
statement by Congress excluding such remedies, the question of their constitutional
status need not be and has not been addressed.
300 See supra pp. 1248-49.
301 When a legislature deliberately and conspicuously qualifies substantive measures with procedures that may not correspond fully to judicial notions of accuracy,
the Supreme Court is likely to accept such procedures. It has done so by concluding
either that the process afforded was all that was due, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
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As with rights of defense, however, a small core of interests
enjoys constitutional protection through judicially specified
procedures substantially immune from legislative or administrative efforts to exclude or limit such procedures. As we have
seen, limited categories of important common law rights are
afforded constitutional protection against deprivation by government officials. In a welfare state, an analogous core of
functional entitlements - most conspicuously, the interest in
the means of subsistence - also enjoys such protection. Goldberg v. Kelly30 2 is the new-property analogue of Vitek and

Ingraham. When the legislature has formally conferred entitlements to minimum levels of income, food, or shelter, the
courts have invalidated, with little deference to the legislature
or agency, procedures they regard as inadequate. 3 03 When the
legislature has not conferred basic benefits formally, courts
have invoked due process to require the responsible adminis30 4
trators to adopt formal criteria for dispensing such benefits;
once adopted, those criteria create formal entitlements that
30 5
trigger procedural guarantees of accuracy and impartiality.
If the doctrinal form of new-property hearing rights were
restructured in accordance with this analysis, it would exhibit

527, 543-44 (198z), or that no constitutionally protected entitlement existed, see Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). The Court has shown similar deference in the
regulatory context. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
(seizure of food supplement for misbranding); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(i944) (wartime price controls); cf. The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968) (FPC allowed to use rulemaking rather than adjudicatory hearings to regulate
natural gas prices).
Accordingly, the procedural requirements imposed on both state and federal benefit
programs may be viewed as a form of constitutional common law, because these
requirements may be replaced by well-supported contrary legislation. See Monaghan,
The Supreme Court, z974 Term - Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV.
L. REV. i (i975). There is thus a series of fine gradations in judicial decisions
imposing procedural safeguards, gradations that run along a continuum from statutory
interpretation through federal common law, constitutional common law, and traditional constitutional adjudication. The formalist thesis is hard to square with this
continuum.
302 397 U.S. 254 (,970).
303 See id.; Tatum v. Mathews, 541 F.2d i6i (6th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Matthews, 539 F.2d uiin (8th Cir. 1976); see also Basel v. Knebel, 55I F.2d 395 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding decision denying food stamps pending administrative review of applicant's qualifications).
304 See Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978); Holmes v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); Ressler v. Landrieu, 502 F.
Supp. 324, 328-30 (D. Alaska i98o) (citing Holmes).
305 See supra note 26o.
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a two-tiered structure similar to that of rights of defense: one
tier based on the Constitution, the other on federal common
law.
VI. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF INITIATION

A. Introduction
The private right of initiation is a relatively recent innovation in the control of administrative performance. 30 6 Regulated entities have traditionally been permitted to contest
administrative action in court, but the beneficiaries of regulation have been barred from challenging agency inaction. Principles of prosecutorial discretion partially account for this
asymmetry. Decisions of attorneys general and public prosecutors to initiate or to forgo civil or criminal litigation have
historically been insulated from judicial review. 30 7 With the
advent of modern regulatory agencies, courts have shown similar deference to administrators' decisions on the initiation of
enforcement action. 30 8 When the courts extended principles of
prosecutorial discretion to regulatory programs, however, they
overlooked important differences between the two systems of
public enforcement.
Traditional public law remedies - criminal prosecutions
and actions for injunctions - were frequently supplemented
with private remedies, including private prosecutions 30 9 and
tort actions, 3 10 that enabled citizens to protect their rights even
when the government failed to act. Indeed, legal historians
have suggested that the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion
developed in England and America largely because private
prosecutions were also available. 3 1' In theory, regulatory pro306 See supra pp. 12o5-o6; note ioo.
307 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Howard v. Hodgson, 490

F.2d 194 (8th Cir. i974); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. r521 (1981).
.08 See, e.g., Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1975) (National Labor
Relations Act); Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys. Corp., 43o F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (Consumer Credit Protection Act).
309 See generally Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law,
17 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 315-18 (1973) (until the i 9 th century, the English legal
system relied predominantly on private citizens, rather than on public prosecutors, to
prosecute felonies).
310 If the defendant is indigent, of course, a civil action for damages would hardly
be an adequate remedy.
311 See Langbein, Controlling ProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI.
L. REv. 439, 443-46 (1974). Professor Langbein suggests that the current American
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grams involve a similar mixed enforcement system, because
regulatory statutes have rarely been held to preempt common
law remedies for conduct that might also violate such statutes. 3 12 But the availability of private enforcement is often a
mirage. The inadequacy of conventional common law remedies in dealing with modern industrial conditions was a prin3 13
cipal reason for the creation of regulatory schemes.
The traditional model of administrative law 3 14 encouraged
courts to apply settled principles of prosecutorial discretion to
regulatory enforcement decisions. Government officials were
required to show legislative authorization for their conduct
3 15
only if that conduct violated a citizen's common law rights.
Because the failure of administrative officials to undertake
enforcement would not ordinarily constitute a violation of the
common law rights of statutory beneficiaries, that failure to
act was not reviewable.
Judicial reluctance to intervene was reinforced by prevailing doctrines that conceived the right of review in "all or
nothing" terms. Within this context, a right of initiation, if
recognized, would necessarily be strongly responsive: if a person subject to regulation had violated the relevant statute, the
court would have to mandate specific enforcement action at a
victim's insistence, notwithstanding competing agency priorities and budget constraints. 3 16 Control over the deployment
of enforcement resources would thus be remitted to private
litigants. 3 17 Moreover, a basic purpose of administrative agencies would be thwarted. The Progressives had designed the
regulatory structure to bypass a conservative and unaccountable judiciary; agencies were to be responsible to the legislasystem of plea bargaining partially accounts for the unavailability of private remedies
in the criminal context. See Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea
Bargaining, 13 LAv & Soc'Y REV. 261 (i979). A similar need for negotiated settlements has been relied upon as a reason for denying private rights of action. See supra
pp. 1206-07; infra pp. 1292-93.
312 See Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 247, 237 N.W.2d

266, 275 (1975); State v. Dairyland Power Coop., 152 Wig. 2d 45, 187 N.W.2d 878
(,971). See generally R. STEWVART & J. KRIER, supra note 72, at 548-50 (preclusion

of private actions by regulatory statutes).
313 See supra pp. 1235-39.

314 See Byse & Fiocca, supra note

29;

Note, supra note 29.

315 For discussion of why government enforcement could generally not be com-

pelled under the prerogative writs, such as mandamus, see supra p. 1203 & note

29.

316 In application, of course, the doctrine was less rigid than its logic might imply.
317 Judicial control of regulatory enforcement might have been justified under

classical conceptions if an agency's failure to enforce the law were considered to have
invaded private rights. But no system of private rights to public enforcement had
been developed in the past, perhaps because the historical system of mixed private
and public enforcement allowed for considerable "self help" through private actions.
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ture, which was in turn accountable to the citizenry. From
this perspective, it would be paradoxical to rely on judges to
invigorate administrators.
In the face of these obstacles, how did private initiation
rights gain recognition? First, there developed a now-widespread perception that agencies do not enforce regulatory
norms adequately; both the social responsiveness and the
technical competence of agencies have been questioned, as has
Congress' ability to supervise their performance. 3 18 Second,
judicial review of agency decisions has become considerably
more flexible than the classical "all or nothing" review exercised by the courts in the nineteenth century. Courts have
developed various supervisory techniques 3 19 to review discretion while leaving the agency considerable freedom of action.
Such techniques allow courts to recognize weak initiation
rights, which require only that an agency show a reasonable
justification for failure to take enforcement action. This approach avoids the need to mandate enforcement whenever a
regulatory violation is shown, and allows deference to competing priorities and budgetary limits.
Despite this second development, the creation of initiation
rights still presents special problems. Agencies charged with
providing regulatory benefits 320 have limited resources and

multiple responsibilities, and face severe political and organizational constraints. 3 21 As a result, enforcement decisions are
318 See supra pp. 1226-27.

319 These techniques include new procedural requirements, insistence on reasoned
articulation of the factors governing discretionary decisions, and an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review on the merits. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 133,
at 322-29.
320 The creation of regulatory agencies can be understood as a response to the
failure of market exchange arrangements, as structured by the common law, to secure
certain collective goods (or to remedy collective "bads") whose value rose dramatically
with the industrialization of society. Regulatory protection typically provides collective
goods that have a certain "size" and "shape." "Size" refers to the costs and benefits
of producing particular collective goods. "Shape" refers to the distribution of these
costs and benefits among affected individuals. Economic measures of size and shape
must, of course, be based upon some assumed background of entitlements and wealth
distribution. See Kennedy, supra note i59, at 427-29; Stewart, supra note 13, at
1706-09. Collective goods could be measured by willingness to pay minus compliance
costs, but they might also be measured in physical terms (X cases of lung disease
avoided by installing Y coal power plant scrubbers), or, conceivably, in terms of
impacts on personal well-being (increments or decrements of utility). The choice
among alternative shapes and sizes of regulatory policies typically presents polycentric
problems of resource allocation.
321 These constraints include the need for the cooperation of regulated firms and
the terms on which such cooperation is conditioned, judicial review and the costs and
hazards of litigation, constraints imposed by congressional and executive officials, and
other factors such as media attention and public support. For example, the adoption
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a highly complex - indeed, "polycentric" 3 22 task. In
adopting an enforcement plan, the agency presumably has
weighed the advantages and disadvantages of a variety of
alternative regulatory initiatives. 3 23 A private right of initiation forces a court to compare, with greater or lesser deference
to the agency, the net benefits of the initiative demanded by
the plaintiff with those of the myriad potential alternatives
that the initiative might foreclose. 324 The judiciary, bound to
forensic methods of proof and decision, is poorly equipped to
make such an evaluation. For this and other reasons, 325 control over an agency's allocation of resources is traditionally
regarded as a legislative or executive rather than a judicial
responsibility.
By contrast, a right of defense usually requires a court to
examine only the particular agency initiative at issue. If that
action is invalidated, the agency is ordinarily free to deploy its
resources as it sees fit, subject to judicial review of subsequent
decisions. 326 The right of defense therefore involves a much
more manageable judicial task.
of a more stringent standard for air pollution from coal-fired power plants may require
an agency (i) to ease water pollution standards applicable to those plants, (z) to
appease an influential senator from a coal-producing state by acquiescing in environmentally questionable "synfuel" projects, or (3)to divert scarce analytical and legal
resources from other projects in order to defend litigation initiated by the industry.
Vigorous enforcement in one area, however, does not necessarily entail a reduction
of efforts elsewhere. On the contrary, successful implementation policies may enhance
popular support for an agency, add to its credibility among regulated firms, and thus
facilitate enforcement in other areas.
322 See Fuller, supra note 139, at 393-405.
323 It may be, of course, that the agency has not attempted to optimize (in any
relevant sense) the use of its resources. If courts attempted to determine whether
agencies had made conscientious efforts to optimize resource use, however, they would
encounter many of the difficulties noted in the text. See supra pp. 1210-1i, 1228.
324 Alternatives might include initiatives that the agency does not currently plan
to pursue, but which might be demanded by other plaintiffs not then before the court.
This possibility is most apparent in the case of strong initiation rights, but it also
exists with weak initiation rights. If the agency is required to present a reasoned
justification for inaction and the requirement is to be more than nominal, the court
must assess the initiative demanded against alternative uses of agency resources. And
even a purely procedural requirement of hearings or consultation will have effects on
the allocation of agency resources, effects that the court may be unable to evaluate.
325 See infra note 353.
326 A right of defense might, however, be used to invalidate agency action on the
ground that the action represents a misallocation of agency resources. For example,
an agency might focus on relatively trivial risks, and in the process waste social
resources by directing industry compliance efforts toward these risks and away from
more serious ones. A production approach to review of regulation might imply such
an inquiry, which would be designed to steer the agency toward the optimal use of
limited enforcement and compliance resources. Such an approach, however, would
require the court to undertake the same wide-ranging inquiry into alternative resource
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The fact that initiation rights invite courts to evaluate the
entire pattern of an agency's allocation of limited resources
raises anew the question of judicial power to create such rights
in the absence of explicit constitutional or statutory warrant.
The courts' role in decisions about the allocation of scarce
governmental benefits is generally quite limited. What justifies
courts in policing, in the course of an initiation suit, agency
decisions about how to allocate resources in order to produce
collective goods? The three conceptions help to resolve this
question.
B. Entitlement: JudicialRefusal to Recognize Private Rights
to Regulatory Collective Goods
Under the entitlement conception, regulatory benefits
would be considered the contemporary successors to a plaintiffs common law rights - modern forms of liberty and property deserving judicial protection. 32 7 Such protection could
take the form either of a private right of action against private
parties who violate regulatory requirements, or of a private
right of initiation to force an agency to prevent or redress such
violations. A plaintiff would be entitled to the statutory benefit of regulatory protection if he could establish that he was
within the class of beneficiaries that the regulatory scheme was
enacted to protect, and that he had been injured by, or was
threatened with injury from, conduct that the statute was
enacted to prevent. 328
uses as it undertakes in initiation cases. Cf. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 670 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment) (suggesting that agency regulatory decisions be judged
by whether they achieve regulatory objectives at the lowest possible cost); The Supreme
Court, z98o Term, 95 HARV. L. REv. 91, 326-29 (i98i) (same).
327 This parallel is not exact. First, in the common law system it is primarily the
courts that define both sets of entitlements, as is reflected in the maxim ubi jus, ibi
remedium ("where there is right, there is remedy"). In the regulatory system, on the
other hand, defining the controls imposed upon regulated entities is the shared responsibility of legislature, agency, and court, while the definition of rights against the
government is (in the absence of statutory citizen-suit provisions) wholly the responsibility of the courts. Second, the common law remedy, unlike a regulatory remedy,
ordinarily results in a good that is predominantly private rather than collective.
Finally, in the common law system, public and private enforcement are largely
independent, with public enforcement decisions insulated from judicial review by the
principle of prosecutorial discretion. In contrast, the recognition of private rights of
initiation by the regulatory system merges public and private enforcement.
328 Thus, for example, if a statute delegated to an agency the authority to enforce
a prohibition against unsafe working conditions and if an employee were to show that
his employer had violated the prohibition, that employee would have standing to sue
and would - if his allegations were proved - be entitled to relief. Relief would
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In creating initiation rights, however, courts have generally
not followed this entitlement rationale. 32 9 In the vast majority
of cases, the plaintiff is unable to mandate regulatory enforcement merely by showing that a statute has been violated to
his detriment. At best, plaintiffs obtain a weakly responsive
initiation right; the courts require little more than a reasoned
justification for agency inaction. 330 Such rights cannot fairly
be termed substantive entitlements without depriving that concept of its meaning. 33 1 An entitlement, as we are reminded,
is a trump; 33 2 in cases to which an entitlement applies, it
excludes consideration of all other factors and commands protection or redress. A requirement of reasoned justification, by
contrast, is designed only to structure a process of decision,
not to direct a result.333 A weakly responsive initiation remedy
may be the most that a court is willing or able to offer, but
it is a pale substitute for a common law entitlement.
The failure to embrace an entitlement rationale in initiation
cases is also reflected in the fact that private rights of initiation
are far more likely to be granted to a beneficiary class alleging
a systemic wrong than to a single beneficiary. 334 This pattern
is at odds with the traditional role of entitlements; as exemconsist of an order from the court requiring the agency to enforce the law against the
employer or a direct order to the employer to obey the law.
329 See infra pp. 1287-88. Rights of initiation have been based on principles of
entitlement in cases in which the government was actively implicated in the wrong.
An example is Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per
curiam). The Adams court noted that the government's active role in supplying
segregated institutions with federal funds made that case distinguishable from government failure to deter purely private wrongdoing. Id. at 1162; see supra note 22;
see also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (states may not aid discriminatory
private schools). The current controversy over tax credits to segregated schools provides another instance in which rights of initiation might be asserted on the basis of
government participation in wrongdoing.
330 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 6o6 F.2d 1O31, 104547, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659,
674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
331 A requirement of reasoned justification might be recast as a substantive entitlement: plaintiffs are entitled to all regulatory initiatives that an agency cannot
reasonably justify withholding. But this formulation is largely verbal artifice. An
"entitlement" with a content so fluid does not possess trumping power that is both
reliable and general.
332 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 139, at xi.
333 See J. VINING, supra note 175, at ioo-oi.
334 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (individual lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution of another); see also Adams v. Richardson, 480
F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (that an action challenged a
general policy, rather than isolated decisions not to act, argues in favor of review); cf.
Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1974) (review of agency failure to enforce
election regulations designed to ensure union members' right to vote), affd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 n.7 (I975).
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plified in cases involving the classical right of defense and the
contemporary new-property hearing right, entitlements are
trumps asserted by individuals.
Moreover, regulatory programs typically seek to reduce
risks of harm across large populations, rather than to eliminate
all risk for any particular individual. For example, whatever
its rhetoric, the Occupational Safety and Health Act 335 aims

not at eliminating all workplace injuries, but at reducing such
injuries to a tolerable level. 336 Such a task, which is designed

to produce a collective good, 3 37 cannot easily be squared with
the notion of private entitlements to regulatory protection. Of
course, courts might seek to create an individual entitlement
to no more than a given level of risk. But the uncertainties
and fine gradations associated with most risks in an industrial
society would make this exercise vexing and essentially arbitrary. 338 And an especially susceptible or concerned plaintiff
seeking additional protection might simply be one of the statistically acceptable "casualties."
The distinction between collective and individual goods
thus explains why the entitlement conception is able to account
for traditional rights of defense and new-property hearing
rights, but not for rights of initiation. The first two rights
vindicate entitlements by redressing individual deprivations,
whereas rights of initiation remedy the failure to provide col3 39
lective goods.
Even if courts attempted to define entitlements to collective
goods, they would face additional difficulties in creating a
system of initiation rights based on such entitlements. Courts
might seek to create an exhaustive hierarchy of beneficiary
entitlements that would lexically allocate any given level of
agency resources among possible initiatives. 3 40 But unless such
335 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
336 See W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 8-II (1976) (goal of regulatory
schemes is reduction rather than elimination of risk); Stewart, Paradoxes of Liberty,
Integrity and Fraternity:The Collective Nature of Environmental Quality and Judicial
Review of Administrative Action, 7 ENVTL. L. 463, 470-71 (1977) (same).
337 See supra pp. 1236-38.
338 A simple requirement that an agency keep risk at some minimum level would
be meaningless unless the court were able to determine what types of conduct generate
various risks and how particular regulatory initiatives would affect that conduct. But
this determination would require the specialized information-gathering and analytic
capabilities that courts lack and that agencies were created to provide. Moreover,
even with perfect information, the specification of a cutoff point would necessarily be
arbitrary, because levels of harm tend to fall along a continuum rather than at discrete
points.
339 See cases cited supra note 334.
340 The common law can also be understood as a system of entitlements determining the allocation of economic resources. See R. POSNER, supra note 81, at 27HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1273 1981-1982
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a system were continually readjusted by a judicial Hercules, 34 1
it would straitjacket the administrative process by reintroducing many of the common law rigidities that regulatory
programs were designed to eliminate. No such Hercules exists. 342 Total control of regulatory programs through initiation
rights would far exceed judicial capacity to deal with changes
in technical knowledge and social or economic conditions.
Because they would entail judicial allocation of resources
through a system of ex ante controls, initiation rights might in
fact prove even more unworkable than the common law system, which generally provides for damage remedies and allows
parties to contract out of many obligations. The decentralized
character of the judicial system, its slowness in reaching decisions, and the division of responsibilities between courts and
agencies would make coordinated direction of regulatory initiatives impossible.
Alternatively, courts could devise a less comprehensive system that would grant entitlement status to a small range of
initiatives well within an agency's resources and leave allocation of the remaining resources to agency discretion. But
34 3
which interests would be eligible for this special protection?
The selection and definition of entitlements within such a system would reintroduce the formal-functional dilemma. For all
I59.

There are, however, important differences between the two contexts. Common
law rules do not directly determine the ultimate allocation of resources, but merely
define the starting points for an elaborate process of negotiation, agreement, and
adjustment on the part of individual economic actors. Command and control regulation, in contrast, require specific conduct by those regulated. Further, common law
remedies consist primarily of damage awards imposed after a violation of entitlements
has occurred; this system allows defendants the flexibility to violate rules on payment
of damages. Public enforcement of regulation, however, provides flexibility in a
different way - by permitting an agency to enforce standards selectively and to
change the substantive content of regulatory commands. This flexibility would be
greatly reduced by a system of regulatory entitlements enforceable by any beneficiary.
See supra pp. 1245-46.
341 If the judicial system consisted of a single Hercules, see R. DWORKIN, supra
note 139, at io5, who had access to all relevant information and high-speed computational capability, such mastery might be achievable. Hercules would constantly
redefine the entire polycentric structure of regulatory entitlements; regulatory agencies
would function as so many special masters in Hercules' service.
342 The judicial system, consisting of thousands of judges responding fairly passively to individual lawsuits and acquiring information through cumbersome forensic
devices, is certainly no Hercules. Agencies are no Hercules either, but they are better
equipped to deal with the fluid demands of an industrial society than are courts
engaged in case-by-case adjudication.
343 In rare cases entitlements to regulatory protection may be defined with such
formality that it would be relatively easy to single them out for special protection.
See infra note 395.
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of these reasons, initiation rights cannot ordinarily be based
on an entitlement conception.
C. Production:JudicialRefusal to Adopt an Economic
Approach to Agency Inaction
A production approach to regulatory enforcement would
measure the benefits of regulatory protection by the aggregate

344
amount that beneficiaries would be willing to pay for them.

The goal would be to maximize the net amount of such benefits, computed by subtracting from total willingness to pay
for those benefits the overall costs of providing them. 34 5 Ini-

tiation rights might be thought likely to increase these net
benefits. For example, exercise of such rights might reduce
the danger that administrators will ignore or discount the potential benefits of certain enforcement measures - particularly
those aimed at producing collective goods. In light of growing
34 6
evidence of "government failure" in providing such goods,
initiation rights might yield an economically more productive
mix of regulatory initiatives.
Nevertheless, judicial treatment of initiation suits strongly
suggests that a production rationale has not accounted for the
creation of these rights. First, private remedies are most likely
to be efficient when the costs of identifying and prosecuting a
violator are relatively low in comparison with the value of the
344 This criterion implicitly assumes that beneficiaries do not have an entitlement
to regulatory protection. If the contrary assumption is made, the appropriate measure
of value is the amount that they would demand for being deprived of such protection.
See supra note 170.
345 A dynamic approach to productive efficiency would trace the impact of regulation over time and would consider, for example, the contribution of a cleaner
environment to a healthier and more productive population, and the chilling effect of
regulatory uncertainty on investment. See supra note 159. Such an approach would
require that costs and benefits occurring over long periods of time be aggregated and
compared, a process that raises the so-called discount problem. A thoroughgoing
production-oriented analysis would need to look not only at the allocation of agency
resources, but also at the allocation of private sector resources between the production
of private commodities and that of collective regulatory benefits. See Wood, Laws,
& Breen, Restraining the Regulators: Legal Perspectives on a Regulatory Budget for
FederalAgencies, i8 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I (1981).
346 Reasons for such failure include bureaucratic tendencies to economize on information and decision costs, to adhere to an established sense of agency mission, and
to continue existing patterns of regulatory and administrative accommodation, as well
as the ability of regulated firms to subvert regulatory programs by withholding cooperation. See supra pp. 1237-38. See generally J. BUClANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

(x962) (defects of majority rule prevent economically efficient government provision
of collective goods); W. NISKANEN, supra note 173 (inability of legislature to evaluate
bureaucratic provision of public goods); Weisbrod, supra note 133, at 3o-4i (explaining
government failures in allocating resources).
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victim's legal claim. 34 7 When the costs are high, public enforcement may be necessary to provide adequate deterrence of
undesirable activity, such as widespread air or water pollution.
Under this analysis, courts seeking to advance production
should be most willing to recognize private rights of initiation
when an individual has suffered a discrete, easily identifiable
injury. In fact, however, the courts have generally denied
initiation rights in such situations, and have instead created
private rights of initiation primarily when an agency has failed
3 48
to prevent a widely diffused or collective harm.
More fundamentally, the production view of initiation
rights would require courts to determine aggregate beneficiary
willingness to pay for protection. To do so, courts would have
to ascertain the number of persons represented (directly or
indirectly) by a litigant seeking an initiation right, the intensity
of their preferences, and their wealth or income. 349 Parties
might be required to furnish studies indicating the willingness
of the population in general to pay for regulatory benefits.
Courts do not, however, follow such an approach in initiation
3 50

cases.
By contrast, in cases involving "hard look" defense rights,
regulated firms or their trade associations are often encouraged
to document in detail the monetary costs of regulatory initiatives 35 1 - the capital and operating cost of pollution "scrubbers," for example and courts take these cost measures

seriously. But the costs of regulation, which are usually con347 Landes & Posner, supra note z. The victim is often best equipped to identify
the offender and to determine whether the benefits of a lawsuit would justify its costs.
In such cases, however, giving the victim a private right of action may be preferable
to granting him a right of initiation. Requiring the victim to pay the costs of litigation
imposes a discipline that discourages inefficient enforcement. See infra pp. 1297-99.
348 See cases cited supra note 334. The Landes-Posner conclusion that private
enforcement is efficient in cases involving easily identifiable harms may, however, be
inapplicable when a harm is collective and individual injuries are small. In such
cases, public enforcement is likely to be more efficient. But it would be difficult to
justify a private right of initiation in such cases on efficiency grounds. There is no
reason to believe that judicial review of a private litigant's claim that public enforcement is inadequate or misdirected will lead to economically superior outcomes.
349 For example, claims of environmental organizations with large memberships
might be given greater weight than claims advanced by individuals.
350 Furthermore, the initiation cases frequently describe participation by regulatory
beneficiaries in the enforcement process as an intrinsic good. See infra pp. 1279-81.
Under a production conception, participation ordinarily has no such intrinsic value:
it is simply a costly impediment that is tolerable only if it helps achieve a result that
maximizes value.
351 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.
(Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (I98O), discussed at supra pp. 1243-44, 1252-53; American

Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. r981).
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crete cash outlays or opportunity costs incurred by particular
firms, are almost always much easier to express in monetary
terms than the benefits, which are usually hard-to-quantify
collective goods such as environmental integrity. In part, this
asymmetry reflects the fact that the economic analysis of regulatory benefits is less advanced than analysis of costs. 352 But
it also reflects the institutional setting in which courts operate. 35 3 Regulatory costs are largely defined by available market measures that can be readily assimilated to prevailing
modes of proof in administrative law. Such market measures
are generally unavailable for regulatory benefits, which must
be identified and aggregated through nonmarket mechanisms.
Because litigation is a poor device for accomplishing these
tasks, it is understandable that the courts have failed to adopt
35 4
an economic approach to regulatory benefits.
352 Economists are developing methods for determining willingness to pay for such
collective goods as clean air. These methods include question surveys and surrogate
market measures such as the differences in residential property values associated with
variations in air quality. See A. FREEMAN, supra note 25o. However, the techniques
have not been sufficiently developed to serve as a basis for judicial decision.
353 See generally D. HOROWITZ, supra note 138 (basic shortcomings of adjudicatory
process in evaluating public policy). The representativeness of public interest plaintiffs
is difficult to establish. See supra pp. 1227-28. However great the imperfections of
electoral representation and delegation to administrative agencies as means of registering aggregate preferences for regulatory benefits, these mechanisms are likely to be
superior to forensic processes. It might be argued that the political process, dominated
as it is by certain groups having special access to power, is a wholly inadequate
mechanism for registering collective preferences and that the courts, which are largely
insulated from such pressures, can operate from a kind of ongoing "original position,"
see J. RAWLS, supra note 191, at 17-22, and are thus far superior to political methods
of collective choice. Cf. M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 32 (1966):

[T]he lawmaker to whom the nasty old undemocratic Supreme Court is supposed to yield so reverently because of his greater democratic virtues is the
entire mass of majoritarian-anti-majoritarian, elected-appointed, special interest-general interest, responsible-irresponsible elements that make up American
national politics. If we are off on a democratic quest, the dragon begins to
look better and better and St. George worse and worse.
We do not suggest that this position is irresponsible - though we do not share it
- but rather that it depends on a sweeping repudiation of the basic premises of
American representative government, a repudiation not readily accepted by judicial
lawmakers, who must to a considerable degree accept those premises. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 31-39 (1977) (judges believing

in judicial restraint assume that societal institutions are "well-ordered").
354 The problem of incomparability between benefits and costs produces a different
emphasis in initiation cases than in right of defense cases. When regulated firms
oppose controls, the court's attention is focused on the quantifiable (cost) side; when
beneficiaries seek more effective enforcement, the focus is on the unquantifiable (benefit) side. This difference helps to explain the courts' adoption of the production
conception in right of defense cases and of the public values conception in initiation
cases. Of course, courts must examine potential regulatory benefits in defense cases,
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The difficulties courts face in quantifying benefits and comparing them to costs make it infeasible to create a system of
strong initiation rights based on production. A system of weak
initiation rights, however, might conceivably advance production by requiring agencies to give more careful consideration
to the benefits of various initiatives and to improve the process
for selecting among those initiatives. Nevertheless, such a
system involves the substantial costs of litigation, of agency
responses to initiation proposals, and of delay and uncertainty.
The benefits to be achieved are speculative; indeed, the system
may have little or no impact on agency decisions. 3 55 Alternatively, the agency may avoid litigation by accommodating
the demands of a few vocal but unrepresentative litigants.
Any claim that initiation rights promote economic productivity is thus too problematic to serve as the predicate for
judicial lawmaking. And even if such a claim were more
plausible, a production rationale for initiation rights would still
lack roots in traditional arrangements of private and public
law. Unlike the production-based right of defense, 3 56 a production-based approach to initiation rights does not further the
traditional objective of insulating private ordering from government direction.
D. Public Values: A Rationalefor InitiationRights
Under the public values conception, private initiation rights
are justified as a means of filling the gaps 'that have arisen
between the traditional system of electoral representation and
the present reality of bureaucratic regulation. The creation of
regulatory bureaucracies with wide discretion undermined the
constitutional system by breaching two key safeguards: separation of powers and electoral accountability. The private law
function of the courts was an important element in the separation of powers. Resolution of privately initiated controversies by an independent and largely decentralized judiciary offered a system that was to be impervious to "capture" by any
factional interest bent on exploitation of government power to
redistribute wealth. 35 7 This system was breached by the transsee Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, discussed at supra pp. 1243-44, 1252-53, and costs in

initiation cases.
3S5 See, e.g., Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239
(1973).
356 See supra pp. 1246-55.
357 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison); id. Nos. 78, 79 (A. Hamilton);
sources cited supra note 154.
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fer of responsibility over the economy from the judiciary to
administrative agencies, which were created in deliberate rejection of the passivity, decentralization, and independence of
courts - the very attributes thought to prevent "capture."
The traditional model of administrative law sought to close
these gaps by requiring specific directives in legislative delegations to agencies and by creating a system of defense rights
to enforce those directives. These requirements were designed
to secure the purposes of separation of powers and electoral
accountability in the administrative era. But old fears of factional domination are now widely perceived to have been realized; broad legislative delegations have left agencies vulnerable to the sustained and organized political pressure of
regulated firms, unions, and other powerful interest groups.
In these circumstances, private remedies can serve as a supplement to traditional safeguards against domination of administrative decisions by parochial interests. The "hard look"
version of the right of defense relies on principles of production
to provide such a remedy in favor of regulated entities. The
initiation right relies on public values to provide a corresponding remedy for regulatory beneficiaries.
When a plaintiff asserts a strong initiation right, a court
determines whether an agency's failure to provide regulatory
protection violates a dominant statutory norm. When a plaintiff asserts a weak initiation right, a court requires an agency
to provide a reasoned justification for the balance it has struck
among several relevant statutory norms. Both versions of the
initiation right aim to ensure that regulatory power is exercised
in the interest of the community through processes open to
public scrutiny.
The public values rationale for initiation rights is reflected
in the rhetoric of participation that frequently accompanies
initiation cases. 3 58 Unlike the production and entitlement conceptions, the public values conception regards participation as
inherently valuable; citizen involvement in community selfdetermination is desirable without regard to notions of efficiency or private rights. 359 Public values are defined and
358 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 6o6 F.2d

o3i,
discussed at infra pp. 1280-81; Medical Comm. for
Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404
1046 n.i8 (D.C. Cir. '979),

U.S. 403 (1972), and quoted at infra note 364.
359 An argument for participation rights based on recognition of individual dignity

is developed in Michelman, supra note 278, at x26, and in L. TaBE, supra note 268,
§ 10-7, at 5oi-o6. The conception examined in the text is based on a process of
community self-determination similar to that developed in Michelman, supra note x75.
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sharpened during the process of examination, advocacy, and
response; they are not simply reflections of the existing stock
of individual preferences or of an exogenous structure of en36 0
titlements.
The connection between a public values conception and
the creation of initiation rights is also revealed in expanded
principles of standing and judicial review. As some cases
make explicit, private rights of initiation have been recognized
in order to allow representatives of public values to articulate
a point of view that might otherwise be disregarded in the
formulation of regulatory policy. 36 1 A good example is Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC,3 62 in which the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sought to force the
SEC to promulgate regulations requiring corporations to disclose their environmental and equal employment policies. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated
that the NRDC "brought to the Commission's attention a perspective, different from that of most of its registrant corporations, that it might not otherwise have fully appreciated." The
plaintiff thus "performed the public service of causing the
Commission to re-examine its disclosure policies in light of the
360 The ideal of citizen participation and education is an elusive one in an industrialized society in which government is highly centralized and bureaucratic. The
American tradition of voluntary organization, however, promotes this ideal. Many
citizens derive satisfaction not from participating directly in public proceedings, but
from contributing to organizations that will do so in their stead. It is difficult to
fathom the source of this satisfaction if participation is viewed only as a form of
personal dialectic with governmental officials in which officials acknowledge the citizen's individual dignity. See sources cited supra note 359. But the satisfaction
becomes readily understandable when we assume that a major goal of participation
is advocacy of certain public values, for this task may well be accomplished better by
a representative than by ordinary citizens.
361 Rights to intervene in ongoing administrative processes, while not pure rights
of initiation, serve similar purposes. Both rights empower regulatory beneficiaries to
energize and to redirect an agency's enforcement efforts.
Intervention rights have been recognized in many cases. For example, in Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966), plaintiffs, who included certain civil rights leaders, were permitted to intervene
to challenge the renewal of a station's broadcasting license, on the ground, inter alia,
that the station had failed to provide a balanced and fair discussion of public issues,
especially those concerning blacks. Similarly, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), conservation groups were allowed to intervene in a proceeding under the Federal Power
Act ch. 285, §§ 1-30, 41 Stat. io63-77 (1920) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a828C (1976 & Supp. IV 198O)), on the ground that the public values represented by
those groups might otherwise be ignored in the regulatory process. See 354 F.2d at
616.
362 606 F.2d 1O3i (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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fundamental national priorities expressed in NEPA [National
Environmental Policy Act] and in federal equal employment
legislation. ' 36 3 In these circumstances, "[j]udicial review of
agency decisions not to adopt rules would help ensure that the
agency gives due consideration to citizen participation, and in
this sense might actually enhance the agency's effectiveness in
' 36 4
furthering the public interest.
The tests for standing articulated in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 3 65 and subsequent
decisions also serve the public values conception in initiation
cases. 3 66 These decisions have extended standing to representatives of interests that suffer "injury in fact" as a result of
the agency decision challenged and that are "arguably within
the zone" of the protection offered by a relevant statutory
provision. The "injury in fact" test, coupled with the substantial dilution of the "zone of interests" test, 3 67 might suggest

that initiation actions may be brought by anyone who can
show specific adverse impact. But the "zone of interests" test
has continuing vitality and serves an important function in
defining initiation rights by identifying the public values relevant to a particular administrative policy.
At times, the organic statute lists the operative public values. 368 But frequently the agency's mandate is more opaque.
In such cases, courts must identify the relevant values in order
to determine whether the plaintiff has standing (as well as to
decide the merits). 369 In initiation cases, as in other cases of
363 Id. at 1046.

364 Id. In a supporting footnote, the court added that "[p]ublic participation in
agency decision making is increasingly recognized as a desirable objective." Id. at
1046 n.i8.

See also Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 667

(D.C. Cir. 1970) ("substantial public interest in having important issues of corporate
democracy raised before the Commission and the courts by interested, responsible
private parties"), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). A similar rationale has been
followed in other cases. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439
F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
6o8 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
365 397 U.S. 150 (970).

366 See cases cited infra note 367.
367 See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352

(i980);

Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457

F. Supp. 771, 779-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
368 See Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 614-17.

369 Because defense rights are based on a production rationale, standing is ordinarily grounded in economic loss - although standing is usually not seriously contested in such cases. For new-property hearing rights and private rights of action,
standing is based on entitlement, which in turn determines the ultimate resolution of
the merits as well as the threshold question of access to the court.
There is a potential difficulty in reconciling a public values account with that
aspect of the law of standing that limits initiation rights to persons who can demon-
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statutory construction, the courts' task is often "not simply a
process of drawing out of the statute what the maker put into
it but is also in part . . . a process of adjusting the statute to
the implicit demands and values of the society to which it is
to be applied."' 3 70 Although these demands and values are
dynamic, statutes cannot be constantly rewritten and bureaucracies too often adhere to outdated missions. Because they
are sometimes more accessible than legislatures and bureaucracies, courts can encourage the adaptation of cumbersome
administrative institutions to emergent public values. 3 7 1 Decisions such as Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
SEC 3 7 2 or Adams v. Richardson,3 73 which require old-line
administrative agencies to give new weight to environmental
concerns or to the elimination of racial discrimination, exemplify this sometimes controversial process of judicial renovation
374
of statutory norms.
These arguments are not advanced to suggest that initiation
suits are by any means a panacea for "government failure."
Courts may misconceive the social norms at issue in a statutory
scheme or give a particular norm undue weight. Initiation
suits also raise difficult remedial questions. Recognition of a
strong right of initiation may result in a judicial order compelling regulation or enforcement that an agency cannot unstrate "injury in fact." See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980); Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 15o (1970). If the public values
conception in fact accounts for the initiation cases, why have the courts not simply
allowed assertion of initiation rights by any litigant who speaks on behalf of a relevant
public value? The answer, we believe, has been identified by Professor Vining:
unrestricted standing would raise the question whether a litigant sincerely represented
the value for which he purported to speak. See J. VININGi supra note 175, at 12425. The "injury in fact" requirement ensures that the relevant value is embedded in
the litigant's extra-forensic activities in ways that the legal system can grasp and
verify. Given the impossibility of determining the number of persons that a given
litigant represents and the extent of their stake, the requirement of "injury in fact"
can be understood as a very crude mechanism for promoting the integrity of representation.
370 L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 59 (1968); see also G. CALABRESI, supra
note 139.
311See, e.g., supra pp. 128o-81 & notes 361-364. The plural character of the
values that regulatory agencies are held to serve is made explicit in the creation of
initiation rights on behalf of parties asserting values in opposition to one another.
See, e.g., Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d 6o8. The array of litigants presents a comparable
array of public values. This conception of standing draws heavily on J. VINING,
supra note 175, and is a revision of the views expressed in Stewart, supra note 5g.
372 6o6 F.2d io31 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
373480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam).
374But see NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (FPC's duty to advance "public
interest" is not a basis for prohibiting regulated firms from engaging in racial discrimination).
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dertake because it lacks the necessary information3 75or resources.
Courts can do little to resolve such an impasse.
Even if the necessary information and resources are available, a court may have to resort to timetables and deadlines
to enforce its orders and thus assume a supervisory and managerial role that courts traditionally eschew. 3 76 It is exceptionally difficult to police the vigor and good faith of agency
enforcement efforts and settlement negotiations. 3 77 Initiation
suits to force agencies to comply with implementation deadlines have frequently presented frustrating enforcement prob378
lems to district judges.
Weak initiation rights avoid some of these problems, but
they create others. Because they are deferential, weak initiation rights depend on the good faith of the agency. When this
faith is well placed, an initiation right may lead an agency,
after considering the contentions of the beneficiaries, to take
enforcement action or to modify previous policies. 3 79 But in
other cases, an order that an agency "adequately consider"
beneficiary interests may be little more than a symbolic vic375 See Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 791-92
(1978).
376 There has been a great deal of commentary on this problem in recent years.
See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1301-02 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. I, 27-28 (1979); Note, Judicial Control of Systematic
Inadequacies in FederalAdministrative Enforcement, 88 YALE L.J. 407, 420-22, 43233 (1978).
377 See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d at 1165-66 (affirming order to HEW
to commence title VI enforcement proceedings against scores of school districts, yet
relying on HEW's good faith in the face of limited resources); see also Note, supra
note 376, at 423 (describing subsequent history of Adams).
In some situations, such as licensing, the remedy is far more simple: a court can
simply order an agency to vacate a license and to invite new applications. See Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 550 (D.C.
Cir. r969).
378 See Illinois v. Gorsuch, Nos. 78-1689, -1715, -1734, -1899 (D.D.C. Jan. 28,
1982) (recounting "years of futility" experienced by court in attempt to force EPA to
promulgate regulations concerning hazardous waste land disposal facilities).
379 For example, following Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the EPA cancelled the registration of DDT. See N.Y.
Times, June 15, 1972, § x, at i, col. I; id., Jan. 6, 1971, at 59, col. 3. Following
the first Scenic Hudson decision, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
354 F.2d 6o8 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), the FPC modified the
power project in controversy to reduce some of the adverse environmental effects.
See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 465-66 (2d Cir.
197), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); see also Trubek, Environmental Defense, 1:
Introduction to Interest Group Advocacy in Complex Disputes, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW, supra note 133, at 151-94 (intervention by an environmental group led to AEC
decision to require a cooling tower for nuclear plant).
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tory. 380 To achieve more, a court might have to evaluate the
agency's entire enforcement program and compel enforcement
should it determine that the agency has miscalculated the applicable norms or acted in less than full good faith. Such a
step would reintroduce the remedial problems associated with
the strong right of initiation.
To identify the remedial problems in initiation cases is not
to say that rights of initiation should be denied. But these
considerations do suggest that judicially created remedies are
only a partial solution to the problem of inadequate regulatory
protection.
E. JudicialAuthority to Create Initiation Rights
In light of the existence of rights of defense for regulated
"defendants," mere symmetry may appear to require an initiation remedy for "plaintiff" beneficiaries. The initial justification in each case is that the displacement of the common
law by regulatory schemes has created a need for new safeguards to protect important private interests and to promote
accountability. But this symmetry masks potential differences
between the two situations that may bear on the decision
whether to create private remedies. As a matter both of tradition and of competence, courts are best suited to protect
private individuals against particular impositions by government; 38 1 Congress and administrative bodies are better
equipped to determine how public resources should be allocated to secure collective benefits.
This dichotomy suggests that courts should create defense
rights and deny initiation rights. But the dichotomy is too
simplistic. The development of large bureaucracies and the
proliferation of governmental functions have attenuated the
link between regulation and electoral representation. 38 2 As a
380 Cf. Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The
Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1429, 1445-68 (1978) (demonstrating the weakness of legal requirements that seek voluntary cooperation in
pursuit of values that run counter to institutions' interests); Sax, supra note 355, at
239 (requirements that agency "consider" values not congruent with its mission are
ineffective, because based on false behavioral assumptions).
381 The hornbook rule that due process ordinarily requires some sort of evidentiary
hearing in adjudication, but not in rulemaking, indicates that courts are readier to
provide remedies when the consequences of government action are individual rather
than collective.
382 See supra pp. 1226-27, 1238-39. To reach this conclusion, it is unnecessary
to embrace a theory of industry "capture" or of symbolic "filter" politics. See supra
note 134. One must merely acknowledge the weakness of the link to the ballot box
and the vulnerability of regulators to incentives and influences that threaten the
adequacy of regulatory protection under a public values conception.

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1284 1981-1982

1982]

PRIVATE RIGHTS

1285

result, one cannot readily assume that a public enforcement
monopoly will yield an appropriate pattern of regulatory protection. Traditional common law remedies, which provided a
means by which citizens could obtain protection from the
courts if administrative officials failed to provide such protection, are often ineffective today. In addition, rights of defense
are no longer limited to the prevention of particular impositions. Such rights are frequently asserted by an entire industry
or by groups of industries seeking to protect collective interests,
often by striking down or modifying the terms of far-reaching
regulations. 3 83 Nonetheless, the courts have correctly concluded that -

given the weakness of the political link -

a

"hard look" judicial remedy is appropriate for regulated firms.
A similar conclusion should be reached in the case of beneficiary remedies.
For the most part, the institutional differences between
protection of beneficiaries and protection of regulated entities
can more appropriately be taken into account by adjusting the
degree of deference that courts accord to agencies, rather than
by automatically foreclosing relief. 384 Courts may, however,
more readily deny relief altogether in initiation than in defense
cases, on the ground that "agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law. '38 5 Unlike administrative inaction,
an agency's decision to promulgate a rule or bring an enforcement action crystallizes its discretion in a particular measure
with a particular rationale; a court can both determine whether
the agency has statutory authority and take a "hard look" at
the specific justification for the agency's decision. By contrast,
if inaction is challenged as arbitrary and unreasonable, meaningful review will ordinarily be precluded: unless the statute
specifically mandates enforcement, or the agency has a welldeveloped system of enforcement priorities, or the court is
willing to order the agency to adopt such a system, there will
be little at which to "look hard. ' 38 6 In these circumstances,
383 See, e.g., National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 198o).
3S4 Except in unusual cases in which a statute mandates enforcement, the contem-

porary right of initiation is weakly responsive; like the "hard look" right of defense,
it sidesteps many of the problems that might otherwise be presented by judicial review
of agency discretion over enforcement of broad regulatory programs.
3s5 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
386 See also infra pp. 1293-94 (discussing burdens imposed by creation of new
remedies); cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (973) (private person
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another). As this decision
illustrates, the extreme example of "no law to apply" in connection with rights of
initiation is criminal prosecution. With only limited resources, prosecutors must enforce hundreds of substantive statutes without any external guidance about how to
resolve competing priorities; nor do prosecutors typically articulate internal enforceHeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 1981-1982
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it may be better for courts to deny review than to undertake
a difficult inquiry that not only promises little benefit but also
might generate considerable litigation costs and administrative
burdens.
An additional difference between rights of initiation and
rights of defense is that the availability of a private right of
38 7
action may justify denial of initiation but not defense rights.
But a private action may not be an adequate surrogate for a
right of initiation if a litigant is challenging an agency's pattern
of enforcement or interpretation of its mandate, 38 8 or if the
litigation is a "big case" whose prosecution would, because of
its costs and the collective nature of the regulatory benefit,
exhaust the resources of a private litigant. A right of initiation
allows for an overview of agency enforcement policies that is
preferable to piecemeal lawsuits for ensuring that the relevant
public values are taken into account.
Because of these considerations, courts are justified in creating initiation rights to implement the background understandings provided by the public values conception and to
furnish modern surrogates for traditional judicial safeguards
upon the exercise of government power. Further, like rights
of defense 38 9 and new-property hearing rights, 390 rights of initiation have a two-tiered structure.
Ordinarily, the interest of beneficiaries in regulatory protection and the weakness of the link between agency decisions
and electoral representation do not justify giving constitutional
status to initiation rights. The formal-functional dilemma generally prevents courts from singling out particular regulatory
benefits for constitutional protection because the benefits are
ment guidelines. Review of prosecutors' decisions is therefore generally unavailable.
For similar reasons, judicial review is usually not available in the new-property and
regulatory contexts unless there are clear statutory or self-imposed limits on the
administrator's discretion.
Review should be available, however, if a plaintiff's particular allegation is one
to which there is "law to apply" - for example, a claim of complete default in the
enforcement process or of influence by factors, such as racial discrimination, that are
irrelevant under the governing statute. Claims of particular instances of "abuse of
discretion," by contrast, will be less likely to justify review in the absence of a
reference to agency reliance on factors made irrelevant or impermissible by law.
387 Correspondingly, the lack of either a private right of action or an adequate

common law remedy bolsters the case for private rights of initiation.
388 See Adams v. Richardson, 48o F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per
curiam) (involving HEW's failure to enforce title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
The same conclusion is appropriate if the controversy is a test case implicating a more

general pattern of agency action. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
389 See supra pp. 1254-55.
390 See supra pp. 1263-67.
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"basic" or "fundamental" to citizens' welfare. 3 91 Moreover,
the combination of formal and informal access to the political
process, in addition to whatever administrative procedures are
provided by law, usually satisfies minimal due process standards. 39 2 Indeed, such political participation in collective institutions is itself desirable under the public values conception.
Public values justifications thus support recognition of initiation rights in the absence of a clear statement from Congress.
But such rights are not constitutional in status; the creation of
private rights of initiation is for the most part a species of
393
federal common law.

There are, however, three categories of cases in which due
process does require an initiation right. The first category
consists of cases in which the government's failure to enforce
a regulatory scheme jeopardizes a plaintiff's common law "liberty" or "property" interest, and no adequate alternative remedy is available. Suppose, for example, that the government
were to create a regulatory program to displace common law
protections against assault and battery with a scheme involving
only public civil or criminal enforcement. The harm for which
the plaintiff would seek redress is not collective, and the remedy sought would be limited to his case. Moreover, the formalfunctional dilemma would not come into play, because both
394
formal and functional criteria would be simultaneously met.
The second category of cases consists of those in which a
statute unambiguously grants a formal entitlement to regulatory protection, and a private right of action is unavailable or
wholly inadequate. Although the demanding standard of formality developed in the case of new-property hearing rights
suggests that few statutes are likely to meet this test, the
391 The difficulties inherent in such an enterprise are discussed in C. FRIED, supra
note 157, at iO8-3i, and in Stewart, supra note 336. Decisions such as San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i, 29-39 (I973), and Tanner v. Armco
Steel Corp., 34o F. Supp. 532, 536-37 (S.D. Tex. 1972), reflect a similar sense of
judicial incapacity.
392 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (i9,5).
Indeed, the legislature should be encouraged to create new mechanisms for control of
the administrative process, mechanisms that may possess important advantages over
judicial remedies. See Sunstein, supra note 53; J. Mashaw, supra note 185.
393 Indeed, in only one case, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 5o U.S.L.W. 4247
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1982), has the Court used the Constitution as a basis for creating
initiation rights to prevent harms to personal interests by private parties. The lack
of cases taking this approach may be explained by the availability in most cases of
a direct remedy against private wrongdoers. In addition, when government officials
are "directly" responsible for a wrong, a remedy is often required by substantive
commands of the Constitution, such as equal protection. See supra note 329; infra
pp. 13o8-i6.
394 See supra pp. 1245-46.
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Supreme Court recently held in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co. 3 9 5 that, when such a statute has been enacted, due process
requires a remedy to vindicate the statutory entitlement. Six
Justices found that equal protection likewise requires such a
396
remedy.
395 5o U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982). In Logan, the Illinois legislature had
passed a Fair Employment Practices Act that barred job discrimination on the basis
of handicap. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act §§ 1-67, ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
48, §§ 851-867 (1977) (amended 198o). Logan filed charges with the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission, alleging that the Zimmerman Brush Company
had engaged in illegal discrimination by discharging him. The Act required the
Commission to provide redress unless no "substantial evidence" supported the claim;
the Act also stated that the Commission "shall" hold a hearing within 12o days of the
filing of a charge. See 50 U.S.L.W. at 4249. Through apparent inadvertence, the
Commission failed to take action on Logan's claims within the 12o-day period. The
state court held that the 12o-day period was mandatory and that the Commission's
failure to act terminated Logan's claim.
Logan contended that the Commission's failure to provide a hearing violated due
process because the Act created a property interest in redress from discrimination. A
direct action against the employer was an inadequate remedy, Logan argued, because
reinstatement would not be possible. Effectively, Logan thus demanded a right of
initiation as a matter of due process. Logan also argued that the Commission's
inaction violated the equal protection clause because it resulted in an irrational distinction: claims processed within 12o days received full consideration; otherwise identical claims were terminated solely because of Commission negligence.
A unanimous Court ruled for Logan. Six Justices accepted Logan's due process
argument. A different group of six Justices, represented by two different opinions,
accepted the equal protection claim. Id. at 4252 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at
4253 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Concerning the due process claim, the
Court said that the "cause of action" created by the state "is a species of property
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." 5o U.S.L.W. at
4249. That clause "protect[s] civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as
defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress
grievances." Id. Because Logan's "right to redress is guaranteed by the State . . .
under what is, in essence, a 'for cause' standard," id. at 425o, Logan had a constitutionally protected property interest similar to that in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975), and in other cases involving the dispensation of government benefits.
The Court distinguished enforcement actions like those brought by the NLRB.
The NLRB's General Counsel has control over decisions to prosecute, the Court
noted, and his refusal to issue a complaint is not subject to judicial review. 5o
U.S.L.W. at 425o n.6. This reasoning, however, fails to explain why the General
Counsel's decisions are exempt from review, but those of the Employment Commission
in Logan are not. A more plausible distinction is that the National Labor Relations
Act does not create a formal entitlement, but instead vests complete discretion in the
General Counsel. If so, the NLRB case is analogous to Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972), Bishop v. Wood, 410 U.S. 614 (I973), and Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 426 U.S. 341 (1976), rather than to Logan.

The statute at issue in Logan was recently amended to make discretionary the
holding of a hearing. Act of June 29, i98O, Pub. Act No. 81-1267, § 7-102(c)(3), 198o

Ill. Laws 250, 257. This amendment might vitiate the right of initiation found in
Logan.
396 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, wrote
a separate opinion in which he stated that the Commission's inaction violated equal
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The third category in which due process demands an initiation right consists of cases involving new contemporary
equivalents of core common law rights: personal interests on
whose functional importance there is deep social consensus and
that also can be expressed as formal entitlements. Freedom
from racial discrimination is an example.
Few cases are likely to arise, however, in which courts will
be required to create initiation rights on constitutional grounds.
Legislatures have rarely preempted basic common law remedies, created unambiguous formal entitlements to regulatory
protection, or foreclosed private remedies for racial discrimination.
VII.

PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

A. Introduction
If initiation rights are available to remedy agency inaction,
why are private rights of action needed at all? There are
several answers. For the plaintiff, initiation is often a less
attractive option than a private right of action. A weak ini39 7
tiation right - which is all the courts will usually afford
places a substantial burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the agency's inaction was unreasonable. Moreover, "victory" may consist merely of a remand for a better explanation
398
of the agency's decision not to act.
There are also institutional advantages. A private right of
action does not require courts to monitor the use of public
enforcement resources, nor does it require the agency to divert
those limited resources to the defense of initiation suits. Moreover, private rights of action impose a budget discipline on
plaintiffs more stringent than that in initiation cases. Private
rights of action permit private parties to enforce a statute
protection, because "terminating a claim that the State itself has misscheduled" is not
"a rational way of expediting the resolution of disputes." Logan, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4252
(opinion of Blackmun, J.). Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, basically
accepted this reasoning in a separate concurring opinion, and stated that the challenged classification is "arbitrary and irrational" in relation to the goals of "redressing
valid claims of discrimination [or] of protecting employers from frivolous lawsuits."
Id. at 4253 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Query: does the equal protection
holding mean that a litigant has a constitutional claim to an explanation of why an
agency has failed to act on his complaint when it has decided to act on the complaints
of others?
397 See supra pp. 1205-o6.
393 See supra pp. 1283-84.
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beyond the level permitted by an agency's limited budget only
if they believe that the benefits of additional enforcement outweigh its costs. This method of making enforcement decisions
may be desirable, since private litigants - who are often closer
to local controversies than are public officials - may know
more about the costs and benefits of particular enforcement
initiatives. 39 9 Finally, since private right of action cases tend
to be more narrowly focused than initiation suits, the right of
action may better reflect differing preferences for collective
goods.
Judicial creation of private rights of action, however, poses
special hazards. Such rights could disrupt legislative judgments concerning appropriate enforcement levels, undermine
legislative decisions to entrust regulatory decisions to centralized, specialized, and politically accountable bodies, and impose undue burdens on the courts. We examine each of these
considerations in turn.
x. Legislative Calibration of Regulatory Compliance. Assume that a regulatory statute is silent on the availability of
private rights of action. If that statute specifies in precise
terms the conduct that it prohibits, the extent of compliance
with the statute will be a function of the level of enforcement
and the sanctions imposed. The legislature can control both
of these variables through specification of penalties and appropriations. By generating additional sanctions and enforcement, judicial creation of private rights of action might upset
40 0
legislative fine-tuning of compliance levels.
This objection is largely unpersuasive. Statutory language
is often so general or ambiguous that the legislature could not
confidently predict the specific kind of activity against which
enforcement action will be brought. The fine-tuning argument
is even less convincing when, as is common, an agency has a
lump-sum budget to cover enforcement of numerous provisions. Moreover, statutes often give agencies considerable discretion in selecting among alternative sanctions and penalty
levels. 40 1 These considerations severely weaken the argument
that the legislature anticipates and controls enforcement levels
in a way that would be undermined by judicial creation of
private rights of action.
The legislature can also monitor and control agency enforcement by increasing or decreasing appropriations or by
399 See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (I969).
400 See R. POSNER, supra note 8i, § 22.1 (analyzing on efficiency grounds the
relative advantages of public and private enforcement); see also Landes & Posner,
supra note 21 (same).
401 See infra p. 1291 & note 403.
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other forms of oversight. 40 2 But agencies can shift enforcement
resources and adjust the content of regulatory controls and the
sanctions imposed; as a result, variations in appropriations
may have little impact on the nature or amount of enforcement
that agencies undertake. 40 3 Occasionally, as exemplified by
4°4
Congress' recent curbs on the Federal Trade Commission,
the legislature acts decisively to control enforcement policies.
But such control is infrequent and episodic.
Moreover, the objection that creation of private rights of
action disturbs careful legislative decisions about compliance
levels begs the question by assuming that congressional silence
reflects an intention to foreclose judicial creation of such rights.

It is equally plausible that sanctions and appropriations have
been tailored in contemplation of possible private enforcement. 40 5 Congress may wish to take advantage of the courts'
ability to draw upon experience with implementation of a
particular regulatory program and to judge the impact and
40 6
desirability of private rights of action.
402 Professor Posner notes that "the annual appropriations hearing affords the
legislature an opportunity to assure that the agency has not strayed too far from the
intended, as distinct from the enacted, legislative regulations that the agency is
enforcing." R. POSNER, supra note 81, at 472. This conclusion is echoed in cases
rejecting the argument that a record of substantial nonenforcement is a reason for
implying private rights of action. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485
F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
403 COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-

MISSION (1969). When an agency is charged with enforcing a wide variety of rules,
a general budget reduction does not ensure that a particular rule will be enforced less
enthusiastically. The use of line item appropriations to direct enforcement activity
may be difficult. Amendment of the governing statute or application of informal
political pressures would seem more effective, although each has costs of its own.
404 For example, in I98O Congress "punished" the Federal Trade Commission for what Congress considered misguided enforcement decisions - by almost totally
cutting off FTC appropriations. See FTC Funds Bill With Legislative Veto Clears,
36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 233-36 (I980).
40S On occasion, Congress has pointedly left it for the courts to determine whether
private rights of action should exist. One example can be found in the enactment of
the provision in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1976), that allows, at the court's discretion, the recovery of attorney's fees for
successful suits under title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C. §§ i681x686 (1976). Congressional debates indicate that this provision was not meant to
influence the judicial decision whether to infer a private right of action. See Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d lo63, 1077-80 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 441 U.S. 677 (I979). The legislative history of § 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, I5 U.S.C. § 8ob-6 (1976), includes similar caveats. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. ii (1979).
406 See Note, supra note 2, at 291. It might be objected that the legislature can
also engage in ongoing supervision and that its failure to act should be binding on the
courts. But legislative inaction can result from a number of factors; it is not necessarily
the product of satisfaction with an agency's failure to enforce a statute vigorously.
See Note, supra note 143, at 9o5.
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In addition, courts can refuse to create rights of action
when such rights would be inconsistent with clearly expressed
legislative policies about enforcement. For these reasons, we
conclude that judicial creation of private rights of action would
generally not be inconsistent with respect for legislative control
over enforcement levels.
2. Displacing Agency Responsibility for Specifying Regulatory Controls. - Private rights of action circumvent administrative responsibility for regulatory policy. Litigants asserting such rights can force courts to define the content of
necessarily overbroad regulatory statutes, thereby undermining
the advantages of political accountability, specialization, and
centralization that administrative regulation was designed to
provide. 4 07 Private rights of action may also impair an
agency's ability to harmonize potentially conflicting statutory
provisions 408 and to negotiate with regulated firms and other
407 Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts can refer to the agency those
questions that should first be resolved by specialized administrators. See K. DAvis,
supra note 215, §§ x9.oi-.o9; Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037
(1964). It has been contended that this doctrine can solve the problems discussed in
the text by divorcing the questions of judicial competence from those of recognition
of private suits. O'Neil, supra note 146; see Note, supra note 2, at 295-96. This
argument derives some support from Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways,
Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962), which suggested that, although the legality of routing
practices is within the primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
courts may award damages after the ICC finds conduct unlawful.
But use of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to avoid problems of de novo
judicial construction exacerbates many of the difficulties involved in recognizing private rights of initiation. It allows a private litigant to conscript agency resources:
public funds will be devoted to resolution of a controversy that the agency has not
judged sufficiently serious to require public intervention. But unlike initiation suits,
this conscription occurs without a court's first determining whether the agency's failure
to act was improper. The agency may be forced to consider the question even though
it believes that its resources would be better spent on other, more egregious violations.
See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Thus, the combination of implied rights of action and the primary jurisdiction
doctrine could result in the worst of all possible worlds: the level of enforcement
would not be subject to legislative control, since private parties could bring unlimited
suits under regulatory programs that agencies were unable or unwilling to enforce;
but the public would bear at least part of the cost of such suits, since agency resources
would have to be expended in order for the suits to proceed.
408 This consideration is reflected in Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts
Plating Co., 457 F.2d 8i (2d Cir. 1972). Suing under the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (T976), the plaintiff contended that
private rights of action should be created because no right of initiation was available.
The court rejected the argument, noting that the Department of Justice's selective
enforcement was an effort to coordinate with other federal and state pollution laws
and to give new content to the governing statute. 457 F.2d at 87. The court approved
of this effort and noted that private rights of action would disturb that coordination
and result in conflicts between environmental programs. Id. at 88.
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affected interests in order to establish a workable and consis40 9
tent regulatory system.
These dangers are minimal when statutory language is specific or when an agency has adopted a definitive rule or precedent that a court can apply. In such cases, the court should
ordinarily reach the same result as would the agency. But
when the governing statute is vague or ambiguous and when
centralized and coordinated enforcement appears to be critical
to the regulatory scheme, judicial creation of private rights of
4 10
action should be discouraged.
3. JudicialBurdens and Costs. - Regulatory controversies
often raise economic and scientific questions that courts are ill
equipped to resolve. These burdens are greater in suits asserting private rights of action than in initiation or defense
cases, for the court must decide issues de novo, without the
benefit of prior agency deliberations. Additional burdens are
imposed in suits involving private rights of action for damages,
particularly when sought on behalf of a class, because of the
scientific and economic uncertainties involved in tracing the
411
perturbations caused by a defendant's actions.
Moreover, private suits to enforce regulatory provisions
may merit lower priority in the courts than do traditional
lawsuits. The victim of a tort or of a breach of contract may
have a remedy only in court; an individual seeking regulatory
protection has the alternative of pressing his claim in the
administrative process. Furthermore, given the increasing cost
and complexity of private litigation - especially that involving
large-scale regulatory issues - courts may well doubt that
409 Such problems might be mitigated by allowing an affirmative defense to private
suits when an agency's failure to act was based on a rational policy and was not
motivated by budget constraints. Professor Mashaw argues that an agency should be
permitted to intervene to make this argument in private suits brought under public
programs. See Mashaw, Private Enforcement of Public Regulatory Provisions: The
"Citizen Suit," 4 CLASS ACTION REP. 29 (1975). Such solutions, however, have little
support in the cases. But see Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co.,
457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972). Such a form of intervention would raise in a new guise
the difficulties of judicial review of agency enforcement policies.
410 See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246 (1951); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

If agency enforcement is not uniform with respect to all members of the regulated
class, a right of initiation could rectify the situation more effectively than could a
right of action. Selective enforcement, however, may be a rational means of implementing agency policy. Thus, private rights of initiation can also undermine an

agency's considered decisions regarding the optimal method and level of compliance.
411 Not only must the court resolve the question whether a violation of regulatory
requirements occurred, but it also must attempt to measure the economic impact of
noncompliance. In complex areas of economic regulation, such measurements may
approach the impossible. See J. VINING, supra note 175, at 8o-ioi.
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private enforcement is more cost-effective than public enforcement or that it will secure social benefits commensurate with
its costs.
These considerations supplement the most fundamental objections to judicial creation of private enforcement rights: those
derived from the constitutional scheme of separated powers.
These objections, examined in detail in Part HI,412 have
greater force when applied to private rights of action than to
private initiation rights, which generally reserve final authority
over enforcement matters to the political branches. In the
following Sections, we consider whether, despite these objections, the three conceptions provide a justification for judicial
creation of private rights of action, and whether they help to
explain the evolution of judicial doctrine.
B. Private Rights of Action Under a Public Values
Conception
There is paradox in the notion that the private right of
action could serve as a crucible for the advancement of public
values; the very origins of administrative agencies lay in dissatisfaction with private litigation as an undemocratic mechanism for social choice and control. Nonetheless, one could
base a public values justification for private rights of action
on a theory of the regulatory process that focuses on transaction-cost barriers to organized advocacy by regulatory beneficiaries. In the implementation process, administrative bureaucracies sometimes tend to sacrifice the diffused interests of
widely scattered beneficiaries in favor of the interests of more
cohesive and better-organized groups, such as regulated firms
and the bureaucrats themselves. This tendency could block
the full realization of the public values embodied in regulatory
programs.
On such a theory, private rights of action might be justified
as an open, nonbureaucratic means of asserting public values,
ensuring their enforcement, and reestablishing the balance
struck in the regulatory statute. The courtroom might also
serve as a stage for dramatizing these social values and for
awakening the concern of the media, the public, and the leg4 13
islature.
412 See supra p. 1221.

413 The litigation itself focuses public attention on the problem that prompted
regulation. Moreover, the only method by which regulated entities can avoid such
litigation and the consequent publicity is to secure an explicit legislative injunction
against private rights of action - which may call attention, to the issue of why the
legislature would dilute enforcement of its statute. It is not clear, however, that this
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Nevertheless, courts have generally not adopted a public
values rationale in private right of action cases. Under a
public values theory, the case for private enforcement rights
would be especially strong when a statute grants substantial
discretion to an administrator; participation by various statutory beneficiaries would be most needed in such a case to force
consideration and vindication of the full range of affected
interests. But courts have recognized private rights of action
only when a statute sharply limits agency discretion by granting formal entitlements to regulatory protection. 4 14 When the
statutory standard vests the administrator with broad discretion or includes several competing norms, private rights of
action have usually been denied. 4 15 Moreover, the rhetoric
employed in creating private rights of action includes no reference to the values of beneficiary participation and public
4 16
education.
Judicial rejection of the public values conception in this
setting is quite understandable. Litigation between private
parties is an unlikely forum for achieving community selfdetermination, and there is little evidence that such litigation
has awakened public or congressional concern over regulatory
policies. Furthermore, the premise that unorganized beneficiary interests are systematically underrepresented is not easily
verified; one person's "implementation slippage" is another's
safeguard against excesses of regulatory zeal. Even if the
premise of transaction-cost barriers were accepted, private
rights of initiation are a superior remedy from a public values
perspective because they seek to invigorate administrative and
political processes. Private rights of action, by contrast, bypass such processes and give power to judges and self-selected
private litigants to determine whether enforcement is desirable
4 17
in particular cases.
watchdog role is appropriate for the courts. See supra pp. 1258-59. Further, it is
rare that judicial creation of private rights of action prompts either legislative reconsideration of regulation or widespread public debate. But cf. Board of Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (decision on affirmative action prompting public dialogue).
414 See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (no cause of action found);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (198i) (same); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 56o (1979) (same); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979) (cause of action found).
415 See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); Universities Research
Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 56o
(1979); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. x973); Tanner v.
Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
416 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (979).

417 The public values argument for private rights of action, however, is particularly
strong when a private right of initiation is unavailable because agencies lack authority
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C. A ProductionRationalefor Private Rights of Action
i. Analysis of Mixed Enforcement Systems. -

Under the

production conception, the creation of private rights of action
would be justified when two conditions are met. First, the
regulatory agency must have devoted inadequate resources to
enforcement or must lack the sanctions needed to obtain an
economically appropriate level of compliance from regulated
firms. Second, private enforcement must promote a higher
level of compliance without costing more than its incremental
benefits.
In order to make these determinations in particular cases,
judges would have to measure and weigh numerous variables
that are usually inaccessible to courts - including the relative
costs of, incentives for, and effectiveness of public and private
enforcement. To perform such a calculus in each case would
be absurd: decisional costs would be high and the risk of error
substantial. Rules of thumb are required that can be applied
to decide individual cases. The following issues must be addressed in developing such rough guidelines:
(i) Whether the statutory norm promotes efficiency. The
first inquiry in evaluating whether a private right of action is
desirable under the production conception is whether the relevant statute promotes efficiency at all. Some statutes are
demonstrably aimed at doing so; certain antitrust laws are a
prime example. Other statutes promote - both in purpose
4 18
and in effect - goals other than the maximization of wealth.
Examples of statutes within the second category are laws forbidding discrimination against the handicapped and those protecting wilderness areas. These statutes are probably best regarded as regulations designed to advance noneconomic goals
- such as personal dignity or the preservation of areas free
or capacity to enforce a regulation. For example, the Hill-Burton Act conditions
federal construction grants for hospitals on the provision of free medical care to the
indigent. But there is no federal regulatory body to enforce this requirement once the
hospital has been constructed.

Courts have thus created private rights of action

against the hospitals. See, e.g., Saine v. Hospital Auth., 502 F.2d 1033 ( 5 th Cir.
1974); Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (ioth Cir. 1972). Creation of these rights
has been defended on the ground that it promotes public values. See Rosenblatt,
supra note 133.
418 For a catalogue of possible purposes of legislation, see Posner, Economics,
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 267
(r982). It is, of course, desirable to achieve the appropriate level of compliance with

such statutes at the lowest possible cost. But it is difficult for courts to determine the
appropriate level of compliance, and in this context neither private damage awards
nor injunctive remedies display the automatic efficiency-promoting characteristics of
damage actions in the context of externalities and forced wealth transfers.
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1296 1981-1982

1982)

PRIVATE RIGHTS

1297

from human domination. Under the production conception,
private actions brought to enforce statutes of this type should
presumptively be dismissed.
(2) Whether additional compliance with the relevant norm
is presumptively efficient. In most cases, it would not be
economically desirable to achieve ioo percent compliance with
regulatory norms. The incremental costs to firms (and hence
to society) of achieving higher levels of compliance often rise
rapidly; in most cases, these costs will at some point exceed
the incremental benefits of greater compliance. Private enforcement may push compliance beyond this social break-even
point. As we explain below, this result is not true of private
actions awarding compensatory damages, which tend automatically to promote a more efficient level of compliance by
4 19
taxing defendants for the costs they impose upon others.
Remedial injunctions, however, do pose serious dangers of
420
overdeterrence.
(3)Whether the benefits of additional compliance outweigh
enforcement costs. Even if the additional compliance produced
by private enforcement yields economic benefits, 42 1 these benefits must be compared with the costs of the enforcement
process itself - a comparison that is exceptionally difficult for
courts to make. But limiting plaintiffs to damage remedies
and requiring them to bear their own litigation expenses discourages lawsuits in which costs exceed social benefits.
(4)Whether private enforcement would generate serious
problems of overinclusiveness. It is a commonplace that statutory standards are often overinclusive because of empirical
and institutional obstacles to greater precision. 4 22 Private
plaintiffs may wish to exploit overinclusive - and therefore
economically inefficient - applications of statutory norms.
Private rights of action should accordingly be denied under
such overinclusive statutes unless statutory boundaries can be
trimmed appropriately by the courts.
419 See Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, ii J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
420 For comparative economic analysis of damages and injunctive remedies, see
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 159, at 1115-27; Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L.

REV. 1075, io88-9i (i98o). For illustrations of the difficulties in calibrating efficient
injunctions, see R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 72, at 233-55.
421 In addition to stimulating higher levels of compliance, damage remedies for

victims of regulatory violations could increase economic welfare by efficiently spreading risk. These benefits should be included in the calculus.
422 See Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 38-41; Stewart, supra note 13, at
1693-97.
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(5) Whether there is a need for consistency and coordination in norm enforcement. Nonuniform enforcement of a statutory standard might create economic distortions. For example, a regulatory crackdown aimed at certain categories of
firms in an industry could yield several undesirable results: the
closing of those firms, inefficient expansion of the remaining
firms, or both. Private rights of action create this danger
because they lead to decentralized enforcement that is uncoordinated, unpredictable, and sometimes inconsistent. 42 3 Decisions to initiate enforcement actions are left in the hands of
numerous individual litigants; statutory norms are interpreted
by widely scattered judges and juries; and appellate review
provides only limited assurance of consistency.
(6) The relative costs of private and public enforcement. If
private enforcement is substantially more costly than additional public enforcement, private rights of action should presumptively be denied. There is, however, scant basis for concluding that public enforcement is generally cheaper. 4 24 To be
sure, public enforcement may enjoy scale economies. But private enforcement can tap such economies through development
of a specialized plaintiffs' bar. Centralized public enforcement
may also involve diseconomies of scale, given multiple layers
of decision and review and the temptation to adopt overly
rigid norms in order to reduce administrative costs. In addition, private enforcement will often be less costly than public
enforcement when an injury is caused to discrete individuals
rather than to large groups. 425 Finally, the legislature may
-

for reasons unrelated to efficiency -

fail to provide addi-

tional public enforcement even though such enforcement is
economically desirable and is cheaper than private enforcement.

426

The safeguards achieved by requiring plaintiffs to bear
their own litigation expenses and by awarding compensatory
423 See, e.g., Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 8I,
90 (2d Cir. 1972).
424 The government might economize on enforcement costs by increasing sanctions

to offset reduced enforcement, see Landes & Posner, supra note 21, but that strategy
has costs of its own, see Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979).
425 See supra pp. 1275-76.
426 In this context, a right of initiation would be an ineffective remedy, for it

would not add to the resources allocated to enforcement. In addition, judicial decisions whether to devote additional resources to private enforcement -

by creating

private rights of action - are probably less vulnerable to political pressures unrelated
to efficiency than are legislative decisions on appropriations for public enforcement.
Creation of private rights of action might thus be justified by a form of second-best
calculation, even if additional enforcement could be more cheaply produced by a

public authority than through private litigation.
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damages create what might be called a "victim compensation
hedge" protecting against overdeterrence and excessive enforcement costs. Because common law damage remedies were
generally aimed at compensation for spillovers and forced
wealth transfers, 4 27 they embody the victim compensation
hedge. If private rights of action were limited to enforcement,
through damage remedies, of regulatory norms that resemble
common law norms, such actions would similarly promote
production.
The victim compensation hedge operates somewhat differently in the two classes of norms involved: prevention of socially costly spillovers and prevention of forced wealth transfers. In the case of spillovers such as pollution, a private
damage remedy forces defendants to "internalize" the social
costs of activity that violates the regulatory norm. 4 28 Subject
to minor qualifications, 42 9 award of compensation to victims
is unlikely to lead to overdeterrence. By hypothesis, defendant's violation has not been deterred and has resulted in
social costs. The award of damages to those who actually
incur those costs (assuming damages are properly computed)
will provide incentives for defendants to maintain an efficient
level of compliance. 430 The danger of excessive enforcement
is small: 4 3 1 before a rational plaintiff will sue, the social costs
sought to be internalized (expected damage awards) must exceed the plaintiff's expected litigation costs. This calculation
tends to ensure that the social benefits of private enforcement
43 2
exceed its costs.
427 Externalities could, of course, be viewed as a form of coerced wealth transfer.
428 This account assumes, of course, that the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to be
free of defendant's invasions. See generally Kennedy, supra note 159 (arguing that all
cost-benefit analysis involves inherent value judgments).
429 One qualification is that the plaintiff, or a third party, might be able to reduce
the social costs associated with defendant's and plaintiffs activity more cheaply than
could the defendant. See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
205 (1973). But such situations are relatively rare in the context of the classic criminal
prohibitions and could be made the subject of affirmative defenses.
430 If the benefits of activity to the defendant outweigh its social costs, an order
to compensate the plaintiff will not cause a defendant to change his conduct, at least
in the short run. The internalization of the costs will, however, be partially reflected
in the higher price at which the regulated entity will sell its goods and services - an
efficiency-promoting market signal. This signal may lead to output changes, which
would be desirable from the standpoint of the production conception. See Shavell,
Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
431 Moreover, a system in which the victim has a monopoly on private enforcement
avoids many of the potential costs in a competitive system. See Landes & Posner,
supra note 21, at 21-22.
432 This generalization ignores a number of complicating factors, including the
defendant's litigation expenses, settlement incentives, and court costs. See Shavell,
supra note 419. Further, the social benefit of "taxing" the defendant may not be
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In the context of forced wealth transfers resulting from
trespass, fraud, abuse of fiduciary trust, or exercise of market
power, the damage remedy taxes the transferred wealth to the

extent of the victim's loss. 433 This loss will normally not equal

the overall social costs associated with the violation, which
will include such costs as increased insecurity. But the remedy
should deter such transfers unless the transferred resources
434
would be far more valuable in the hands of the wrongdoer,
and - for reasons similar to those in the case of spillovers
it should not
result in overdeterrence or excessive enforce5
ment

costS.

43

Although private victim compensation remedies do guard
against excessive enforcement, they do not eliminate the problem of underenforcement; particularly if the harms inflicted
are diffuse and individually small, litigation costs may deter
private actions even though higher compliance levels would be
efficient. 4 36 But the alternative of injunctions raises problems
of overdeterrence so serious that a grant of injunction will
often be held inappropriate in the case of sporadic forced
wealth transfers
and spillovers that are isolated or costly to
437
correct.
2. Applications: The Record of Judicial Decisions. In
this Section, we apply the six criteria identified above to the
historical development of private rights of action, and attempt
to derive rules of thumb for identifying cases in which creation
of such rights is likely to promote efficiency.
(a) Victim CompensationRemedies for Criminal Violations.
The classic example of a judicially created private right of
action is a common law decision to extend civil damage remedies to a person injured by the violation of a criminal statute
equivalent to the amount of the tax. The gains in efficiency obtained by virtue of the
tax "signal" may be less than the amount of the damage award, and hence less than

plaintiffs litigation costs.
433 This generalization ignores several complications introduced by variations in

the measure of damages.
434 Criminal and injunctive sanctions will also be available, but they may not be
sought - and courts may decline to impose them - when the forced transfer works
a clear net social benefit.
435 Note, however, that the expected recovery is unlikely to be identical to the
social benefits of private enforcement. See supra note 432.

436 It does not appear that courts could resolve this problem by abandoning the
victim compensation hedge - for example, by awarding multiple damages - without
creating serious dangers of overdeterrence or excessive enforcement costs. For a
discussion of the effects of the treble damage provision in the antitrust area, see 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 311a-3iib (1978).

437 Spillovers resulting from continuing activity could lend themselves to injunctive
remedies; the judicial practice of "balancing the equities" helps to eliminate the danger
of resulting inefficiencies. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 72, at 233-47.
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designed to protect a class of which he is a member. 438 In this
context, the argument that the legislature has made careful
calibrations to ensure a particular level of compliance is unpersuasive, both because of the enormous discretion afforded
in the criminal enforcement process and because the prosecutor
enforces hundreds of statutes for which he generally receives
funding on a lump-sum basis.
Moreover, the six efficiency-related criteria all normally
point in favor of private rights of action for victim compensation. Traditional criminal prohibitions parallel common law
entitlements; increased compliance with these prohibitions
tends to advance production. 43 9 The remedy is available only
to a limited beneficiary class for whom the costs of identifying
and proving harm will be comparatively low. Constitutional
strictures of overbroad criminal statutes reduce the danger of
overinclusiveness; similarly, procedural safeguards and overbreadth doctrines mitigate the need for coordinated enforcement by reducing the likelihood of inconsistent application.
And the victim compensation hedge serves to limit overdeterrence and excessive enforcement costs.
(b) Victim Compensation Actions Under Regulatory Statutes. - After the creation of regulatory agencies, litigants
often sought victim compensation remedies for violations of
regulatory prohibitions. Under the production conception,
however, this extension is not always desirable; private enforcement of regulatory statutes is less likely to be efficient
than is private enforcement of criminal statutes. Because the
stigma associated with regulatory violations is less than that
associated with crimes, society is willing to tolerate overinclusive regulatory standards. Moreover, overbreadth is inevitable
when agencies are given responsibility to supervise an entire
sector of the economy under changing conditions. Finally,
unlike the criminal law, regulation is often prompted by the
need for coordinated and centralized enforcement; decentralized private enforcement undercuts that goal.
Courts have been sensitive to these problems. They tend
to refuse to create private rights of action when broadly
phrased regulatory statutes delegate "planning" responsibility,
require specialized experience and resources for implementation, or necessitate coordinated enforcement. 440 When broad
43s See supra p. 1206; see also, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41
N.W. 543 (1889) (failure to perform statutory duty gives rise to liability for injuries
to those whom statute was designed to protect).
439 See R. POSNER, supra note

8i, §§

7.1-.6.

See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975)
(Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Na440
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regulatory norms resemble those of the common law, however,
courts handle overinclusiveness not by denying private
rights
441
of action, but by narrowing applicable standards.
Courts have been guided to these results by the same criteria applied in creating private rights of action under criminal
statutes. These criteria limit private actions to situations in
which (i) the statute imposes a standard of conduct for the
special benefit of a class to which plaintiff belongs; (2) the
plaintiff suffers harm from the defendant's violation of the
standard; and (3) the plaintiffs harm is of the type that the
statute was designed to prevent. 44 2 These private enforcement
criteria, which create an entitlement in the plaintiff and a
corresponding duty in the defendant, are most likely to be
satisfied by regulatory statutes similar to criminal or common
4 43
law prohibitions of spillovers and forced wealth transfers.
When the criteria are met, private rights of action will simultaneously promote efficiency and protect individual entitlements. Rights of action are thus akin to the traditional defense
rights in the context of regulation; both integrate the entitlement and production conceptions by enforcing dyadic rightduty obligations similar to those created by the common law.
(c) The Supreme Court's Reassessment. - During the past
fifteen years, the lower federal courts have greatly expanded
the availability of private rights of action under regulatory
statutes. In some cases they have created rights of action in
situations that superficially appeared to satisfy private enforcetional Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Rail Passenger Service Act of
197o); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (Motor Carrier Act of
1935); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(i95i) (Federal Power Act); Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., 570 F.2d 1138 (3 d Cir. 1977)
(Natural Gas Act), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970 (1978); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers
Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Federal Trade Commission Act); Connecticut
Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 8i (2d Cir. 1972) (Rivers and

Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899). Alternatively, courts have relied on the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction to dismiss or defer decision of private actions under regulatory
statutes. See supra note 407.
441 The most obvious example is judicial interpretation of the antifraud provisions
of the securities laws. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
442 See supra pp. 1300-01.
443 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. i85, 196 (1976) (acknowledging
civil remedy under Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § io(b), which prohibits use

of manipulative or deceptive devices in securities trading); Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (i916) (violation of federal statute requiring use of safety devices

by railroads gives rise to a private damage action). See generally Frankel, Implied
Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553 (i98I) (acknowledging problems of overdeterrence and economic waste in private litigation under the securities laws, but claiming

that the Supreme Court has overreacted by undermining private rights of action even
when plaintiff suffers substantial individual injury).
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ment criteria, but that in fact lacked the efficient self-regulating properties of the common law damage action. 4 44 In recent
decisions the Supreme Court has severely restricted the availability of private remedies in a wide variety of regulatory
contexts, 4 45 including election campaign regulation, 446 provision of passenger train service, 44 7 and financial rescue operations for brokerage houses. 4 48 These decisions apparently reflect a general perception that the expansion of private rights
of action, in association with the proliferation of regulation
during the past fifteen years, has resulted in overdeterrence
and excessive enforcement costs. They can also be understood
as a specific reaction to erosion of the victim compensation
hedge resulting from the extension of private rights of action
to new situations that do not in fact satisfy private enforcement
criteria.
449
illusThe landmark decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak

trates this erosion. The plaintiff, a shareholder, sought
damages from the corporation and its directors. Plaintiff alleged that management had secured shareholder approval of
a disadvantageous merger by distributing a misleading proxy
statement in violation of the Securities Exchange Act. The
Court found an implied right of action for damages under the
Act.
Borak and other "informed market" cases do not fit within
the traditional structure of private law entitlements: they impose liability not to provide individual victims redress for
forced wealth transfers, 450 but to ensure the efficient operation
4 51
of the market system as a whole - a diffuse collective good.
444 One respect in which these cases depart from the common law model is that
many private rights of action, particularly those in the area of securities and financial
regulation, are brought as derivative suits or class actions. Because lawyers interested
in legal fees play a large role in initiating and sustaining such actions, the cases
display features of a competitive enforcement system, including seemingly wasteful
conflicts among rival counsel seeking control over a potential recovery. The discipline
of the victim compensation hedge on enforcement has been further eroded by the
possibility that a corporation will be required to pay plaintiffs' litigation expenses for

a derivative suit even if no damages are recovered. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (I97O).
445 See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (181); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. II (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 56o (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
446 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (I975).
447 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
448 Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
449 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
450

421

U.S. 412 (1975).

See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.

512

(E.D. Pa. 1946).

451 See Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442
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The social costs of the defendants' distribution of misleading
information include allocational inefficiencies in the capital
market resulting from reliance on that information and deterrence to investment resulting from the increased risk of such
reliance. The challenged conduct often involves omissions
rather than falsehoods. Judgments of causation are hazardous.
In the case of a class action, damage awards may be huge
sums that far exceed social costs45 2 and that do not equal
wealth forcibly transferred from the plaintiffs to the defendants. The damages awarded often dwarf the defendants'
gains. By circumventing the victim compensation hedge,
Borak thus presents a serious threat of overdeterrence and
excessive enforcement costs. 453 This threat is even more dramatic in actions seeking to recover damages from accountants,
target companies and their directors, inside traders, and tippees - all of whom have some responsibility for maintaining
an informed and efficient capital market. 4 54
The Supreme Court has responded to these developments
by denying private rights of action altogether, 45 5 or by limiting
them through arbitrary statutory interpretation that reflects the
formalist thesis. 45 6 Not content to reinstate the traditional
U.S. 56o (1979); Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978),
vacated, 444 U.S. 959 (r979); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156
(gth Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
452 The amount of a particular plaintiffs damages, based on the changes in the
value of his own stock, bears little relation to such social costs. The judicial system,
however, is not well suited to measuring these costs, and it has limited flexibility to
abandon conventional measures of liability. Although the damages in classic forcedwealth-transfer cases do not equal the social costs of the transfers, the relatively
limited and foreseeable character of the damages awarded is an important brake on
overdeterrence and excess enforcement costs. This brake is lacking in many current
cases in which courts are called upon to create private rights of action.
453 Rather than deny rights of action, some courts have tried to mitigate this threat
by imposing various restrictions on damage awards in an attempt to approximate
social costs. See, e.g., Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th
Cir. 1978), vacated, 444 U.S. 959 (1979); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). But such restrictions are apt to be quite
arbitrary. See supra note 452.
454 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Such suits are brought, not on behalf of those
who have dealt with the defendants, but by investors who claim that their decisions
to purchase or sell were prejudiced by market information or price signals that were
distorted by the defendants' conduct.
455 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 56o (1979); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
456 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11 (i979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. I85 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (i975).
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common law criteria for creation of private rights of action, 4 s 7
the Court has instead restricted private actions to statutes
whose language singles out a class of statutory beneficiaries
and explicitly confers on them a right to be free of specified
conduct. 458 These restrictions have not been confined to cases
involving diffuse social harms. In TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 45 9 for example, the Court denied
a private right of action for damages under the securities laws
to redress injuries caused by fiduciary self-dealing - a classic
example of coerced wealth transfer that falls within the victim
compensation hedge.
From the viewpoint of production, this overreaction is regrettable, 4 60 if understandable. On balance, however, the
practical significance of the Court's new approach may be
small, for it is increasingly difficult to satisfy even the traditional criteria when regulatory schemes become pervasive and
must adjust to the dynamics of complicated economic and
social systems. These conditions require statutory norms that allow considerable flexibility in regulating conduct; such norms are
unlikely to satisfy even the traditional criteria for recognizing private rights of action, because they rarely create bipolar rightduty legal relations. 46 1 This is yet another example of the
formal-functional dilemma, and of the limited capacity of courts
to provide correctives for deficient administrative performance.

457 See supra pp. 1301-02.
458

See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (I98i); Northwest Airlines v.

Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu,
450 U.S. 754 (1q8i); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (979); Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, the Court stated that it

would imply a private right of action under statutory language that "expressly identifies the class Congress intended to benefit" - language that "contrasts sharply with
statutory language customarily found in criminal statutes ...

and other laws enacted

for the protection of the general public." Id. at 690 (footnote omitted); cf. Texas
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (i981) (characterizing statutes that
merely ban specified conduct as regulations intended to benefit the public at large);
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (I981) (same). The Court's new approach
will, of course, lead to fewer implied rights of action.
459 444 U.S.

II (1979).
460 See Frankel, supra note 443.
461 For example, automobile emissions standards are constantly readjusted in
response to changing assessments of technology, cost, and other factors such as
dependence on oil imports. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 72, at 406-10.

Similarly, the partial deregulation of broadcasting, including the loosening of restrictions on cable television, has proceeded by small, irregular steps. NATIONAL ASS'N
OF BROADCASTERS,
PREVIEW OF

BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: A REVIEW OF 1981 AND A

1982, at vii-xi, I-II

(1982).

To impose a dyadic right-duty structure of

legal relations upon such enterprises would be procrustean.
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As we have seen, the pervasiveness of regulation also un46 2
dermined the entitlement justification for rights of defense.
When that justification became unworkable, the production
conception remained, animating a technocratically oriented
"hard look" approach to rights of defense. With private rights
of action, courts have responded to the same problems very
differently, adopting instead a formal version of the entitle463
ment conception.
This difference in the evolution of the two remedies reflects
both the different identities of the litigants in the two types of
cases and the institutional limitations of the courts. In right
of defense cases, the preregulation market is presumed to operate productively; this presumption supports "hard look" review to limit the imposition of regulatory burdens. No comparable guide to the advancement of production is available
when courts confront plaintiffs seeking enforcement of regulatory norms. Moreover, as we have seen, 464 courts lack the
capacity to gather and analyze data that are needed to gauge
4 65
the economic benefits of increased regulatory protection.
Courts are thus institutionally ill equipped to determine
whether economic welfare would be improved by creating private rights of action in particular situations.
The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have,
however, continued to recognize private rights of action when
litigants have challenged discrimination (against minoritygroup members, 4 66 women, 4 67 or the handicapped 4 68 ), protested the failure to pay minimum wages or to provide ade462 See supra pp. 1246-48, 1250-52.
463 In two respects, the Supreme Court's formal, linguistic approach to private

rights of action is inconsistent with a production rationale. First, in the context of
prohibitions of spillovers and forced wealth transfers, damage actions may promote
efficiency under a statutory tort approach even if the linguistic criteria are not satisfied.
The Court has, however, denied private rights of action in such cases. See, e.g.,

Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615
(ig8i); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. ii (1979).

Second, the courts have created private rights of action even when the applicable
regulations are not designed to promote efficiency and when the additional enforcement
generated by private rights of action may therefore be inefficient. See cases cited
infra notes 466-70. Thus, although the use of formal criteria is compatible in many
contexts with both a production and an entitlement approach to regulation, the
production conception alone cannot explain the formal approach.
464 See supra pp. 1275-78.
465 See supra pp. 1276-77; note 452.
466 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); NAACP v. Medical
Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
467 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
468 See Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. i98o); Davis v.
Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d II58 (4 th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1306 1981-1982

1982)

PRIVATE RIGHTS

1307

quate working conditions, 4 69 or sought to redress restriction of
voting rights. 470 These decisions do not seek to enhance production, for they involve norms whose enforcement often does
not promote efficiency; moreover, they present potentially severe problems of overinclusiveness and overdeterrence. The
decisions instead reflect a conception of entitlement that still
has a tenacious hold in the area of "personal rights."
D. Private Rights of Action Under an Entitlement
Conception
In this Section, we first examine the parallels and differences between private rights of action under regulatory statutes
on the one hand, and new-property hearing rights on the other.
We then discuss the question of judicial authority to create
private rights of action.
i. Parallelsand Differences Between Private Rights of Action and New-Property Hearing Rights. - In the previous
Section, we examined the obvious parallels (as well as the
often significant differences) between common law remedies
and private rights of action under regulatory statutes. The
similarities between new-property hearing rights and private
rights of action may be less obvious, but the two remedies are
nonetheless closely allied. The new-property hearing right protects recipients of certain statutory benefits, such as welfare
assistance, from arbitrary or discriminatory decisions by government officials to withhold those benefits. Private rights of
action protect different statutory beneficiaries - those dependent upon enforcement of regulatory laws. We have seen how
nondelegation, due process, and equal protection considerations account for judicial creation of new-property hearing
rights. 4 71 The same considerations support creation of private
rights of action to ensure that statutory entitlements to regulatory benefits are provided evenhandedly.
Like the new-property hearing right, the private right of
action presents a formal-functional dilemma for courts attempting to determine what benefits should be protected. For
reasons discussed in Part V, the courts have restricted newproperty hearing rights to cases in which the relevant statute
(8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v.
Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).

469 Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 ( 5 th Cir. 1969);
Jenkins v. S & A Chaissan & Sons, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Abraham
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 418 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Fagot v. Flintkote Co.,
305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969).
470 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).

471 See supra pp. 126o-63.
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formally confers individual entitlements to benefits. The Supreme Court has taken precisely the same route in the case of
private rights of action. The justifications for a formal approach are essentially the same as those in the new-property
context. In both situations, a formal approach relieves the
courts of a difficult task; it also limits protection to situations
in which the legislature has apparently concluded that a system
of entitlements is administrable.
Despite these parallels, the Supreme Court, until its recent
Logan decision, 4 72 had never explicitly accorded constitutional
protection to regulatory entitlements. New-property entitlements, by contrast, have enjoyed such protection for some
time. These differences in received doctrine may reflect two
potentially important differences between the two sets of remedies. First, new-property entitlements are characterized, at
least formally, by a bilateral relation between the government
and a statutory beneficiary. By contrast, the regulatory context involves a trilateral structure of legal relations among the
government, the regulatory beneficiary, and the regulated entity. In this trilateral structure, "state action" might be considered lacking when the government simply fails to undertake
enforcement action. 4 73 Second, regulatory benefits, unlike
new-property benefits, are frequently collective in nature.
To what extent do these differences explain the traditional
failure to treat regulatory benefits as entitlements deserving of
constitutional protection? To answer this 'question, we first
examine the related issue of constitutional protection for common law entitlements.
2. Violation of Common Law Entitlements by Private Parties. - If a government official violates or threatens to violate
certain common law rights, such as liberty of the person, due
process entitles the affected individual to a remedy that will
redress or prevent the violation. 4 74 There are two possible
472 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982).

473 The argument that we offer, see infra pp. 1308-11, depends on our conclusion
that state action may be present when the government has failed to furnish protection
against intrusion by third parties. Cases such as Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978), indicate that the Court has sometimes been unwilling to accept such
a broad approach. But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4247
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1982); cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (198o)
(not questioning presence of state action when state constitution protects rights of free
speech on shopping center property and thus permits private parties to enter onto the
property of other private parties).
474 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 65i (1977); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 6oi (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 6oo
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Traditionally, the remedy provided
was a right to damages against the government official. See, e.g., Miller v. Horton,
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theories for requiring due process safeguards in such a case.
Under the first and narrower theory, the due process clause
requires a hearing or other protection against legislatively unauthorized invasions by government officials of common law
rights to "liberty" or "property. ' 4 75 Under a second and
broader theory - which has support in both political history
and judicial precedent - the government is in some circumstances required to redress one citizen's violation of another's
common law rights, at least if the legislature has not authorized the violation. 4 76 Under this view, the government
would, for example, be obliged to furnish some remedy if one
person assaulted another. The commission of wrongs against
provided was a right to damages against the government official. See, e.g., Miller v.
Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. Ico (i8gi) (Holmes, J.). More recently, the standard
required by due process was a pre-deprivation hearing of some sort. In the past few
years, the doctrinal evolution has come full circle: the Supreme Court has held that
a damage remedy against officials satisfies due process in some circumstances. See
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (i98i); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 65I (I977).
475Authorization from the legislature is the ultimate "process due" for any governmental invasion of common law entitlements. When an isolated invasion occurs,
the due process clause accordingly demands a reliable process for determining whether
the particular invasion is among those authorized by a statute. Under this rationale,
the legislature would have broad latitude to abolish or limit common law entitlements
as long as it did so on some general basis. See supra pp. 1250-52.
476 This second rationale is more consonant with the contractarian political theory
out of which the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution emerged. The
view that protection by the government is a constitutional right has been echoed
frequently in constitutional history. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch)
137, 163 (1803); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3230) (Washington, Circuit Justice) (referring to "[p]rotection by the government" as
a privilege or immunity under art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution); CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th
Cong., ist Sess. 2542 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Bingham) (listing "the right to ... be
protected in life, liberty, and property" among rights protected by the 14th amendment).
The celebrated dialogue of Professor Hart, see Hart, supra note 226, might be
read to support the narrower view - that the due process clause extends only to
official and not to private deprivations of common law protected interests. But
Professor Hart was concerned with a different distinction - the distinction between
cases in which courts are called upon affirmatively to enforce government power, and
cases in which officials act without use of the courts and citizens then seek to redress
those acts. In Professor Hart's view, Congress can withdraw federal jurisdiction to
consider the legality of the government's action in the second class of cases, but not
in the first. See Hart, supra note 226, at 1374-79, 1386-87. Thus, Professor Hart
cannot be taken to support the narrow view; he simply takes an entirely different
approach to the problem.
But the availability of state court action as an alternative source of remedies emphasized throughout Professor Hart's dialogue - is relevant to our discussion.
That the state courts have generally been available to redress invasions by private
citizens of the rights of others has meant that the question whether government has
a constitutional obligation to provide such redress has rarely arisen. As a result, there
is little judicial learning that helps to select between the broader and narrower views.
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other citizens by individuals who happen to be government
officials is simply a special case of government failure to protect common law "liberty" and "property" rights. 47 7 The common law is consistent with the broad theory; it has enabled a
private citizen to protect his rights against fellow citizens including government officials, who were generally liable on
the same basis as were private persons unless they could show
legislative authorization for their conduct.
Now suppose that it is a private third party who invades
an individual's common law rights. If the third party can
invoke a principle of self-help endorsed by the government,
the third party is acting in an official capacity, for the state
has delegated to him the power to enforce the law. 4 78 Even

under the narrower theory, due process would require that the
victim be afforded a hearing at which the third party, as a
state actor, would be required to show legislative authorization
for his action. This hearing would typically take the form of
a common law action for damages by the victim. The victim
might also have a due process claim against the government
on the ground that the delegation of law enforcement authority
to citizens makes the protection of entitlements intolerably
uncertain and thus violates due process. The claim would be
closely analogous to contentions in new-property cases that
government procedures for the allocation of statutory benefits
are not sufficiently reliable.
But suppose there is no rule or practice permitting self-help
by citizens. The third party is then simply a naked lawbreaker, and under either theory the victim has no due process
rights against him. But under the broader theory, the victim
would have a due process claim against the government to
furnish reasonably accurate procedures for the protection of
entitlements against third parties. If the government failed to
provide any protections at all for entitlements, it would violate
its due process obligation to protect common law "liberty" and
"property" interests. 4 79 If the government does protect some
entitlements, but fails to protect others, it may violate equal

477 Cf. H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967) ("rights" are simply
derivatives of statutory and administrative instructions to government officials that
direct them to provide specified remedies in particular circumstances).
478 See L. TRIBE, supra note 268, §§ 18-3 to -7 (1978).
479 Governmental refusal to offer any protective mechanisms might be understood
as the abolition of all entitlements rather than the mere refusal of a remedy. This
view raises the substantive due process question of the legislature's authority to abolish

common law entitlements. See supra pp. 125o-52.
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protection as well as due process. 48 0 Such violations were
48 1
found in Logan.
Even if the government shut the doors of the courts to
private civil business, and thus foreclosed private enforcement,
it might meet its due process obligations by punishing or redressing violations of entitlements through criminal prosecutions or other forms of public enforcement. Under such a
system, the due process clause might require a relatively strong
right of initiation against prosecutors to ensure at least some
reliability in the protection of entitlements. As we have seen,
however, such a relatively strong right of initiation is undesirable to the extent that it relegates the allocation of scarce
public resources to private litigants and judges. 48 2 For this
reason, private civil actions, relator actions, and other privately initiated criminal prosecutions 48 3 can be understood as
a system of private rights of action - a system that represents
an alternative to initiation rights as a means of protecting
common law entitlements.
3. Due Process Protection of Regulatory Benefits. - Regulatory programs, as we have seen, are often designed to
provide more effective protection for common law entitlements. The previous Section analyzed the constitutional basis
for requiring government to protect those entitlements. That
analysis strongly suggests that counterpart interests in regulatory protection should enjoy similar constitutional safeguards
and that courts should create private remedies when necessary
to provide such protection.
At the very least, that analysis should dissolve the objection
that regulatory entitlements cannot be recognized because they
involve control of the conduct of third parties. The common
law itself is inevitably a trilateral set of relations among rightholders, duty-bearers, and government. The existence of that
trilateral relation has not inhibited the recognition of entitlements on the part of rightholders to government protection of
their rights against defaulting duty-bearers. Private rights of
action or initiation, both of which are designed to redress
regulatory violations by regulated entities, simply engraft the
trilateral structure of the common law onto a system of stat480 Individuals disfavored under such rules or practices could, like welfare claimants or discharged employees, challenge the procedures on the ground that they
introduce the sort of unreliability and unchecked official discretion in the protection
of entitlements that due process is designed to prevent.
481 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., So U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, l982).
482 See supra pp. 1282-83.
483 See supra pp. 1267-68.
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utory lawmaking. Accordingly, due process :protection for regulatory beneficiaries should not be denied simply because such
protection will involve other private parties, 48 4 The Supreme
Court thus erred in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center,485 when it indicated that due process protections should
rarely apply when the impact of a government decision on a
person is "indirect" because it is a consequence of government
action against third persons. 4 86 That error has been corrected
(albeit without acknowledgment) by Logan.
The fact that regulatory benefits can be produced only by
altering the conduct of third parties assumes greater significance, however, when linked with the fact that regulatory
benefits are often collective. By contrast, common law and
new-property remedies secure benefits that are predominantly
private. Because the goals of regulatory policies are collective,
it is often hard to show a close link between those policies and
the welfare of a particular individual. 487 Moreover, private

484 Indeed, one might argue that new-property benefits are ultimately trilateral,
because their financing is generally provided by taxpayers. The nature of the treasury
as a common fisc, as well as the legal rules that have developed to exclude standing
for taxpayers, has obscured this trilateral character.
48' 447 U.S. 773 (i98o).
486 In O'Bannon, nursing home residents receiving Medicaid assistance claimed
that they were entitled to a hearing before the home in which they resided was
"decertified." The consequence of decertification was that the residents would be
transferred to another home. According to the Court, the transfer was merely an
"indirect" product of government action taken against and with respect to a third
party - the nursing home. The Court offered no explanation for this conclusion, nor
did it explain why the indirect nature of the impact was relevant to the due process
question. In a significant footnote, the Court stated that it did not "hold that a person
may never have a right to a hearing before his interests may be indirectly affected by
government action." Id. at 789 n.22.
O'Bannon may have been correctly decided. The Court noted that "the Government is enforcing its regulations against the home for the benefit of the patients as a
whole and the home itself has a strong financial incentive to contest its enforcement
decision." Id. This more limited rationale provides a plausible basis for the O'Bannon
result. As Justice Blackmun elaborated, the nursing home was apparently an effective
functional representative of the interests of its residents, and an additional hearing for
the residents might therefore have been unnecessary. Id. at 790-805 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). A different analysis must be applied when the interests of the third party
are totally different from those of the statutory beneficiary. Such a conflict occurs by
definition in the context of private rights of action. O'Bannon is thus inapplicable in
the ordinary context of regulatory benefits, as the Court recognized in Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982).
487 In addition to providing benefits that are private rather than collective, statutes
defining the terms under which welfare payments or employment is to be provided
are frequently more specific than are regulatory statutes. Cf. Ehrlich & Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (6974) (discussing the
conditions under which greater specificity or greater generality of legal rules is the
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rights of action might allow particular litigants to dictate regulatory policies that affect the welfare of many others, and
thus to short-circuit collective processes for adjusting regula48 8
tory controls.
But these difficulties can be minimized by limiting private
rights of action to statutes that grant individuals formal entitlements to regulatory protection. The Supreme Court has
followed such a course. Indeed, the logic of the common law
and of the new-property hearing cases suggests that protection
48 9
for such formal entitlements is constitutionally compelled.
Such protection could be afforded through either a right of
initiation or a private right of action. As we have seen, however, protection of regulatory entitlements through initiation
rights presents serious difficulties. 490 A private right of action
against the regulated firm thus serves as an alternative means
of securing due process protection for regulatory entitlements.
By creating such rights, judges and court officials themselves
carry out the government's obligation to protect such entitlemore efficient choice). Legislatures have faced stronger political incentives to adopt
specific statutory controls in the welfare payment context, because such payments
involve a conspicuous outlay of social resources, whereas regulation (at least until
recently) has not. With developing awareness of the costs imposed by regulatory
statutes, legislatures have drafted some of those statutes more specifically. See R.
STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 72, at 325-554.
488 The distinction between regulatory benefits and new-property benefits should
not be overdrawn. Even though benefits such as welfare payments or employment
may be statutorily defined in individual and nominally formal terms, there are operational interdependencies among beneficiaries because of budget limitations and bureaucratic management of such resources on a "mass justice" basis. See J. Mashaw,
supra note 185. Flexibility in adjusting such benefits in light of changing circumstances may be as important here as in the regulatory context. But because individual
new-property benefits are more readily defined in formal terms than are collective
regulatory benefits, courts will more frequently impose their own procedures to ensure
that new-property benefits are provided.
489 See Logan, So U.S.L.W. 4247. It is, however, more difficult to establish an
individual entitlement to regulatory protection. See supra pp. 1271-75. For example,
it would ordinarily be quite difficult for a plaintiff to prove that he would have
benefited had officials undertaken certain regulatory initiatives. See Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-44 (1976). In the welfare assistance context,
by contrast, the slip between official duty and private benefit is much easier to
ascertain. Similarly, a regulated firm can readily show that it would benefit if regulatory controls were not enforced against it.
490 To the extent that a court perceives "capture" of a regulatory agency by
regulated or client entities, it may be willing to infer a strongly responsive right of
initiation to protect a beneficiary interest. The situation is analogous to a conspiracy
between a government official and a private individual to violate common law entitlements. Such a perception may explain decisions like Adams v. Richardson, 480
F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam), and Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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ments, rather than derivatively enforcing them against admin491
istrative officials.
Despite this logic, courts creating private rights of action
have not based their decisions on the due process clause.
There are two basic explanations for this phenomenon. First,
statutory entitlements to regulatory protection are constitutionally protected in only three limited situations. One instance,
exemplified by Logan, is that presented when a statute creates
a formal entitlement by specifically granting an individual a
right to a particular form of regulatory protection. 492 But
statutes that grant such entitlements are quite rare. 4 93 Certain

common law rights, such as the interest in bodily integrity,
are
4 94 If
also constitutionally entitled to government protection.
common law remedies for protection of such interests were
totally preempted by a regulatory scheme, some kind of private
remedy

-

such as a private right of action -

might be

495
required in order to ensure the protection of those rights.
But such preemption occurs infrequently. 4 96 Finally, some
interests protected by regulatory norms - such as the right to
be free from racial discrimination - are today accepted as so
important functionally that they are also entitled to constitutional protection. 49 7 But few other interests have achieved
that status.
491 Note that the distinction between rights of initiation and rights of action
vanishes at common law because the two coalesce into one action. The private lawsuit is both the assertion by the plaintiff of an entitlement against the defendant (a
private right of action) and the assertion against government officials - the judges
- of a right of initiation. But we are understandably disposed to view the primary
responsibility for enforcing a regulatory entitlement as resting with administrative
officials and not with judges. Under this view, the right of initiation properly consists
of a hearing at which an administrative agency is requested to protect the asserted
entitlement, followed by judicial review if the agency falls to do so.
492 Logan, 5o U.S.L.W. at 4249-51. However, a substantial showing that legitimate state interests are secured by the failure to provide procedural protection will be
sufficient to justify denial of a remedy if the interest at stake does not receive
protection under a functional approach. See id. at 4251; supra p. 1265.
493 Indeed, the statute at issue in Logan was amended to eliminate the entitlement
almost immediately after commencement of the lawsuit. See 5o U.S.L.W. at 4248
n.i.; supra note 395.
494 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (x977).
495 Professor Hart pointed to this conclusion in his famous dialogue. Hart, supra
note 226, at 1384-85.
496 For an example of such preemption, albeit one in which an adequate quid pro
quo was provided, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S.
59 (r978).
497 Although the decisions creating private rights of action to redress discrimination
technically turn on statutory interpretation and are not couched in constitutional
terms, their rhetoric makes clear that they are acting in response to a norm of great
power. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (969); cases cited
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The second reason that courts have not resorted to due
process reasoning in right of action cases is that other remedies
are usually available. 498 As we have noted, common law remedies are typically not preempted. Invoking the entitlement
conception, federal courts may create private rights of action
as a matter of federal common law. State courts can also use
their own common law power to create rights of action. Furthermore, statutes often provide remedies for their own enforcement. Finally, a private right of initiation may be available. 4 99 Only if the legislature ruled out all such remedies

would courts be required to face the constitutional issue, and
5 00
such preclusion is extremely rare.
Like the other remedies we have examined, private rights
of action are a partial and imperfect remedy for defective
administrative performance. The remedy is limited to violations of statutorily defined entitlements and may therefore fail
to protect important private interests; the remedy creates a
danger that legislative and administrative management of regulatory programs will be disrupted by the initiatives of judges
and private litigants; and the remedy depends on private resources for financing. Nonetheless, private rights of action
represent a justifiable effort by courts to draw upon the entitlement conception in order to carry forward their traditional
responsibility of safeguarding individual security and private
ordering.
4. Conclusion.

-

There are significant parallels between

judicial protection of statutory beneficiaries through new-propsupra notes 466-67; cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Civil
Rights Act of 1866 bars private as well as public racial discrimination in the sale or
rental of property).
498 A further reason that courts have not invoked due process may be that private
rights of action do not fit the contemporary picture of a due process remedy - an

administrative hearing with judicial review. As the Court has recently recognized,
however, damage remedies are alternative means of satisfying due process require-

ments. See Parratt v. Taylor, 45! U.S. 527 (i98i); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
65i (1977). These decisions may focus attention on the constitutionality of doctrines
of official immunity that preclude damage remedies for official harms when no ade-

quate alternative remedy is available. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

499 The private right of initiation is typically weak when statutory norms are weak
or conflicting, but in such cases the criteria of entitlement are unlikely to be met.
When the formal or functional criteria of entitlement are fully met, a relatively strong
right of initiation would be required to satisfy due process. Courts may, however, be
reluctant to grant such a right for fear of disrupting an agency's management of
limited enforcement resources. In such cases, creation of a private right of action may
be preferable.

Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (upholding

private right of action).
S0o See supra note 496.
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erty hearing rights and protection through private rights of
action. In both contexts, the entitlement conception accounts
for judicial intervention into the administrative process. Moreover, the Supreme Court has relied in both situations primarily
on a formal test that makes the availability of judicial protection turn on whether Congress has imposed constraints on
agency discretion to define and distribute the benefit in question.
Like all the administrative remedies considered in this Article, the right of action exhibits a two-tiered structure. Judicial creation of private rights of action should ordinarily be
understood as a justifiable exercise of federal common law.
The entitlement conception and associated due process considerations serve to justify judicial creation of private rights of
action when regulatory statutes grant common-law-like protection to an identifiable beneficiary class and the legislature has
not expressly precluded private rights of action. In a few
instances, however, the beneficiary interest - a formal entitlement to regulatory protection, a "core" common law interest,
or a widely accepted functional entitlement - will be sufficiently powerful to require that a right of action or initiation
be provided as a matter of due process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to remove some of the
doctrinal and conceptual partitions that have traditionally separated the four remedies for deficient administrative performance: private rights of initiation, private rights of action,
rights of defense, and new-property hearing rights. With the
ground thus cleared, we are able to begin an assessment of the
remedies in relation to three questions: (i) whether courts have
the authority to create such remedies; (2) why such remedies
have had different histories and doctrinal foundations, and
why they have each been associated with a particular conception of institutional purpose; and (3) whether and in what
circumstances such remedies will improve administrative performance.
In evaluating the authority of courts to order these four
remedies, we have been confronted with a puzzle. The remedies are quite similar: each is a means of correcting faulty
agency decisions. Yet while two of these remedies - rights
of defense and new-property hearing rights - have been created by the courts with only an occasional ripple of criticism,
the other two have been sharply attacked as usurpations of
legislative authority. We believe that this difference in reacHeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1316 1981-1982
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tion is more the product of historical accident than of thoughtful analysis and that the four remedies must stand or fall
together on the basic question of judicial authority. Each
should be seen as a response to the displacement of common
law ordering by administrative regimes. Each represents part
of a judicial effort to maintain, in an administrative era, aspects of traditional arrangements of public and private law.
The formalist thesis would forbid such remedial creativity.
Although that thesis suffers from fatal logical and operational
infirmities, it is grounded in powerful separation-of-powers
concerns: because it is for Congress to determine the substance
of administrative programs and because questions of implementation are inseparable from those of substance, Congress
should enjoy broad authority over implementation. That authority is improperly invaded when a court responds to a
statutory violation by creating remedies not provided in the
statute itself. Courts thus have no power to intervene in order
to promote production, to protect what the courts regard as
entitlements, or to overrule congressional decisions concerning
values that the public ostensibly supports. When litigants
challenge state administrative programs, considerations of federalism dictate a similar conclusion.
These arguments have been most forcefully directed against
private rights of action, but all four of the remedies are vulnerable. In our view, the four remedies are nonetheless valid
forms of judicial lawmaking. When Congress is simply silent
on the question of remedies for defective administrative performance, that silence cannot automatically be read to negate
judicial authority to create such remedies. Silence is inarticulate in the absence of background understandings that give
it meaning. The conceptions that we have identified - entitlement, production, and public values - provide that meaning by helping courts to determine when it is appropriate to
create private remedies and by providing the background understandings that justify judicial creation of remedies in the
absence of express textual warrant. The threads that connect
electoral representation and administrative decisions are too
slender to support the separation-of-powers objections to such
a judicial role.
Each remedy represents a reaction to the displacement of
traditional public and private law by administrative regimes.
Accordingly, each seeks to harmonize traditional norms with
new institutions. The right of defense protects the system of
private exchange and production from ill-considered government controls and simultaneously disciplines the exercise of
administrative discretion. The new-property hearing right
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maintains, in a welfare state, a measure of the economic and
personal security afforded in an earlier era by private law
entitlements. The private right of action seeks to furnish similar security in the context of regulatory programs. Finally, in
order to promote bureaucratic fidelity to the public values
embodied in regulatory programs, the private right of initiation
provides citizens with a partial substitute for the traditional
system of electoral representation.
This process of judicial lawmaking cannot be validated by
any single knockdown proof. Its justification rests on an
amalgam of concerns, including the desirability of enforcing
statutory limits on official discretion, the need for judicial
checks in a system of separated powers, and the importance
of personal security. These factors, which are the classic underpinnings of the Rule of Law, are constitutionally recognized
in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. We have explored this amalgam of factors most fully
in the context of new-property hearing rights. The same factors, however, have for three hundred years supported the
presumption of review upon which the right of defense was
built, and have also justified the creation of private rights of
action through traditional judicial practices. With a suitable
adjustment of emphasis, the same considerations support the
more recent development of initiation rights.
On the other hand, the case for judicial creation of beneficiary remedies is weakened by the absence of any definitive
constitutional basis for such remedies and the plenary power
of Congress over the substance of administrative programs.
These considerations suggest that the four remedies are not
constitutionally mandated, except in those rare cases involving
interests - like bodily integrity, subsistence, or freedom from
discrimination - on whose importance there is deep social
consensus, or in cases in which the legislature has explicitly
created formal entitlements to statutory benefits or immunities.
Under this two-tiered structure, most of the cases in which
courts create remedies for deficient administrative performance
50l
represent federal common law that Congress may displace.
To some, this structure will appear an unduly fragile status
for judicial safeguards of private security and public accountability. The conclusion that the four remedies are not ordinarily compelled by the Constitution must, however, be qual501 The tunnel vision that is built into each of the remedies is itself a reason not
to conclude that the four remedies are constitutionally required. Each remedy has a
valuable core of insight into institutional purpose, but in an administrative state none
can ordinarily be considered indispensable.
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ified with the expectation that legislatures will not arbitrarily
bar such remedies. The historic elements of due process of
law that were created by English courts have always been
vulnerable to the overarching power of Parliament. 0 2 Not
every judicial norm must be constitutionalized in order to have
enduring moral power.
Moreover, enthusiasm for judicial remedies must be tempered by an acknowledgment of their considerable limitations.
As we have emphasized, courts apprehend and implement only
a few of the various possible conceptions of institutional purpose. Because of the formal-functional dilemma and the difficulties faced by the courts in assessing complex regulatory
programs, the scope of judicial remedies must be limited in
order to avoid serious disruptions. Congress and the President
should therefore be encouraged to develop nonjudicial methods
for controlling administrative authority. The four remedies
have seen much service because the courts have responded to
those dissatisfied with the performance of particular agencies.
By contrast, Congress and the executive have on the whole
shown relatively little interest in administrative performance
or in ways of improving it, even though the goals of the judgemade remedies might in many instances be better served by
50 3
other means that only Congress or the President can devise.
In addition to examining the question of judicial authority
to create the four remedies, we have discussed why these
remedies have had such distinct doctrinal structures and fields
of application. We have shown how each of the four different
administrative law "forms of action" has developed and how
each has joined a particular party structure, a particular administative function, and a particular conception of institutional purpose.
Under the traditional model of administrative law, the right
of defense was founded on a system of private common law
rights against which regulatory controls could be measured
and checked. The right of defense was thus based on an
entitlement conception, although its application might also ad502 But see M. SHAPIRO, COURTS, ch. 3 (198o) (in Britain, administrative functions
are substantially insulated from judicial review).
503 For example, reliance on an external system of judicial review through an
adversary process may serve production less well than a system of agency decision
that relies on negotiations or expert consensus, internal administrative review by
economists and policy analysts, or basic changes in regulatory tools. See B. ACKERmAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 147-61 (1974); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and

Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (981); Sunstein, supra note 53. Congress and the President can provide and enforce such
remedies; the courts ordinarily cannot.
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vance production by limiting the extent of governmental intervention. When regulatory controls became pervasive and
deep, however, the entitlements defined by the common law
could no longer function as standards by which to judge particular regulatory actions. Judicial review invoked by regulated firms has therefore turned to questions of technological
and economic feasibility. Despite various forms of market
failure, preservation of private market ordering is presumed
to favor production. The result has been the emergence of
production as the dominant conception supporting the "hard
look" right of defense.
In the case of the private right of initiation, the regulatory
enterprise is understood to involve choice among, and reconciliation of, competing public values, with the ultimate decision normally resting with the agency. The initiation right is
justified as a means of assuring that all such values are considered in the regulatory process. In light of competing claims
on scarce agency resources, the necessity of flexibility in regulatory policy, and the difficulties faced by courts in determining the economic benefits of greater regulatory protection,
neither the conception of entitlement nor that of production
provides a feasible basis for initiation rights. The public values conception is thus the principal foundation for rights of
initiation.
Judicial creation of private rights of action has been based
on an entitlement conception. The context requires courts to
resolve controversies without the aid of a prior agency decision. This fact, together with the formal-functional dilemma,
has led the courts to limit the availability of private rights of
action to cases in which the regulatory statute creates a rightduty relation analogous to that created by common law entitlements. Such a limitation ensures that the benefit sought
will be individualized and capable of judicial assessment. Private lawsuits are a poor forum for reconciling the various
social norms involved in regulatory programs, The production
conception also fits many private rights of action poorly: under
most modern regulatory schemes, it is difficult for courts to
know whether creation of a particular private right of action
will promote economic welfare.
Analogous reasoning rules out a production or public values
foundation for new-property hearing rights, which have also
been based on an entitlement conception. Because of the formal-functional dilemma, new-property hearing rights have
generally been recognized only when the claimed benefits are
individual in character and when formal criteria of entitlement
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are met. The procedural safeguards of hearing and review are
used to ensure that the government honors these entitlements.
While recognizing the limitations of courts and of the forms
of action that they create, we conclude that courts have authority to create rights of action and rights of initiation. These
remedies should, we believe, stand with rights of defense and
new-property hearing rights as legitimate and useful correctives for deficient administrative performance.
The presumption in favor of review of administrative decisions should be extended to beneficiaries as well as to regulated entities, an extension that is achieved by countering
rights of defense with rights of initiation. Unless direct private
enforcement is clearly a preferable remedy, courts should generally recognize weakly responsive private rights of initiation.
On occasion, however, courts may be justified in viewing a
relevant public value - such as the government's responsibility to eliminate racial discrimination in federally supported
activities - as an overriding norm that compels enforcement
action through a strongly responsive initiation right.
Judicial creation of private rights of action is an alternative
method of protecting statutory interests. When the regulatory
statute creates a right-duty relation similar to those established
by the common law, courts may ordinarily provide private
remedies without exceeding their competence, subverting legislative control of regulatory policy, or contradicting any of
the reasons for the creation of an administrative enforcement
system. The common law analogy will not, however, support
private rights of action when a statutory norm is vague or
ambiguous, delegates broad managerial authority, or presents
a context in which coordination and consistency in regulatory
policy is important. A private right of initiation is more appropriate in such circumstances, 5 0 4 which will be common in
the modern regulatory setting.
We have explained that, without background understandings of institutional purpose, it is impossible to give content to
legislative silence on remedies or to determine in which circumstances particular remedies are appropriate. The three
conceptions of institutional purpose that we have identified are
504 A private right of initiation is also likely to be preferable to a right of action
in cases in which the courts are asked to provide systemic injunctive relief to restructure existing institutions. For example, in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. x (i98i), the plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted a private right of action
against a state mental health facility in an attempt to enforce statutory conditions on
federal financial assistance. An initiation right against the federal officials would have
been the preferable remedy.
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a means of liberating courts from the formalist thesis. Such
conceptions justify the judicial creation of remedies for defective administrative performance and, at the same time, guide
the process of judicial lawmaking by demarcating the larger
purposes that these remedies can serve.
But the conceptions are a form of bondage as well.
Grounded in eighteenth century principles of public and private law, they generate remedial regimes that are narrow and
often dysfunctional in an industrially developed polyarchy administered by bureaucracies. The traditional notions of private
and public law on which the three conceptions are bottomed
are not fully compatible with the administrative process. The
four paradigm remedies are thus partial and perhaps anachronistic approaches to inadequate agency performance. In this
sense, the four remedies suffer from shortcomings similar to
those presented by the common law forms of action in the
nineteenth century.
May it be possible to clear the ground and to develop a
single cause of action to remedy deficient administrative performance? If so, what form would that cause of action take?
Could it provide the foundation of a distinctive administrative
jurisprudence that would create a distinct realm for administrative agencies between the traditional poles of private and
public law? Could such a jurisprudence develop background
understandings of institutional purpose that were not borrowed
from traditional public and private law?
These questions we simply note, leaving to another day the
attempt to answer them. The hope of an affirmative answer
must, however, be tempered by two suspicions. The first is
that there is truly nothing new under our sun; perhaps we can
only recycle the original conceptions of private and public law
upon which our republic was founded and continues to endure.
The second is that the effort to collect every administrative
function of modern government under a single overarching
conception may simply be a Realist mistake. If we strip away
our traditional conceptions and remedial doctrines, we may be
left with a mass of discrete and disparate administrative activities, forfeiting the capacity to order them through law.
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